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Abstract
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE RECRUITTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
WITHIN “RELIGION-ABUSING TERRORIST NETWORKS”
By Hursit Ucak, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012
Major Director: William W. Newmann, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, L. Douglas
Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs
This study examines the motivation factors that make some individuals
(terrorists) confidential informants. The study is based on the assumptions of Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs and Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theories. Accordingly, main
assumption of the present study is that some individuals with unsatisfied needs in
religion-abusing terrorist (RAT) networks choose to become confidential informants to
satisfy their predominant needs. The main hypothesis for the purpose of this study is
“The individuals’ decision-making processes to cooperate with law enforcement
intelligence (LEI) as a confidential informant is affected by some motivation factors
during recruitment process.” The present study tests 27 hypotheses in order to answer
two main research questions. To meet its objectives the present study uses quantitative
research methodology, constructs a cross-sectional research design, and employs
secondary data analysis to test the hypotheses of the research questions.

xiii

A dataset was formed based on official records of Turkish National Police by
including all confidential informants within eight different RAT networks in Turkey. First,
individual effect of each motivation factor on being a confidential informant is tested
and discussed in detail. Then two group specific multivariate models for being an
informant in Al-Qaeda and Turkish-Hezbollah are illustrated, compared and contrasted.
Both bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses not only revealed the extent of
individual effects of motivations among RAT groups, but also helped us to build fitting
multivariate models that explain the probability of being informants in certain RAT
networks. By doing so, the present study aims to make contributions to the literature
and practice on this relatively unexplored phenomenon. Findings indicate that while
some motivation factors are common among all RAT networks, the strength and
direction of their effects vary among different RAT networks.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The end of cold war and advancements in technology created an illusion within
the intelligence community, which led them to rely mostly on Technical intelligence
(TECHINT) such as signals intelligence, satellites and etc. This trend consequently
resulted in underestimation of HUMINT (Ucak, 2003). Accordingly, less investment on
HUMINT ended up with little attention on confidential informants who have played
crucial role in almost every conflict situation throughout the history. For instance, the
9/11 commission findings indicate a significant intelligence deficiency on terrorism
related issues. Among the factors mentioned in the report, deficiency in human
intelligence is the hardest one because it requires long-term investment in human
capital, such as training and education in different foreign languages and cultures, that
are not familiar to American minds (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). Furthermore, human
intelligence is very dangerous. Undercover agents who will penetrate into terrorist
networks will be risking their lives. At this point, recruiting informants who are already
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in a terrorist network and using them to collect intelligence is more efficient, less risky,
and can pay back in a short time (Ucak, 2003).
In fact, human intelligence (HUMINT) is not new; it has always been an
important component of the intelligence community regardless of department, agency,
or nation throughout history. The famous historical case of Judas Iscariot, a paid
informant, is a well-known example. His name has become inextricably entwined with
betrayal as it was his information that resulted in the capture of Jesus by the Romans
(Bloom, 2002; Madinger, 2000). Sun Tzu, 2000 years ago in another part of the world,
mentioned the significance of spies in his historical book “The Art of War” and identified
five different types of spies. Accordingly, his contemporary, Tu Mu, summarized five
principle motivations for informing: greed, fear, ego, revenge, and perversity— most of
which are still active today (Madinger, 2000; Sun Tzu, 1994).
There is no doubt that informants—one of the crucial elements of HUMINT—have
a significant role in collecting inside intelligence about the dispositions of a target
group. Recruiting somebody within the target group and infiltrating timely information
about the assets, personnel, logistics, or plans of the enemy can provide a substantial
advantage to the intelligence community. It should be recognized that without the
ability to use confidential informants the mission of law enforcement intelligence in the
fight against terrorism would be seriously handicapped.
Therefore, informants have vital importance in combating terrorism in terms of
attaining intelligence that is not possible to collect by other means of intelligence.
2

From the literature review it has become clear that no study has been conducted
specifically focusing on motivating factors of confidential informants in terrorist
networks. Most of the studies have either been conducted in the areas of drug
trafficking, organized crime, or corruption. On the other hand, the ones in the area of
terrorism focus either on the recruitment process to the terrorism, or on the motives
leading to specific acts and behaviors of terrorists in their terrorism life cycle (Unal,
2010; Victoroff, 2005; Yilmaz, 2009). The gap in the literature in terms of empirical
studies regarding confidential informants especially for the ones active in terrorist
networks is obvious. This study intends to fill such a gap.
Knowing the motivations and handling the informant in accordance with his/her
predominant needs play a crucial role in the attainment of informant recruitment
process. Therefore, the purpose of this study is threefold. The first is to find out
motivation factors that are effective on confidential informant’s decision to choose to
cooperate with Law Enforcement Intelligence (LEI). This is done by testing and
analyzing motivation factors of informants in different fields—narcotics, corruption,
organized crime, etc.—to see which ones are effective on confidential informants active
in Religion-Abusing Terrorist (RAT) networks in Turkey.
The second purpose of this study is to find a theoretical explanation for the
phenomena. This study utilizes two important conceptual approaches to motivation—
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, and Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory—in order to
understand the reasons underlying the decision of a terrorist to become an informant.
3

Both of these theories focus on the factors—needs and incentives—within the person
that cause—energize, direct, sustain, and stop—behavior. They both attempt to
determine the specific needs that motivate people (C.P. Alderfer, 1969; Hersey,
Johnson, & Blanchard, 1996; Herzberg, 1959; Ivancevich, Konopaske, & Matteson,
2005; A. Maslow, 1954; Robbins & Judge, 2007; Simsek, 2008; Steers & Black, 1994).
Even though these theories are mainly used to explain employee motivation in work
force environments, I have tested if there is an empirical support in my study to these
theories and to what degree the phenomena can be explained by these approaches.
Based on Maslow’s theory, the main hypothesis of this study is that motivating
factors—needs and incentives—that are valid, effective and, predominant during the
recruitment process of individuals in RAT groups are the main reasons that make them
choose to be confidential informants.
Based on Herzberg’s theory, members of RAT groups who are dissatisfied with
the lack of Herzberg’s “hygiene factors” in the terrorism setting will develop an
inclination to leave terrorism. When they have the opportunity, they will leave terrorism.
If Herzberg’s theory is correct, then the informants’ initial motive during the recruitment
process should be in the “hygiene” category of Herzberg’s theory.
According to Maslow’s theory, if the LEI officer offers appropriate opportunities
to meet the unsatisfied predominant needs of RAT members, then this will lead to
successful recruitment of an individual as confidential informant. If Maslow’s theory is
correct, then the informants’ initial motive during the recruitment process should be in
4

accordance with his/her social and economic status and be in one of the five categories
of Maslow’s theory. Studies and evidence relating to each of these frameworks are
discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
Each informant recruitment process begins with roughly the same procedures
under various circumstances, but every informant has his/her own story and relatively
different motivational factors that are effective on his/her decision to perform as a
confidential informant for the Istihbarat Dairesi Baskanligi (IDB), LEI department of the
Turkish National Police (TNP). All of the subjects of this study are informants within
Religion-Abusing Terrorist (RAT) networks in Turkey. Besides, each RAT group has its
own peculiar characteristics. Thus, the strength and direction of these factors on the
decision to cooperate with Law Enforcement Intelligence (LEI) as a confidential
informant is expected to vary among individuals who are active in different terrorist
groups. It is also expected that these peculiar characteristics of RAT groups do not
outweigh or overshadow the similarities within each RAT group. Therefore, the third
aim of this study is to discover whether there are group level models about motivating
factors affecting the recruitment process of confidential informants in RAT networks.
The model is grounded in information from an analysis of RAT networks in Turkey.
The dependent variable of this study is “a decision by a militant to be a

confidential informant”. The independent variables are “motivation factors”. In the
literature regarding the informant development, studies that have been conducted in
the areas of drug trafficking, organized crime, and corruption eleven motivations— fear,
5

revenge, perverse, egoistical/vanity, mercenary, repentance, ideology, friendship with
officer, jealousy, altruism, and police enthusiasm— are commonly mentioned as having
an effect during the recruitment process (Billingsley, Nemitz, & Bean, 2001; Bloom,
2002; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Fitzgerald, 2008; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson,
1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; Natapoff, 2009; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994;
Wilson, 1978). These with some other motivations based on my personal 17 years of
field experience are considered important and are used as independent variables. This
study also includes some “socioeconomic, and demographic” variables as control
variables to eliminate alternative explanations.
For the research design, this study employs cross-sectional research design to
answer the research questions. A dataset is formed by conducting archival surveys on
the official records of Turkish National Police (TNP) for the secondary data analysis. I
used these records to come up with data regarding their motivations during their
recruitment. The findings are coded in a Microsoft Excel® worksheet for every
confidential informant served in our target terrorist groups, RATs, sometime in the past
two decades.
These then are analyzed with appropriate statistical methods to test the main
hypothesis, i.e., that the individuals’ decision-making processes to cooperate with LEI
as a confidential informant is affected by some motivation factors during recruitment
process.
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For the research strategy, I conduct an exploratory design in the first phase of
this study by including as many variables as possible, which are collected from the
subjects of the target population. In addition to descriptive statistical analyses, bivariate
statistics such as crosstabs and Chi Square are used to test the effects of these
variables.
The second phase of this study has an explanatory nature. First, motivational
factors acquired in the first phase of the study are classified based on the main
assumptions of motivation theories. Then, variables in these classifications are analyzed
with appropriate statistical methods such as logistic regression to test whether they
support the hypotheses derived from theories.
Both bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses in the second phase not only
help us to see the extent of individual effects of motivations among RAT groups, but
also help us to build a fitting multivariate model that explains the probability of being an
informant in our target population. The final model is a major contribution to the
literature and practice as well. It will help the intelligence agencies to develop group
specific models by using their organizational memory. Our model will also increase the
success of the intelligence officer in the field by making it possible to foresee some
potential outcomes.

7

Research Questions

1. What are the motivational factors that make some individuals (terrorists) in
RAT groups confidential informants? What motivating factors have an effect on the
individual’s decision to choose to be an informant within RAT networks? In other words,
what general motivating factors of recruiting informants in the literature are applicable
to confidential informants within RAT networks?
2. How do the content approaches of human motivation—Maslow’s need
hierarchy, and Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theories—affect the likelihood of
becoming of certain RAT group informant? This question will be answered by answering
the following two sub questions:
2-a. What is the effect of hygiene factors-dissatisfiers-on the individual’s
decision to leave terrorism in RAT networks? This is essentially a question related to
Herzberg’s theory.
Following sub questions are related to Maslow’s theory:
2-b. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of
becoming Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming other
RAT informants?
2-c. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of
becoming Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT
informants?
8

Hypotheses
Hypotheses for Research Question One
H1. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants with an
expectation of reduced sentence during the trial.
H2. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
friendly relationship with LEI officer.
H3. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer.
H4. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
mercenary needs.
H5. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of fear of
incarceration.
H6. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of
revenge motivation.
H7. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
need for repentance or desire to reform their criminal life.
H8. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
9

patriotic motives.
H9. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of fear
from their terrorist associates.
H10. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
selective law enforcement or altruistic motivations.
H11. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
jealousy within the RAT group.
H12. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
ideological conflict in morality with the RAT group.
H13. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
desire to be a spy. (James Bond syndrome, police wannabe).
H14. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to fulfill their
need for excitement and egoistical motives.
H15. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of a
hidden perverse motivation.
H16. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the state of frustration to some
extend during the recruitment.
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H17. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being labeled as snitch as
a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
H18. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being discarded by police
as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
H19. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed an ideological opposition to the state
and system as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.

Hypotheses for Research Question Two
There are motivational differences between becoming Turkish-Hezbollah/AlQaeda informant and becoming other RAT informant.
H20. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant physiological needs.
H21. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant safety (security) needs.
H22. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant social (affiliation) needs.
H23. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
self-esteem and esteem from others predominant needs.
H24. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
11

predominant Self-Actualization needs.

Hypothesis for the question 2-a:
H25. Lack of Herzberg’s hygiene factors in terrorism settings leads most recruits
from RAT groups to make the decision to leave terrorism to satisfy their
predominant needs by becoming informants.

Hypothesis for the question 2-b:
H26. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow’s need categories) and
demographic differences in the probability of becoming Turkish-Hezbollah
informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

Hypothesis for the question 2-c:
H27. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow’s need categories) and
demographic differences in the probability of becoming Al-Qaeda informant
relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.

Background Information

A Historical Overview of RAT Groups

Terrorism has long been connected to religious extremism. When we look at the
Oxford English Dictionary, many of the terms we use today in connection with terrorism
have their roots in religious extremism- “zealot” originally referred to a Jewish sect that
12

fought in A.D. 66– 73 against the Roman Empire and used public killings as a form of
psychological warfare; “thug” has its origins in a seventh-century religious cult in India;
“assassin” derives from a radical offshoot of the Muslim Shi’a Ismaili sect who between
A.D. 1090 and 1272 tried to repel the Christian Crusaders, by individual killings (Oxford,
2000). They also assassinated commanders of Salahadeen Al-ayyubi’s army and several
Sunni Islamic scholars during the same period as well.
Until the 19th Century, religion was the primary motivation for terrorism. Secular
terrorism coincided with the fall of divine monarchical rule in Western Europe and the
rise of nationalism combined with radical schools of thought- i.e., Marxism, anarchism
and nihilism. During the 20th Century ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically
motivated terrorism became more dominant as anti-colonialist movements took hold in
Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Juergensmeyer, 2008; Rapoport, 1984).
Then in 1979 the Iranian Revolution occurred, bringing in a fundamentalist
theocracy headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Juergensmeyer, 1994, 2008). Of the
sixty-four identifiable terrorist groups active in 1980, only two were religious in nature:
the Iranian-backed Shi’a organizations Al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding
the Islamic Revolution. By 1992 the number of RAT groups had increased to eleven,
and by 1994 sixteen of the forty-nine terrorist groups were RATs. Within a year this had
increased to twenty-six out of the forty-six identified terrorist groups. The trend
continued, and by 2004 fifty- two out of the 110 groups were RATs (Hoffman, 2006).
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The abuse of religious norms seems to have made the attacks less discriminating
and far more violent (Juergensmeyer, 2008). RATs committed only 6 percent of
recorded terrorist attacks between 1998 and 2004, yet their actions accounted for 30
percent of the total number of fatalities recorded during that time period. Specifically,
Shi’a groups committed only 8 percent of all international terrorist incidents between
1982 and 1989,1 yet they were responsible for 30 percent of the recorded fatalities in
that time, and a Salafi group, Al-Qaeda, claims responsibility for 19 percent of the
fatalities between 1998 and 2004,2 despite having only performed 0.1 percent of the
actions (Hoffman, 2006).

Core Characteristics of RATs

The reasons for the markedly more violent and indiscriminate acts perpetrated
by RATs compared to secular terrorists are rooted in radically different value systems,
concepts of morality and general worldview as well as the mechanisms for justification
and rationalization in accordance to their interpretation of their sacred writings. To the
RATs, violence is a sacramental duty in response to a theological imperative or demand.
They feel that they transcend the political, moral and practical constraints that may

1

According to the RAND Terrorism Incident Database, between 1982 and 1989 Shi’a terrorist groups
committed 247 terrorist incidents and were responsible for 1,057 deaths (Hoffman, 2006).
2

According to the RAND Terrorism Incident Database, there were a total number of 11,769 terrorist
attacks recorded between 1998 and 2004. Al Qaeda was responsible for 22 of those incidents but caused a total of
3,457 fatalities (Hoffman, 2006).
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restrain secular terrorists (Juergensmeyer, 1994, 2008). Whereas secular terrorists
avoid indiscriminate mass killings because such tactics are considered counterproductive
to their political purposes and goals, as well as immoral, RATs view broad-spectrum
attacks as being justified and moral according to their beliefs. Their so-called religious
leaders, considered to be speaking for the divine as interpreters of the sacred texts,
view current events through the lens of faith and justify the use of violence. This is why
the blessings of clerics are so important to RATs before they undertake an attack
(Hoffman, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2008).
But more importantly, a secular attack has different aims than a RAT attack. A
secular terrorist sees his actions as a way of forcing changes in a flawed but basically
good system or as a means to creating a new and improved system. RATs view
themselves not as parts of a system that is worth preserving but as outsiders to the
system seeking to destroy it to make fundamental changes in order (Juergensmeyer,
2008). This sense of alienation explains why RATs are willing to consider extreme acts
against broadly defined enemies, namely anyone who is not a part of their religious sect
or group. It also explains why manifestos from these groups often use similar rhetoric,
referring to “holy fire” and terming their enemies as infidels, dogs, children of Satan
and the like. This demonization and dehumanization of others further enables them to
commit horrific acts with less empathy for their targets, who they see as subhuman and
not worthy of living (Hoffman, 2006).

15

RAT Groups in Islam

Thus far the description has been generic and can be applied to any religious
group, and examples may be drawn from recent events to illustrate how this has been
done within the United States to justify the bombings of abortion clinics and other acts
of violence, but it is most closely associated with RATs in Islam, especially Iranian
based ones, Al-Qaeda and its associates. The 1979 revolution in Iran was a pivotal
event in the growth of modern RAT. At the core of the revolution was the intent of
expanding the fundamentalist Iranian interpretation of Islamic view to other countries.
The Iranian revolution has been held up as an example for groups who were resisting
the intrusion of the Western influences into the Middle East. It reflects the beliefs and
history of Shi’a Islam as viewed by Khomeini and his followers in the Middle East. It is
rooted in the belief of Shi’a as a centuries-old minority within Islamic religion,
persecuted for its special revelations and knowledge, but also includes a conviction of
the inherent illegitimacy of any secular government. In their view, legitimacy can only
be conferred by the adoption of Shi’a law to facilitate the return of the Mahdi to earth
as the return of the Messiah. Since Iran is the only nation to have begun redemption by
returning to a “true Islamic” state, it must be the advocate for the oppressed of the
world. Acts of violence and coercion are not only acceptable in the fight to spread their
ideology worldwide, but they are considered necessary to attain this divine goal. The
alienation and need for fundamental changes to the world order can be seen in the
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writings of many Shi’a theologians. For example, Baqer al-Sadr wrote, “The world as it
is today is how others shaped it,” (As cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 90). Similarly,
Khomeini said, “We have two choices: either to accept it with submission, which means
letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires
(As cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 90).
Hussein Mussawi, the former leader of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, said, “We are not
fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to
wipe out the enemy” (As cited in Taheri, 1987, p. 8).
Clerical support of terrorist actions has always been crucial in both Shi’a and
Salafi organizations. The roots of it go back to 13th century writings of Ibn Taymiyya
and several others. Ibn Taymiyya was born during Mongolian incursions and his
childhood was effected by the conflicts of the time. Later, he criticized four main Islamic
sects and scholars, and issued several fatwas based on his own ideas most of which
were contrary to the mainstream Islam. As a result, he was imprisoned exiled several
times, and died in a prison in 1328. A fatwa (a legal ruling or statement of legal issues,
given by a mufti- a qualified jurist- at the request of a religious court) may be issued
ordering an attack, as in the case of Salman Rushdie or the 1993 bombing of the World
Trade Center. Clerics have also given support or even blessings to self-martyrdom,
despite suicide being expressly forbidden by Islamic law (Hoffman, 2006).
Religious motivations are commonly cited, but are heavily debated. Islam,
Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism do not teach violence, and are in fact
17

against it. It is when religion becomes politicized that violence is brought forward. This
is done by deliberate misinterpretations of sacred texts and using quotes taken out of
context to justify political aims (Canan, 2004; Capan, 2004; Simonsen & Spindlove,
2004).
Specifically, Islam has been claimed to justify attacks as jihad, despite the term
being defined in the Qur'an as more than simply "holy war"- it literally means struggle
or effort (Martin, 2009). The Qur‘an says, "Not all people will believe (like Muslims)"3
and "There is no coercion in (the choice of) religion; truly the right way has become
clearly differentiated from the erroneous one."4 These verses clearly indicate that there
is to be no forcible conversion to Islam, and that everyone is entitled to worship as they
see fit (Bulac, 2004; Capan, 2004; Nikbay, 2009).
Jihad can be viewed as the struggle to live in accordance to God's ways. In
literature there are two types of jihad: the big jihad and the small jihad. The big jihad is
the internal struggle of the individual to overcome his temptations to do evil. The small
jihad is the external struggle to defend Islam, either with or without weapons. The
Prophet Muhammad said to the soldiers coming to their homes from the Battle of Badr,
"You have now returned from the minor jihad to the major one" When they asked him
what the major jihad was, he answered that “the major jihad is the one against to the

nafs” —the carnal self of each individual (Bulac, 2004; Nikbay, 2009).

3

Yusuf Sura, verse 12:106 of the Qur‘an

4

Baqara Sura, verses 2:256 of the Qur‘an

18

The militants, however, overlook the big jihad entirely, and emphasize the small
jihad. They deny the clarification and denounce it as heresy. According to the militants,
adherents to other religions should be slaughtered and driven out of the lands
(Laqueur, 1999). While the militants seek confrontation, the battles of the Prophet
Mohammed were always defensive in nature. He never provoked conflict or attacked
others for following a different religion (Aktan, 2004; Martin, 2009).
Along with jihad, the concept of martyrdom has been warped from its original
meaning of "witness or someone whose existence is a living testimony even after his
death" (Dolnik, 2003, p. 29). The original word is shahid, meaning one who lives with
his faith so intensely that he is willing to risk death for the truth according to the
Qur‘an. Therefore those who die in jihad are martyrs (Bulac, 2004; Nikbay, 2009).
However, merely dying for a cause is not sufficient to become a martyr according
to Islamic teachings. The final judgment is with Allah, who looks into the hearts and
motivations to determine if the person was truly acting as a Muslim. Martyrdom is a
spiritual rank, one of the four glorified roles in the Qur'an and the teachings of the
Prophet Mohammed, and is an honor to be prayed for. It is not to be attained by
suicide attacks as suicide is clearly prohibited in Islamic principles (Hudson & DIV.,
1999; Israeli, 1997; Nikbay, 2009).
The Qur‘an also states that "…whoever kills a soul, unless it be for manslaughter
or for mischief in the land, is like one who killed the whole mankind; and whoever saves
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a life, is like one who saves the lives of all mankind…."5 "If a man kills a believer
intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (forever): and the wrath and the
curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful chastisement is prepared for him"6 (Nikbay,
2009).
Martin (2003) credits two major historical events for the resurgence of radical
jihad in recent times: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Ziya ul-Haq, the former President of Pakistan, thought that the invasion was a good
reason to declare jihad against the godless Communism. Similarly, the US thought it
useful to mobilize almost one billion Muslims against its enemy in the Cold War, and
began CIA operations to finance jihad against the Soviet Union (Nikbay, 2009).
Osama bin Laden in 1996 and 1998 declared two fatwas7 to justify Al-Qaeda's
actions, instructing Muslims to "kill the Americans and their allies, civilians, and the
military." There is no justification for this in Islam, nor did he have the authority to
declare a fatwa (Malka, 2003). Jihad is only to be used as a last resort, and can only be
declared by a state representing a legitimate communal authority (Aktan, 2004). No
individual or political or social group can declare jihad (Bulac, 2004; Capan, 2004).

5

Maida sura, verse 5:32 of the Qur‘an

6

Al-Nisa sura, verse 4:93 of the Qur‘an

7

For the texts in English see:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html.
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America and the West have been viewed as the great opponent responsible for
the problems in the Middle East due to their support of Israel and their distancing
themselves from Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Islamic Resistance
Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya), better known by its Arabic acronym,
Hamas (which also means “zeal”), has also declared war against Israel in which the
enemy is to be obliterated. Hamas’s founder and spiritual leader, Imam Sheikh Ahmad
Ibrahim Yassin declared, “Six million descendants of monkeys [i.e., Jews] now rule in all
the nations of the world, but their day, too, will come” (Hamas, 1993, p. 4).
Al-Qaeda has similarly taken an absolutist stance against the United States. In a
May 1998 interview with ABC News, bin Laden stated: “We believe that the worst
thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans . . . We do not
differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians: they are all
targets” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 47).

Development of RAT Groups in Turkey

In late 1960s radical books from Egypt and Pakistan started to be translated into
Turkish and got published in the 1970s. Right after the revolution in Iran, vast amounts
of Shi’a ideological books were translated into Turkish and spread throughout the
country via some publishing companies with the clandestine support of Khomeini
regime. Turkish people also met with the Salafi ideology during the USSR-Afghan war
era. Eventually, some people who were reading these translations started to form
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groups around the bookstores and publishing companies. These ideas were new to
Turkish people, and Turkey has been facing with religious radicalism for the first time in
its history. Subsequently, members of these radical groups continuously made long trips
to Iran and Afghanistan. During these long stays, they not only got ideological and
military training, but also several of them joined the Jihadists in Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Kosovo, etc. (Turkoglu, 2006)
Starting from the early 1990s, Turkey also has become a target for RATs
because of its democratic and secular government structure, and being allies with Israel
and the U.S. Thus, RAT networks, which have ruthlessly attacked governmental and
civilian targets in Turkey in the past two decades, will be the focus of this study. These
RAT networks include but are not limited to: Al-Qaeda, Turkish Hezbollah, HizbutTahrir, Selam-Tevhid, IBDA/C, and other relatively smaller groups such as: ICCB-AFID,
Vasat, and Islamic Movement.
It is important to mention at this point that all subjects of this study- confidential
informants- were already in one of above-mentioned RAT networks at the time law
enforcement intelligence officers recruited them. Therefore, factors that had an effect
on their decision to cooperate with LEI are crucially important for the success of LEI in
recruiting future informants. However, before focusing on our main research it is useful
to know some basics about informants, which will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
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A Historical Overview of Informants

The use of informants has long historical roots. As long as there have been any
sort of competing groups, there have been informants (Ucak, 2003). Generally, there
are two types of informants: incidental and confidential. Incidental informants generally
only act once, in reference to a specific crime situation. Confidential informants provide
a steady stream of information over a period of time.
In ancient Greece informants were rewarded for reporting acts of treason. If the
information was accurate the informant was granted impunity, and if not he was
executed. Ancient Rome made extensive use of informers to quell subversion by using
grain merchants, who had contacts across the Mediterranean as they supplied the
legions (Bloom, 2002).
The most famous case of a paid informant, of course, is Judas Iscariot. His name
has become inextricably entwined with betrayal as it was his information that resulted
in the capture of Jesus by the Romans (Madinger, 2000).
During the Middle Ages in England, informants were used in cases of felony
prosecution (Zimmerman, 1994). In 1275 England created the “approver system” which
was similar to that used by the Greeks an informer could gain pardon by providing good
information, but would be executed for false information. This unfortunately led to
corruption as innocent people were threatened with accusation unless they paid money
(blackmail) and eventually the system collapsed. It was replaced by the common
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informer system in which the informer was “a person who brought certain
transgressions to the notice of the authorities and instituted proceedings, not because
he, personally, had been aggrieved or wished to see justice done, but because under
the law he was entitled to a part of any fine which might be imposed” (Zimmerman,
1994, p. 166). Again, this system fell prey to corruption and collapsed.
In the early 19th Century France in particular began to make more use of
informants. François Vidocq was imprisoned for a minor crime, but managed to gain his
freedom by providing information about the other prisoners. He then founded Paris
Sûreté, a criminal investigation unit of the Paris police, and hired former criminals as his
detectives. From 1810 to 1827 he pioneered surveillance and investigative techniques
(Marx, 1989). In 1877 Howard Vincent established a similar system in England called
the Criminal Investigation Department, but by the 1920s is had become corrupt (Boyd,
1984). And in the United States, the Pinkerton Detective Agency came into existence.
As a private company with corporate clients it became the de facto law enforcement
agency of the American West during the late 19th Century, and still exists today. They
used agents to infiltrate organizations and gather information, as in the case of the
Molly Maguires (Horan & Swiggett, 1951).
In 1908 Theodore Roosevelt formed the Federal Bureau of Investigations, which
developed a network of domestic informants across the United States. It has used
informants to infiltrate what it considered to be radical groups, from the Black Panthers
to the Progressive Labor Party. It has also used informants in criminal investigations,
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such as organized crime cases. In November 1998 the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
addressed the topic of informants directly, focusing on the problems that have plagued
the

informant

systems

from

their

inception.

It

also

discussed

recruitment,

documentation of information and how to assess the value of the gathered intelligence,
as well as how to judge its veracity (Bloom, 2002).
The Turkish National Police was formed in 1846, which developed an effective
informant system in a couple of years. Since the 19th century, the TNP has been using
informants in criminal investigations, such as terrorism, organized crime, narcotics and
mafia cases.
Informants are considered a critical tool today. For instance, According to CNN,
on October 29 2010 with the help of an informant in Yemen, British investigators found
a bomb concealed as a toner cartridge in a plane flying from Yemen to Chicago in
London (Candiotti, 2010).
According to BBC News, on January 22 2010 120-suspected Al-Qaeda members
were arrested in a major nationwide anti-terror operation in Turkey. Confidential
informants had played crucial roles in plotting the Al-Qaeda cells and hideouts before
the operation. In coordinated predawn raids in 16 provinces of Turkey the TNP netted
weapons, fake identity cards, camouflage clothing and documents disclosing details of
extremist militant activity in Turkey (Head, 2010).
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Informant in Guidelines

“Informant” is a generic term often used by law enforcement, intelligence or
military personnel. It refers to a wide range of people who confidentially pass along
information regarding illegal activity. Throughout the world, law enforcement or
investigative agencies at Federal, state, local or tribal levels have a variety of
terminologies and policies regarding the identification and utilization of informants in
every nation (Fitzgerald, 2008).
As an example, the FBI Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines
(MIOG) 137.2.1 defines an informant as “any person or entity who furnishes
information to the FBI on a confidential basis” (FBI, 2000).
The CIA refers to informants as “assets” and are often termed “agents”. The
information they provide for the CIA is referred to as Human Intelligence, or HUMINT,
indicating that it was obtained from a human source. The CIA employees who oversee
assets, gather information and do field work are known as case officers (Davis 1997 as
cited in Fitzgerald, 2008).
The U.S. Attorney General Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential
Informants (Section I.B.6) defines confidential informant or “CI” as: -“any individual
who provides useful and credible information to a JLEA (Department of Justice Law
Enforcement Agency) regarding felonious criminal activities, and from whom the JLEA
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expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible information regarding such
activities in the future” (DOJ, 2001).
In section I.B.1, it also lists the department of justice law enforcement agencies
or “JLEA’s” that are bound with the guidelines as: “The Drug Enforcement
Administration;

The

Federal

Bureau

of

Investigation;

The

Immigration

and

Naturalization Service (INS); The United States Marshals Service; and The Department
of Justice Office of the Inspector General” (DOJ, 2001).
In section I.B.13, Confidential Informant review Committee or “CIRC” is created
by a JLEA for purposes of reviewing certain decisions relating to the registration and
utilization of CIs (DOJ, 2001).

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): This is an investigative agency within
the U.S. Department of Justice. In the DEA Agents Manual the term “ Confidential
Source” or “CS” is used instead of informant. CS is “a person who, under the direction
of a specific DEA agent, and with or without expectation of compensation, furnishes
information on drug trafficking or performs a lawful service for the DEA in its
investigation of drug trafficking” (Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 8).

Internal Revenue Service (IRS): This is the investigative agency of the U.S.
Treasury Department. In the Internal Revenue Service Manual Confidential informant is
defined as "an individual who is not expected to testify but may be paid for the
information provided and/or gathers information and evidence at the direction of IRS”
(Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 13).
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U.S. Marshals Service (USMS): This is within the Justice Department. The US
Marshals Service Manual defines “informant” as “an individual who furnishes
information to the marshal’s service. Such information may be furnished on the
informant’s own initiative or because of being directed to furnish information by a USMS
employee.” A “Confidential Informant” is “one who requests that his name be held in
strict confidence”(Fitzgerald, 2008, pp. 13-14).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Accordingly, informants who fall into
one of the following three categories require approval from the FBI’s Confidential
Informant Review Committee: “Long term confidential informant; High-level confidential
informant; Privileged confidential informant” (DOJ, 2001).
FBI informants in the area of antiterrorism law enforcement and intelligence
gathering are operated under the Attorney General’s Guidelines for National Security
Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection, a partially classified document which
states that informants used in international terrorism, foreign intelligence, or foreign
counterintelligence investigations are referred to as assets (Fitzgerald, 2008).
In 2006 the Department of Justice issued a specific set of guidelines to the FBI,
titled “The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human
Sources”. These guidelines are similar to the more general ones issued in 2002, but
establish additional documentation, authorization and ongoing evaluation requirements
for establishing or using an existing confidential informant. The documentation is to
contain material such as formal statements of any promises or arrangements made to
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the informant. These conditions include that the information must be truthful and that
the informant not engage in any illegal activities beyond what is already under
investigation. The guidelines also set limits on the agents, such as inability to grant
immunity (which may only be granted by a prosecutor) and prohibiting socialization
between the agent and the informant. These guidelines are intended to limit corruption
and to prevent rogue informants (Natapoff, 2009).

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP): The IACP through its
National Law Enforcement Policy Center produced a “Concepts and Issues Paper”
entitled “Confidential Informants” in 1990. According to the IACP: “A confidential
informant could be defined as a private citizen who has entered into a confidential
agreement with a law enforcement agency to provide information about criminals or
criminal activity in exchange for monetary or other consideration” (Rudovsky, 1992).
Each law enforcement Agency has its own agency policy that is formulated within
the environment it operates. Laws, court rulings, ordinances, regulations, administrative
decisions, agency resources and adopted criminal justice philosophies have an impact
on the formulation of this policy.
According to IACP, to be useful as a Confidential Informant, an individual should
have one or more of the following qualities. A good CI:
•

Has firsthand knowledge of, or has intimate information of active criminals.

•

Has a residence or an occupation that is convenient to gathering relevant
information about criminals and their plans.
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•

Is known to the criminal justice system, in being on parole or probation,
being out on bail, has been convicted and is awaiting sentence, or is
imprisoned.

•

Is a civilian who has entered into an agreement with law enforcement to
provide confidential information about criminals and their activities in
exchange for compensation (Rudovsky, 1992).

Based on the IACP qualifications, Fitzgerald (2008) defines a confidential
informant as "a private citizen who has entered into a confidential agreement with a law
enforcement agency to provide information about criminals or criminal activity in
exchange for monetary or other consideration" (Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 16).

Types of Informants

Madinger (2000) defines informant as an individual who has access to
information about a crime or criminal activity, and has the motivation to provide that
information, and is willing to accept the control of a law enforcement officer.
From law enforcement perspective Madinger (2000) classifies informants into 7
distinct categories based on the roles they play during cooperation with the
government:
•

Witness/Informants: The person in this category has no longer access to
information but testifies about historical events. As in the Monica Lewinsky
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case, cooperation of this person is known by many people. These individuals
usually go into a Witness Security Program after the testimony.
•

Active Informants: The informants in this category maintain their status in
criminal setting. As long as their identities are kept secret, they provide timely
inside information about current and future criminal activities. The problems
involved with this type of informant are significant, as they may need to
continue to commit criminal acts to avoid notice from their associates and
stay active in the investigation. This may result in law enforcement being
complicit in crimes. Informants in this category are invaluable, but hard to
obtain as they cooperate at great risk to themselves.

•

Source of Information: People in this category are the ones who reside in
neighborhoods where criminal activity occurs or people who come into
contact with criminal activities because of their occupation. If they are
accordingly motivated by law enforcement officers, airline employees,
pawnbrokers, or parcel service employees can be made good sources of
information by conveying suspicious activities happening around them.

•

Jailhouse Informants: The people in this category are either witnesses or
actively involved in criminal activities. These people are highly motivated to
go out sooner. Therefore, they can provide information about a current
criminal activity inside the prison, a past crime that another inmate has
admitted to, or additional information about an unresolved case. However, as
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they are so strongly motivated their information is often suspect and is
usually mistrusted by prosecutors and investigators.
•

Unwitting Informants: An individual in this category provides information to
law enforcement believing himself to be talking to another criminal or a
reporter. He is unaware of the real occupation of undercover officer and may
react unfavorably when the truth is revealed. Similarly, they may be giving
their information to another informant who, unknown to them, is passing it to
law enforcement.

•

Agent Provocateur: The individuals in this category incite crimes. They usually
induce their associates to take some action—riot—enabling the law
enforcement to intervene —arrest, or dispersion— of the group. Use of these
is generally avoided, as it may result in the entrapment of otherwise innocent
people. Usually this situation occurs when an informant goes beyond the
control of their handler and acts independently.

•

Special Employees: This term was used in the past to describe active
informants who were filling special needs—a Chinese person speaking
Cantonese—that were used to buy drugs and testify in the court. The term is
no longer used to avoid blurring the lines between informers and law
enforcement (Madinger, 2000).
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Overview of Theoretical Framework

The motivations of terrorists are vitally important to understand, yet little has
been written on this subject. Based on the review of literature, no theory has yet been
applied to informants in terrorism. We must therefore rely on theories proposed
regarding the motivations of individuals in various fields such as industry.
There have been many studies done in various fields to analyze motivations.
Hersey, Blanchard and Johnson (1996) define motives as the “whys” of behavior. An
individual's activity is prompted by hundreds of competing motives (needs) within an
individual. The strongest need at a particular moment determines behavior and leads to
activity (Hersey, et al., 1996).
The most applicable motivation theories are the ones proposed by Maslow and
Herzberg, although Alderfer's ERG (Existence, Relatedness and Growth) theory is of use
as well to expand on Maslow's needs theory.

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

Abraham Maslow wrote one of the classic theories of motivation in which he
classified needs in a hierarchy, from the most basic to the highest level. These needs
are defined as follows:

Physiological needs: the needs for shelter, clothing, food and relief from
discomfort. The physiological needs have the highest strength until they are somewhat
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satisfied. Until these needs are fulfilled to a certain degree, needs at other categories
will provide little motivation (Steers & Black, 1994).

Safety and security needs: the security need for freedom from threatening
events or threatening environment. When a person’s life is in danger, or he faces a
significant threat to his/her safety, other things become negligible (Steers & Black,
1994).

Belongingness, social, and love needs: the need for friends, belonging to a
group, social interaction, and love. Individuals at this need level will strive for belonging
and being accepted by several groups (Steers & Black, 1994).

Esteem needs: the need for positive self-image and for approval from others.
When these needs are fulfilled they yield feelings of self-confidence, power, control and
prestige.

Self-actualization needs: the need to feel satisfaction by using abilities, skills,
talents and living up to full potential. (Ivancevich, et al., 2005; Simsek, 2008) Selfactualization is the desire of an individual to maximize his potential (Hersey, et al.,
1996).
Maslow cautioned that this hierarchy is not absolute, but should be considered a
general guideline for motivations and behaviors. It is also important to realize that
absolute fulfillment of one level of need is not required before higher needs become
influential, and that at times individuals may perceive higher needs as more important
than basic needs. An unfulfilled need will not suddenly arise, but will become influential
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over time, and a satisfied need will no longer be a motivator. He also observed that
people who have been generally satisfied in their youth will be more resistant to
unfulfilled needs, and that people who have had their higher needs frustrated for most
of their lives will be satisfied to have only their lower needs met. He added that the
most important exception to the needs hierarchy is the person who is motivated by
their ideals and values, who may martyr themselves to their beliefs. Patriotism and
altruism are motivations that are especially difficult to fit into Maslow's hierarchy, and
an individual acting from these motivations may sacrifice his most basic needs or even
his life, which runs counter to Maslow's theory.
When applied to RAT networks, numerous needs become readily apparent as
being unlikely to be met. Physiological needs are likely to be a problem, as the majority
of RATs live in primitive and harsh circumstances. Safety and security are both
constantly threatened, both from law enforcement and from within as the members
tend to be highly suspicious toward one another. Belonging and social needs may
initially be met as they join a cause, but may be quickly eroded by suspicion and the
hardships of living in poor conditions, and only high ranking members may attain selfactualization. The lower ranking members may feel very motivated to become
informants, but are held in check by fear of reprisals.
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Alderfer’s ERG Theory
Clayton Alderfer refined Maslow's theory to group motivations as being necessary for
Existence, Relatedness or Growth. He defines them as:
1. Existence: Needs satisfied by such factors as food, air, water, pay, and working
conditions.
2. Relatedness: Needs satisfied by meaningful personal and interpersonal relations.
3. Growth: Needs satisfied by an individual making creative and productive
contributions (C.P. Alderfer, 1972).
The assumptions which differentiate Alderfer's theory from Maslow's are that where
Maslow assumes that only one category of needs is dominant at any given time,
Alderfer asserts that several levels of need may be active simultaneously; and where
Maslow claims that needs at a lower level must be satisfied for the individual to move
on, Alderfer counters that frustration at a higher level will cause the individual to
regress and focus on lower level needs more.
Alderfer's theory can also be applied to RAT networks in that the majority of RATs
are operating primarily on the most basic levels, with Existence needs being met and
some Relatedness needs being addressed as well. However, as Alderfer noted,
frustrations at the higher levels increase frustrations with the most basic needs, which
may motivate lower ranking members to abandon the network. Multiple motivations will
be at work on the individuals, pressuring them from different directions. Based on
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Alderfer’s assumptions, the recruits will be expected to mention multiple motivations for
providing information.

Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory

The other major applicable theory is that of Frederick Herzberg, who proposed
the Motivation-Hygiene theory. The original research brought two conclusions: first,
that there are extrinsic conditions in the work environment which give rise to employee
dissatisfaction if they are lacking; and second, there are intrinsic conditions related to
job content that will bring strong positive motivation that may result in improved job
performance. The extrinsic conditions are classified as Hygiene factors, while the
intrinsic conditions are classified as Motivators.

Hygiene factors include, but are not limited to Salary, job security, working
conditions, status, company procedures, quality of supervision, quality of interpersonal
relationships with supervisors, among peers, and with subordinates. Herzberg also
referred to these as Maintenance factors, as constant effort is needed to maintain
satisfaction in these matters and allowing them to lapse will create dissatisfaction in the
workplace. Satisfying these factors will not boost productivity, but will prevent losses.

Motivators

include,

but

are

not

limited

to

achievement,

recognition,

responsibility, advancement, the work itself, and the potential for growth. Herzberg
chose this term because the presence of these influences causes increased motivation
and satisfaction among workers.
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Herzberg concluded that these two groups are independent of one another and
have different effects on behavior. When people are unhappy or frustrated in their jobs
they tend to focus on their work environment, but when they are happy they focus on
the work itself. Prior to Herzberg's study job satisfaction was assumed to be
unidimensional, with satisfaction at one end of a continuum and dissatisfaction at the
other.
The major criticisms of Herzberg's theory are related to the fact that he based it
on a limited sample of engineers and accountants living in the United States and that
his data collection required introspection and subjective judgment on the part of the
people polled. However, empirical studies in other nations have supported this theory.
Herzberg also theorized that another aspect of dissatisfaction is the result of
overspecialization in the workplace, with people being frustrated by limitations placed
on them by their supervisors. He noted that overhiring- using overqualified people to
perform simple tasks- likewise results in frustration and dissatisfaction.
In reference to RAT networks, the conclusions are fairly clear: if a RAT member is well
compensated, is secure in the position, has a good relationship with both peers and
management, and is given duties that he perceives as interesting, he will be less likely
to become an informant. However, if he is not well compensated, feels insecure and
threatened, is bored and not challenged by his work and is generally dissatisfied he will
be eager to quit and therefore more likely to become an informant.
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Maslow's theory helps to identify needs and motives, while Herzberg’s theory
provides insights into the goals and incentives to help satisfy those needs. Used
together, it becomes apparent that physiological, security, social and some esteem
needs are hygiene factors while esteem can be broken down into both hygiene factors
(status) and motivators (peer recognition and esteem). If an individual's strongest
needs can be identified, hygiene factors may be identified and addressed, while
identification of the individual's goals will assist in assessing their higher needs. This can
enable a competent manager to motivate the individual to better performance- or to
demotivate them into quitting.
A detailed review of these theories is included in Chapter 2.

Overview of Common Informant Motivations in Literature

Fear:
Broadly speaking, fear is a desire for self-preservation. A situation that threatens
the safety or security of a person will lead to a strong reaction. They will continue to
react as long as they perceive the threat existing. Informants who act on the basis of
fear are generally responding to fear of either law enforcement or by criminals.

Fear of Incarceration: the threat of incarceration is a very strong motivator for
criminals. Having the possibility of a long jail sentence will certainly induce fear, while
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the possibility of reducing the sentence or even dropping the charges in a plea bargain
is a powerful incentive for cooperation. The combination of the threat and the
possibility of having that threat removed gives considerable control over an informant.

Fear of Criminals: since people involved in crime tend to associate with other criminals,
they tend to find themselves in precarious circumstances. Not only do they have to fear
arrest, but also they have to fear that one of their associates may turn on them for
some perceived slight. Self-preservation may induce them to seek protection from their
associates by law enforcement (see Mafia cases for examples) (Billingsley, et al., 2001;
Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004;
Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978).

Ideology:
An individual may join a group due to his ideology, and then over time find that
the group’s ideology or morality differs from his own on some crucial aspect. He may
realize that they have distorted religion in a way he cannot tolerate, or may perform or
condone something that he considers to be immoral. At that point he will wish to
distance himself from the group or even see them abolished, and may approach a
trusted officer. (Researchers own experience)

Revenge:
Individuals may provide information in retaliation. A person who has been
swindled or betrayed may wish to inflict pain in retribution. Informants giving
information for revenge are generally good sources, especially when their grievance is
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fresh in their mind. They often have close inside information, and the closer they were
to the person who injured them the greater their desire is for revenge. However, once
their emotions have had time to cool off they may be less willing to provide information
(Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee,
2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Wilson, 1978).

Perverse:
Some informants may act out of a desire for some unusual advantage. They
usually hide their true motive, as it will often be some advantage that the police would
ordinarily prefer not to give. Their motivations may not coincide with that of law
enforcement, and the information given is often suspect. Motivations may include:
•

Providing information about business rivals, in hopes that the police will
eliminate competition for them.

•

Minimizing his own role to deflect police attention away from his own
activities.

•

Keeping in contact with police in order to learn of investigative techniques,
gaining information about law enforcement operations or to identify
officers, especially undercover operatives.

•

Using his contacts to steal from the police department

•

Trying to expose police “corruption” or misconduct.

If no other motivation can be determined, the officer should assume a perverse
motive and proceed cautiously. Information gained from such an informant should
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rarely be used, if at all (Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger,
2000; O'Hara, 1973; Wilson, 1978).

Egotistical:
These informants are motivated by a desire to bolster their self-esteem. They
may be small time criminals who wish to be thought of as influential and important, or
they may be people who wish to be law enforcement officers but are unable to fulfill
the requirements. Both of these will often exaggerate the importance of their
information or their closeness to the source, and have the potential to endanger an
investigation. They may also act independently and make decisions on their own.
Another type of egotistical informer is the one who does so out of a sense of
superiority. They may wish to prove that they can outwit those they see as inferior.
They tend to be more common in espionage, where there is intense competition to be
the most clever. They may also try to prove themselves by outwitting the law
enforcement officers.
The motivation of this group will last only as long as their ego needs are being
fed. Once that need has been satisfied they may stop cooperating, even in the middle
of an investigation (Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara,
1973; Skolnick, 1994).

Mercenary:
Though relatively rare, some will give information for monetary gain. They
frequently have other motivations as well, such as a desire for help with an unrelated
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legal problem or desire for protection. As they have usually already made up their
minds to cooperate fully before they walk in, they are often willing to stay committed to
their decision, at least until money is no longer sufficient incentive (Billingsley, et al.,
2001; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004;
Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978).

Repentance or Desire To Reform:
Though relatively rare, some desire to leave the life of crime behind them. They
tend to have very valuable information due to close access. Their motivations may be
fed by needs of self-esteem and belonging, and may view their past associations as
standing in the way of improving their lives. Due to their rarity, the officers must be
cautious and determine that no other motivation exists (Blum, 1972; Harney & Cross,
1968; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000).
In addition to these, other motivations may apply:

Jealousy:
Similar to revenge, the informant will be acting on a strong but transient
emotion. Rather than the person being wronged, they are motivated by a desire to
eliminate someone who is challenging their relationship. Their information is often
exaggerated, stretched or even false (Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000;
O'Hara, 1973).
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Cop Wannabe/James Bond syndrome:
The motivation is similar to the egotistical informant. The individual will be acting
on a desire for the perceived excitement of police or espionage work, and may mimic
officers with whom he works. Like the egotistical informant, he may start testing his
boundaries and acting independently (Blum, 1972; Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000).

Good Citizen: Patriotic Motives:
The motivations of the good citizen are not in question, but the degree of access
they actually have may be questionable. The exceptions are people in service industries
who may actually have contact with criminals, such as taxi drivers, hotel managers,
airline employees, delivery people and business operators (Billingsley, et al., 2001;
Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara,
1973; Skolnick, 1994).

Mentally Disturbed Individuals:
Some informants will come forward with bizarre or incomprehensible information
that stems from some form of delusion. Their information tends to be unreliable at best.
While generally harmless, they can consume time better spent on other efforts (Harney
& Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000).

Selective Law Enforcement:
The informant may not particularly object to various criminal acts, but will
witness something that they consider intolerable. They will bring in law enforcement to
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eliminate what they consider to be the more egregious criminals (Harney & Cross,
1968; Madinger, 2000). The ones that dislike the crime can also be included in this
group (Billingsley, et al., 2001).

Indebtedness- Appreciation or Gratitude Toward Police:
If an informant has been in legal trouble and has been treated fairly and was
well treated, he may feel gratitude toward the people who he perceives as helping him.
After the operation has ended the informant may come forward in the future with
information regarding new cases (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Harney & Cross, 1968).
Similarly, if the informant has received good treatment from the authorities- for
example, humanitarian aid for his family despite being known to be part of a terrorist
cell- he may feel gratitude toward the government.
Terrorists, it must be remembered, are people with needs like any other. If the
authorities have aided them in a time of need- responding to a fire, or taking a child to
the hospital for treatment- the individual may feel a sense of indebtedness to the
authorities, or to a particular officer. They may choose to repay that debt by giving
information.

Friendly with officer:
At times a person in a RAT group may form an acquaintance with an individual in
law enforcement and develop a casual relationship. Over time the officer may gain the
RAT’s trust and form a bond of empathy. The RAT may feel a degree of friendship with
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the officer and desire to pass information to someone he knows he can trust
(Billingsley, et al., 2001).

Overview of Methodology

From the review of literature it has become clear that studies regarding the
informant motivations have been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking, corruption,
organized crime, homicide or other street level crimes. However, no study with a
specific focus on confidential informants acting in terrorism has been conducted yet.
Therefore, this study is exploratory at the first phase in terms of exploring the motives
that may have an effect on terrorists’ decision to cooperate as an informant. In this
phase, terrorist autobiographies were surveyed. Surveying autobiographies is a wellknown data collection technique in terrorism studies.
In the second phase, I conduct a multivariate binomial logistic regression
analysis to look for significant differences in terms of motivations between becoming a
Turkish-Hezbollah/Al-Qaeda informant and becoming a different RAT informant
controlling for all the other motivational and demographic variables.
For the research design, this study employs cross-sectional research design to
answer the research questions. A dataset was formed by conducting archival surveys on
the official records of Turkish National Police (TNP) for the secondary data analysis. The
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TNP has been employing informants over a century for law enforcement purposes, and
keeps records of them confidential under different departments. These records include
very detailed information about informants ranging from demographic and social data
to their hobbies; they are also asked such questions, “Why did they choose to become
informants?” etc. The intelligence department of TNP, the IDB, is responsible for
recruitment, development, management, and protection of all confidential informants
within terrorist networks. Therefore, after getting a top-secret clearance from the TNP,
handwritten autobiographies, and F10 forms which contain detailed information about
the recruit that were filled out by every confidential informant during the recruitment
process and available at IDB archives, were searched.
My data set contains detailed information about all individuals that served as
confidential informants for more than a year within any of 8 different religion abusing
terrorist groups in the last two decades (N= 138).
By saying so, this study didn’t utilize any sampling procedure; instead, it utilized
the entire population of confidential informants within RAT networks in Turkey. Working
with the population also reduces threats to internal and external validity of the study
since the significance levels become irrelevant, and the results of the study directly
reflect the social reality of the phenomena. Moreover, according to the literature,
inferential statistics are used to draw conclusions about the population based on
analysis of the sampling data. If the analysis is focusing on population, than descriptive
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statistics are used. Similarly, most of the variables included in this study are in fact
population parameters (Demirci, 2008; Nardi, 2006; Yang, 2010).
However, I did an exception to this general rule in this study. I applied inferential
statistics to some extent and illustrated group level models for Turkish-Hezbollah and
Al-Qaeda RAT groups in order to illustrate practical implications of the study for the
practitioners. It would be good to form individual models for each RAT network.
Nevertheless, sample sizes of RAT networks other than Turkish-Hezbollah are
insufficient, largest being n=22, which would not only result in loss of power, but also
end up with statistically insignificant results. The ratio of sample size to the number of
parameters is critically important in logistic regression since it uses maximum likelihood
estimation. It is strongly recommended in literature that the number of cases in the
smallest group should be at least ten times the number of predictors in logistic
regression models (Gray & Kinnear, 2012; Hosmer David & Stanley, 2000). Even though
the sample size of Al-Qaeda (n=22) was not quite adequate, I ran a multivariate
analysis for Al-Qaeda in order to shed a light to motivations of Al-Qaeda informants too.
Details of the sources and data collection methods are explained in the
methodology chapter.
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Significance of the study

When we look at the literature, it becomes apparent that there are as of yet very
few empirical studies openly available to the general public about confidential
informants. These studies have either been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking,
organized crime, or corruption. There is no doubt that the ability to use confidential
informants gives substantial advantage to law enforcement intelligence in the fight
against terrorism, but no study has been conducted specifically focusing on confidential
informants in terrorist networks yet.
Moreover, the studies that are available to general public are mainly at
descriptive level written by practitioners for tactical purposes such as handbooks,
service manuals, personal experiences or legal documents. These studies are not
immune to cultural bias, cognitive inflexibility, or attribution error until there is ample
empirical support. This is primarily a consequence of the secret nature of the
phenomena. Because of the legal barriers put to ensure confidentiality, it has been
almost impossible for researchers to obtain and analyze confidential information about
the issue. However, as some researchers have argued, no matter how much they
despise terrorist actions, behavioral scientists should avoid making biased judgments
and instead act as interpreters of observed behavior. (Skolnick, 1994; Victoroff, 2005).
According to Victoroff (2005) isolating practitioners from theorists is a separation akin
to isolating engineers from the discoveries of physicists.
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Accordingly, it took two years of endeavor for the researcher to obtain a topsecret clearance and an approval letter from the TNP in order to conduct such a study
on confidential informants active in RAT networks. With this significant advantage, this
study is the first empirical work open to general public on motivating factors that make
some individuals in RAT networks confidential informants.
As a result this study intends to fill such a gap in the literature in terms of
empirical studies regarding to the confidential informants especially for the ones active
in terrorist networks.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The motivations for terrorists to turn into informants are important to
understand; yet there is relatively little literature that is directly applicable to the
subject. Instead we must focus on existing literature from studies of criminal
informants, psychologists, and corporate motivational studies.
Throughout history, it has been of great interest to behavioral scientists to
understand the reasons or driving forces underlying an individual behavior at a
particular time. They all tried to understand why a particular individual behaves in one
way while others choose to behave in another way. There are hundreds or even
thousands of studies that have tried to give sound explanations to the question. Among
them, the ones that looked at the issue from a motivational perspective show potential
to shed light on the phenomena we are trying to explain in this study. According to
them, motives are defined as wants, drives, or needs within an individual that prompts
him/her to action. Hersey, Blanchard and Johnson (1996) define motives as the “whys”
of behavior. They argue that individuals’ direction of activity is determined and
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maintained by hundreds of competing motives (needs) within an individual. The
strongest need at a particular moment determines behavior and leads to activity
(Hersey, et al., 1996). They seem to be the reasons that underlie individual behavior.
Therefore, this study utilizes motivation theories in order to understand the
reasons underlying the decision of a terrorist to become an informant.
In this study, two important content theories of motivation—Maslow’s Hierarchy
of Needs, and Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory— are considered to be very important
conceptual approaches in exploring the mindset of the confidential informant during the
recruitment process. Moreover, another breed of Maslow’s theory, Alderfer’s ERG—
Existence, Relatedness and Growth—theory is also added in discussions to enrich and
increase the explanatory power of the study. All three of these theories focus on the
motivation factors— needs and incentives— within the person that cause—energize,
direct, sustain, and stop—behavior. They attempt to determine the specific needs that
motivate people at a given situation (C.P. Alderfer, 1969; Hersey, et al., 1996;
Herzberg, 1959; Ivancevich, et al., 2005; A. Maslow, 1954; Robbins & Judge, 2007;
Simsek, 2008; Steers & Black, 1994).
While these theories have historically been used in explaining employee
motivations in the workplace and for personnel management, they may also be used to
predict the likelihood of a recruit within a RAT network to become a confidential
informant by studying his environment within the network and his perceptions of it. As
they are human beings, they also have needs, incentives and ambitions that may not be
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addressed within the RAT network; therefore the informants are also expected to show
similar behaviors to employees in corporations. Accordingly Herzberg's theory is
expected to explain why the recruits seek to leave terrorism and Maslow's theory is
expected to explain what motivation factors lead them to become informants.
After discussing the theories and relevant empirical studies, studies in various
fields such as narcotics, corruption, and organized crime are analyzed and discussed in
detail in order to determine informant motivations that can be applied to confidential
informants within RAT networks.

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

An individual’s behavior at a particular moment is usually determined by his/her
strongest need. Abraham Maslow developed a classical framework that helps explain
the strengths of certain needs that are commonly most important to people (A. Maslow,
1954). According to Maslow, human needs are arranged in a hierarchical order, as
illustrated in Figure 1

53

Figure
gure 1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Hersey, et al., 1996)
The main point of Maslow’s theory is that needs are arranged in a hierarchical
manner, starting from the physiological needs, which are the most basic,
basic to the selfactualization needs (Kaplan,
Kaplan, 1998
1998). These needs are defined as follows:

Physiological needs:
The physiological needs are the basic human needs
needs—air,
air, water, food, clothing,
and shelter—to
to sustain life itself. The physiological needs have the highest strength
until they are somewhat satisfied. Until these needs are fulfilled to a certain degree,
needs
eds at other categories will provide little motivation (Steers
Steers & Black, 1994).
1994
Therefore, these needs are at the top of the needs
needs-hierarchy.
hierarchy. When physiological needs
are gratified to some extent, they become less important and needs at other levels of
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the hierarchy emerge. They start motivating and dominating the individual behavior.
When they are somewhat fulfilled, other needs further down the hierarchy arise
(Hersey, et al., 1996).
The most basic of our needs is generally associated with money. It is generally
assumed that the desire for money is directly linked to the need for food, clothing,
shelter and other basic needs. However, money can play a strong role in satisfying
other needs as well. The ability of a given sum of money to satisfy may decrease as
higher level needs come into play, such as social needs that might be met by
membership into an exclusive club, or the esteem granted by an expensive car or
elaborate house. But the farther one gets from basic physiological needs, the less
appropriate money becomes as a tool for satisfying (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Security/Safety needs:
When basic human needs are fairly fulfilled, the needs for security or safety
become predominant (Hersey, et al., 1996). This need can be defined as preservation
instinct for the moment and the future. Security need includes being free of the fear of
physical danger and deprivation of the physiological needs. When a person’s life is in
danger, or he faces a significant threat to his/her safety, other things become negligible
(Steers & Black, 1994).
These needs tend to take two forms- conscious and unconscious. Conscious
forms are readily apparent- the desire to be free from disease, poverty, disaster,
violence, and so on. Security may play a large role in choice of career for some, as in
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availability of health care or perceived job security (Drucker, 1968). Providing this sort
of security makes people more docile and less likely to engage in behaviors that might
threaten their tranquility.
The unconscious needs are a bit more subtle. They may be formed in childhood
by poverty and other hardships, by overprotective parents, or by their social settings
(Gellerman, 1963). An unexpected disruption to their lives may seem devastating to
them, and is strongly feared.

Belongingness, social, and love needs:
Following the adequate satisfaction of physiological and security needs, social or
affiliation needs become predominant (Hersey, et al., 1996). Since people are social
beings, they will do their utmost for meaningful relationships with others. Individuals at
this need level will strive for belonging and being accepted by several groups (Steers &
Black, 1994).
People being essentially social creatures, the need for social interaction is strong.
Schachter (1959) suggests that people will often seek affiliation with a group to help
reinforce beliefs, especially if a belief has been recently shaken. People in this
circumstance will seek out others in an effort to make order of chaos and re-establish
some control over their lives (Schachter, 1959).

Esteem needs:
Once social and belongingness needs become gratified, the individual’s esteem
needs-both self-esteem and esteem from others-dominate his behavior (Hersey, et al.,
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1996). Individuals have a need for recognition and respect from others. Most people
want to feel that they are useful and have an effect on their environment—self-esteem.
They also want to be recognized by others—esteem from others—through constructive
behavior and expect a high evaluation of themselves that is firmly based in reality.
When these needs are fulfilled they yield feelings of self-confidence, power, control and
prestige. But there are also those esteem needs that are blocked and cannot be
satisfied through adaptive behavior. Frustration of esteem needs may consequently
yield to immature or disruptive behaviors such as engaging in work restriction or
arguments with supervisors, co-workers or subordinates, much like a child throwing a
temper tantrum to gain attention (Hersey, et al., 1996).
The need for esteem may take any of several forms:
•

Prestige: "a sort of unwritten definition of the kinds of conduct that other people
are expected to show in one's presence; what degree of respect or disrespect,
formality or informality, reserve or frankness" (Gellerman, 1963, p. 27). People
tend to have a universal need to have their relative importance clarified, and
desire a high valuation of themselves based upon the recognition and respect
given to them by others.

•

Power: the ability to manipulate and control the actions of others to suit one's
own purposes. This may be personal power (charisma) or the power of position
(authority) (Hersey, et al., 1996).
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Self-actualization needs:
After individuals begin to satisfy their esteem needs, the self-actualization needs
begin to emerge (Hersey, et al., 1996). Maslow articulates self- actualization as “What a
man can be, he must be”. It is the need to become what he is capable of becoming (A.
H. Maslow, Frager, & Fadiman, 1970). The motivation for self-actualization may be to
win battles for a general, to play music for a musician, to write for a poet, or to teach
for a professor. Self-actualization is the desire of an individual to maximize his potential
(Hersey, et al., 1996). A fireman may courageously run into a burning building to save
a child trapped in the fire, knowing that chances for injury are high. His motivation for
action is what he thinks is important at the moment, not for affiliation or recognition. In
this case, the firefighter can be considered as self-actualized—to have maximized the
potential of what is important at the time.
Self-actualization motives can change over time (Hersey, et al., 1996). For
example, a VCU student might express self-actualization by playing basketball at VCU
Rams basketball team. As his horizon broadens or as his physical attributes change over
time, the same individual, eventually, might be self-actualized by teaching at VCU as a
professor.
The most difficult to define, self-actualization needs seem to fall into two
motives:
•

Competence: the ability to manipulate environmental and social factors to one's
favor proactively. This may manifest in childhood as a need to master a sport or
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in taking things apart and putting them back together. In adults it may be
mastering a profession or skills. A routine or closely supervised job may frustrate
this need.
•

Achievement: the need to excel in an area beyond the ability of one's peers.
People to whom achievement is important tend to gravitate toward higher-risk
situations and careers (Hersey, et al., 1996).

Maslow didn’t intend to mean that the hierarchy inevitably follows the pattern
described in the theory and applies universally. Rather, it should be looked at as a
general tendency or a typical pattern that operates most of the time. He mentions the
Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi as an example of someone who sacrificed his
physiological and safety needs while he was operating at self-actualization level. During
the days India was struggling for independence from Great Britain, Gandhi sacrificed his
basic needs and fasted for several weeks to protest British government (Hersey, et al.,
1996).
It is important to mention here that while changing the dominance of motives
between need categories, it shouldn’t be assumed that dominating need at one
category has to be completely satisfied before the next-high level needs emerge.
Rather, somewhat fulfillment of motivations at one level would be sufficient for the
emergence of other levels of needs to predominate the behavior of the individual.
Maslow’s need hierarchy theory is not an “all-or-nothing” framework. In real life
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situations, most people tend to be partially satisfied and partially unsatisfied at each
level. This approach is considered useful to anticipate likelihood of potential individual
behaviors during recruitment of informants (Hersey, et al., 1996).
Traditionally Maslow’s needs hierarchy has been depicted as a pyramid, with the
physiological needs at the bottom and the self-actualization needs at the top. Maslow
himself has never referred to a graphic, and one criticism of the pyramid depiction is
that it implies that in order for higher needs to be met one much completely fulfill the
more basic needs. Maslow’s own commentary states that this is an incorrect
assumption. Therefore, it is assumed that below illustration, which shows how higher
level needs may be partly met while basic needs are not completely fulfilled, is a better
fit for Maslow’s theory (Saeednia & Md-Nor, 2010).

Figure 2: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Saeednia & Md-Nor, 2010)
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Later, Abraham H. Maslow in his book “Motivation and Personality” made the
following statements about his theory:
•

While his theory may “give the false impression that a need must be
satisfied 100 percent before the next need emerges”, in actual fact, “most
members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their
basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same
time” (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

•

When a new need arises, “this emergence is not a sudden, saltatory
phenomenon, but rather a gradual emergence by slow degrees from
nothingness.”(A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

•

“A satisfied need is not a motivator.” (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

•

“People who have been satisfied in their basic needs throughout their
lives, particularly in their earlier years, seem to develop exceptional power
to withstand present or future thwarting of these needs simply because
they have strong healthy character structure as a result of basic
satisfaction.” (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

•

“There are other apparently creative people in whom the drive to
creativeness seems to be more important than any other counterdeterminant. Their creativeness might appear not as self- actualization
released by basic satisfaction, but in spite of lack of basic satisfaction” (A.
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H. Maslow, et al., 1970). An example of this is the stereotype of the
starving artist.
•

“In certain people the level of aspiration may be permanently deadened or
lowered.” A person who has been denied fulfillment of his higher needs
for most of his life will be content to only have his basic needs met.(A. H.
Maslow, et al., 1970)

•

“Perhaps more important than all these exceptions are the ones that
involve ideals, high social standards, high values and the like. With such
values people become martyrs; they will give up everything for the sake
of a particular ideal or value.” (A. H. Maslow, et al., 1970)

The main assumption of Maslow’s need-hierarchy theory is that an individual
attempts to satisfy physiological needs before directing behavior toward satisfaction of
upper-level needs. Some other assumptions of this theory which are considered have
an impact during the recruitment process of informants in RAT networks include:
•

When a need is satisfied it ceases to have motivating power.

•

Frustration, conflict, and stress are potential outcomes of unsatisfied
needs.

•

Individuals have a tendency to grow and develop; therefore, they
persistently will attempt to move up the hierarchy in terms of need
gratification (Ivancevich, et al., 2005).
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Mary Kay, Inc., uses Maslow’s need hierarchy to manage its workforce of over
one million beauty consultants in 34 markets around the world. The company is best
known for its award of the Mary Kay Pink Cadillac for outstanding sales and teamwork.
According to Mary Kay Annual Report (2002) their consultants report that their
motivations are sales commissions and incentives (financial), being part of a team
(social), recognition (esteem) and the chance to help others (self-actualization). Mary
Kay’s management understands the importance of needs and motivators, and
recognizes that pay, incentives, recognition and teamwork are a combination of factors
that their consultants seek. (Ivancevich, et al., 2005)
Maslow estimates that the typical adult in society has satisfied about 85 percent
of the physiological need, 70 percent of their need for safety and security, 50 percent of
the social and love need, 40 percent of the esteem need and 10 percent of selfactualization. Many critics disagree with his estimates, in particular the low percentage
of self-actualization (Ivancevich, et al., 2005).

Alderfer’s ERG Theory

Clayton Alderfer of Yale University revised and realigned Maslow’s theory and
developed the ERG–existence (E), relatedness (R), and growth (G)-theory (C.P.
Alderfer, 1969). Alderfer agrees with the idea of Maslow that individual needs are
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arranged in a hierarchy. Unlike Maslow
Maslow, according to Alderfer there are three sets of
needs:
1. Existence needs: Needs satisfied by such factors as food, air, water, pay, and
working conditions.
2. Relatedness needs: Needs satisfied by meaningful personal and interpersonal
relations.
3. Growth needs: Needs satisfied by an individua
individuall making creative and productive
contributions (C.P.
C.P. Alderfer, 1972
1972).
As demonstrated in Table 1 needs in Alderfer’s Existence group corresponds
corres
to
Maslow’s physiological and safety groups; relatedness group corresponds to Maslow’s
social needs; and growth group corresponds to Maslow’s esteem and self-actualization
self
group needs. (Ivancevich,
Ivancevich, et al., 2005
2005)
Table 1:: Comparison of Maslow’s and Alderfer’s Categories of Needs

According to Robbins and Judge (2007) the ERG theory’s two core assumptions
make it more meaningful and valid in describing the need hierarchy:
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1. According to Maslow only one category of needs are preponderant on the
individual behavior at a given time. The ERG theory asserts that more than one
need can dominate the behavior more or less equally. For example, safety and
social needs, which are in different categories, can equally dominate the
individual’s behavior at the same time.
2. Maslow argues that an individual remains at one need level until his needs are
somewhat gratified. On the other hand, Alderfer proposes that if an individual’s
needs are blocked or frustrated at one need level, he regresses to needs at a
lower level (Robbins & Judge, 2007).
Maslow’s need hierarchy and Alderfer’s ERG theory differ not only in the number
of categories but also on the movement of individual through the different sets of
needs. According to Maslow (1954) higher-level of needs are not triggered and the
person does not progress up the need hierarchy until predominant needs at that level
are adequately satisfied. When needs at one level are somewhat gratified, the nexthigher level needs emerges and the individual progresses up the need hierarchy.
In addition to this satisfaction-progression process, Alderfer (1972) augments a
frustration-regression process to his model. According to the ERG theory when
satisfaction of a need—for example, a growth need—is persistently blocked or the
individual is continually frustrated in attempts to satisfy this need, lower-order needs—
relatedness needs—reemerge as preponderant motivation and consequently, the
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individual conveys efforts towards gratification of a lower-order need category
(Ivancevich, et al., 2005).
Alderfer’s theory of motivation gives an interesting insight for managers about
employee behavior. If an employee’s needs are being blocked, so there is no
opportunity for growth- for instance, if he feels stagnated in his position- then the
manager should try to guide the employee’s efforts to relatedness or existence needs.
The ERG theory suggests that people’s behavior is motivated by satisfying one of the
three sets of needs.(Ivancevich, et al., 2005)
Alderfer’s ERG model hasn’t received enough research support for its empirical
verification yet.

Herzberg’s Motivation – Hygiene Theory

Herzberg (1959) developed a theory that claims two factors of motivation. These
are termed the dissatisfiers-satisfiers or the hygiene-motivators or the extrinsic-intrinsic
factors. It has been observed that higher needs such as esteem and self-actualization
seem to become increasingly important over time as people develop. Frederic Herzberg
studied this extensively and has developed a theory of work motivation that has been
shown to be effective in the workplace in increasing morale and productivity (Herzberg,
1959). Although Herzberg's theory was developed to study conditions in the corporate
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environment, it is considered to be applicable to other organizations, including terrorist
networks.

The original research brought two conclusions: first, that there are extrinsic
conditions in the work environment which give rise to employee dissatisfaction if they
are lacking. If they are present these conditions don’t motivate employees, but they
prevent dissatisfaction. These factors include, but are not limited to: Salary, job
security, working conditions, status, company procedures, quality of supervision, quality
of interpersonal relationships with supervisors, among peers, and with subordinates.
Second, there are intrinsic conditions related to job content that will bring strong
positive motivation that may result in improved job performance. If these conditions are
lacking, the job will not be satisfying. These satisfiers include, but are not limited to:
achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, the work itself, the potential for
growth. These satisfiers are related to the work itself. When they are present they
contribute to positive motivation (Ivancevich, et al., 2005; Steers & Black, 1994).
While developing his theory, Herzberg argued that knowledge of motivation and
human nature could be very important to organizations:
“To industry, the payoff for a study of job attitudes would be increased
productivity, decreased absenteeism, and smoother working relations. To the individual,
an understanding of the forces that lead to improved morale would bring greater
happiness and greater self-realization” (Herzberg, 1959).
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Herzberg’s study was on job attitudes with the goal of gathering data from which
to form assumptions about human behavior. The motivation-hygiene theory was the
result of analysis by Herzberg and his colleagues at the Psychological Service of
Pittsburgh. They intensively interviewed about two hundred engineers and accountants
from eleven companies in Pittsburgh, asking what elements of their jobs made them
happy or unhappy, satisfied or dissatisfied (Herzberg, Mausnes, Peterson, & Capwell,
1957).
In his analysis Herzberg concluded that there are two categories of needs that
are independent of each other and have different effects on behavior. When people are
unhappy or dissatisfied in their jobs they tend to focus on their work environment, but
when they are happy they tend to focus on the work itself. He referred to the first
category as hygiene or maintenance factors, because hygiene refers to the work
environment and serves to prevent job dissatisfaction and maintenance because the
people have to be maintained as they are never completely satisfied. The second
category was labeled motivators because they seem to be effective in motivating people
to better job performance (Herzberg, 1959).

Hygiene Factors:
Work conditions, salary, status, job security, interpersonal relationships and
company policies and administration may be considered to be maintenance needs. They
are not inherent to the jobs themselves, but are related to the work environment.
Herzberg chose the term hygiene for its medical meaning of environmental factors and
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prevention. He found that hygiene needs did not promote increased worker
productivity, but only prevented losses in productivity due to worker restrictions
(Hersey, et al., 1996).

Motivators:
Factors that promote feelings of achievement, recognition and professional
growth in the job are referred to as motivators. Herzberg chose this term because the
factors tend to increase job satisfaction, often resulting in an increase in productivity
(Hersey, et al., 1996).
More recently motivation-hygiene research has been expanded to other parts of
organizations to include everyone from hourly workers to upper management
(Cumming, 1994; Deeprose, 1995) In a study at Texas Instruments,

Myers (1964)

found that Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory “is easily translatable to supervisory
action at all levels of responsibility. It is a framework on which supervisors can evaluate
and put into perspective the constant barrage of ‘helpful hints’ to which they are
subjected, and hence serves to increase their feelings of competence, self-competence,
and autonomy” (Myers, 1964).
Herzberg concludes that satisfiers and hygiene factors can be used to
understand environmental (extrinsic) conditions for factory workers in most countries.
The Global OB, which combines data and research for a variety of researchers, supports
the use of Herzberg’s two-factor theory in various cultures (Herzberg, 1987) An other
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study of employees in Turkey, Cyprus, Nigeria, and Great Britain reported general
support to Herzberg's theory (Adigun, 2000).

Herzberg’s theory assumes that job satisfaction is not one-dimensional, but that
there are two dimensions needed to ensure job satisfaction. Prior to Herzberg’s
research, job satisfaction was considered to be unidimensional, with job satisfaction at
one end and dissatisfaction at the other. The assumption was that if a condition caused
job satisfaction, removing it would cause dissatisfaction, and that the inverse was true
as well (Ivancevich, et al., 2005).
One of the appeals of Herzberg’s theory is that the terminology he used is workoriented, so there is no confusion arising from the use of psychological terms. However,
the theory has been criticized on a number of levels- some researchers feel it
oversimplifies the nature of job satisfaction, while others criticize the methodology,
which requires introspection on the part of the workers. Another criticism is that
Herzberg has done little testing of the theory’s motivational and performance
consequences. In his initial research only self-evaluations were used, and generally the
respondents described work that had gone on over a long period.(Ivancevich, et al.,
2005)
Despite the criticisms to the theory, the impact of the theory on management
should not be underestimated. The concept of job enrichment has arisen from the
theory, which consists of recognition, challenge, growth opportunities, responsibility and
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personal achievement within a person’s career. This increases the individual’s
motivation by providing more independence and accountability when performing
challenging tasks (Steers & Black, 1994).
Many managers feel comfortable with Herzberg’s two-factor approach. From a
scientific perspective this presents some dangers of misuse, but the theory is still
applied in many organizations. Examples include providing time and money for working
on ideas to improve products and processes in manufacturing, introducing flex-time
schedules to give employees greater job discretion, and implementing a profit-sharing
plan to provide both recognition and achievement to employees to reward employees
who exceed expectations.(Ivancevich, et al., 2005)
Herzberg observed that the overspecialization seen in many industries
contributes to job dissatisfaction, and speculated on what was termed "job enrichment",
the deliberate upgrading of challenge, responsibility and scope of one's work. An
example of this is given by Lawler (1990) where a group of janitors, who had been
noted for being lazy and apathetic, were given complete responsibility for housekeeping
within their plant and autonomy in purchasing equipment and supplies. Any sales
representatives were referred to the janitors, as were any housekeeping concerns. After
a time their performance improved dramatically, as did their appearance and morale
(Lawler III, 1990).
Similarly, over hiring—bringing overqualified people into simple jobs—results in
boredom, apathy and high levels of turnover. Marrow et al (1967) tells of an industrial
71

plant that hired security people with a minimum of a high school diploma and three
years of experience to check badges and lunch pails, and had a problem with boredom
and turnover. The hiring requirements were changed so that a high school diploma was
considered overqualified, and people with fourth-and fifth-grade educations were hired
instead. These people had lower job expectations, and found having a position of some
responsibility and authority to be rewarding, resulting in a more effective workforce
(Marrow, Bowers, & Seashore, 1967).
Hygiene factors can be satisfied to reduce dissatisfaction and frustration, but will
not motivate a person to increase their capacity or performance. However, increasing
the positive motivators will allow a person to grow and develop new abilities, increasing
his productivity. We can therefore conclude that hygiene factors affect a person’s
willingness, while motivators affect their abilities.
Based on assumptions of this theory, if a RAT member is well compensated, is
secure in the position, has a good relationship with both peers and management, and is
given duties that he perceives and interesting and challenging for which he will be
accountable will be highly motivated in terrorist setting. This type of militant is expected
to be less likely to be informants.
On the other hand, if members of a RAT group are not well compensated, do not
feel secure in their positions, have poor relationships with peers and management and
are not given challenges and are bored with their work, they will not be motivated in
the terrorist setting. Expected outcomes would be poor performance, absenteeism and
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high rate of turnover. Based on Herzberg’s theory this would be the best case where
most members of RAT group would be eager to be informants because both hygiene
factors and satisfiers are not present in this setting.

The Relationship of Herzberg’s Theory to Maslow’s Theory

Maslow’s theory helps to identify needs and motives, while Herzberg’s theory
provides insights into the goals and incentives to help satisfy those needs. Therefore, in
a motivating situation, if the LEI officer can identify the strongest needs (Maslow), he
should be able to derive the goals he is able to provide in a given environment to
motivate the recruit. Similarly, if the officer can determine the individual’s goals he can
predict what their high-strength needs will be. This is possible because it has been
found that benefits and compensation tend to satisfy the physiological and security
needs, while interpersonal relationships and supervisory relations are examples of
hygiene factors that tend to satisfy social needs, and challenging assignments,
opportunities for growth and development are motivators that satisfy esteem and selfactualization needs. Figure 3 shows the relationship we feel exists between the Maslow
and Herzberg frameworks (Hersey, et al., 1996).
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Figure 3:: The Relationship of Maslow’s Theory to Herzberg’s Theory

It is apparent that physiological, security, social and some esteem needs are
hygiene factors. Esteem needs can be broken down into esteem, status and
professional recognition. Status is generally a reflection of one’s position, which may
have been gained through family ties or networking and may not be representative of
personal achievement
hievement or peer recognition, while recognition is gained through
competence and performance. Therefore, status should be regarded as a hygiene
factor, while recognition and esteem should be considered to be motivators (Hersey, et
al., 1996).
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Select Studies about Theories

Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) suggest that needs models have become of interest
because they agree with other theories about rational choice and because they give
credit for freedom to individuals. The idea of an individual’s choices shaping their
actions to satisfy needs gives direction and purpose to activities. The theories are also
popular because they are easily expressed and simple to understand relative to human
behaviors (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977).
Maslow’s needs hierarchy has been the subject of several studies attempting to
field test it. The first reported research testing a modified version of the hierarchy was
performed by Porter (1961). At the time Porter assumed that management had their
physiological needs adequately satisfied, and substituted a higher order need called

autonomy which he defined as the individual’s satisfaction with opportunities for
independent decisions, setting goals and working with minimal supervision (Porter,
1961).
Research studies about Maslow’s theory have reported:
•

Managers higher in the hierarchy of a company place greater importance
on autonomy and self-actualization (Porter, 1964)

•

Managers in lower positions in smaller firms (less than 500 employees)
are more satisfied than similar managers at larger companies (more than
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5000 employees), while upper management at larger companies are more
satisfied than those of smaller companies (Porter, 1963).
•

American managers working overseas tend to be more satisfied with
opportunities for autonomy than are domestic managers (Ivancevich,
1969).

Despite the findings of the research, there are a number of issues remaining
regarding the needs hierarchy. Data from the managers of two different companies
suggests that a needs hierarchy may not exist. The data suggests that only two levels
of needs exist: physiological and everything else. Researchers have noted that as
managers advance in the hierarchy of their organizations, their need for security
diminishes, while their needs for social interaction, achievement, recognition and selfactualization increase. (Hall & Nougaim, 1968; Ivancevich, et al., 2005)
Mwangi (1993) investigated the motivations of extension agents relative to the
theories of Maslow and Herzberg, among others. His overall finding was that motivation
and job satisfaction were directly linked, and that the factors related to job satisfaction
varied among individuals (Mwangi, 1993).
In his analysis of Maslow's theory, he agrees with the criticisms by Dowling &
Sayles (1971), Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, & Dyer (1980), and Davies, Ellison,
Osborne, & West-Burnham (1990) noting the following:
•

Maslow's theory ignores the possibility of altruistic behavior that may reject
subordinate levels in favor of self-actualization.
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•

It does not account for individual differences in preference for rewards- for
example, some may value self-esteem over social needs.

•

It fails to provide a conceptual link between satisfaction and performance.

•

Continual satisfaction of a need may diminish its relative importance.

•

Satisfaction of higher level needs may change the perception of what constitutes
satisfaction of lower-level needs.

•

Work is not the only source of satisfaction.

•

Managers cannot assume a homogenous workforce.

•

The self-actualization concept is vague and difficult to define for managers
(Davies, Ellison, Osborne, & West-Burnham, 1990; Dowling & Sayles, 1971;
Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, & Dyer, 1980; Mwangi, 1993).
Mwangi (1993) cites following limitations of Herzberg's theory after comparing

and contrasting the studies of Herzberg (1972), Buford, Bedeian, & Lindner (1995), and
Kreitner (1989):
•

Over-generalization. Herzberg's study was based on 200 accountants and
engineers in the Pittsburg area, and so may not be a good representation of
general workforces.

•

Research has not supported Herzberg's assertion that hygiene factors can
prevent dissatisfaction but cannot satisfy employees.

•

Research studies indicate that professional and non-professional employees have
different work preferences for which Herzberg did not account.
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According to Wahba and Bridwell (1976) Maslow's theory does have some
limitations. They reviewed the research on Maslow's model and concluded "there is no
consistent support for the hierarchy proposed by Maslow." They added that there is "no
clear evidence that human needs are classified in five distinct categories, or that these
categories are structured in a special hierarchy" (Wahba & Bridwell, 1976, p. 224).
However, Maslow's hierarchy should not be discarded. Wahba and Bridwell's
study is not definitive, as the theory is difficult to test empirically, but they note that the
studies done used a rank-order system of categorizing needs, which may not be a "valid
test of Maslow's need hierarchy, since rank ordering is not a Maslow concept."
Modifications of the theory may be needed when studying people of other cultures.
Needs hierarchy has also been used to explain the dominance of different needs of
people over time, and can be invaluable for improving employee retention (Castillo,
2003).
Herzberg's theory has also been tested, and his original findings supported
(Friedlander & Walton, 1964; Myers, 1964; Saleh, 1964; Weissenberg & Gruenfeld,
1968), and concluded that factors causing job satisfaction (motivators) are different
from, and not merely opposite to, factors causing job dissatisfaction (hygienes). But
some studies (Dunnette, Campbell, & Hakel, 1967; Friedlander, 1965; Myers, 1964)
showed a particular attribute causing job satisfaction in one sample and job
dissatisfaction in another, while other studies (Ewen, 1963; Gordon, 1965) found the
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same factor causing job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction within the same sample. An
example would be that Ewen (1963) found that salary, considered a hygiene, was a
motivator in one group but both a source of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in another,
while prestige, a motivator, caused satisfaction and dissatisfaction within a group.
Bockman (1971) comments that "the Herzberg results cannot be generalized beyond
the situation that they were obtained" (p. 164).
Ewen (1963) and Ewen, Smith, Hulin & Locke (1966) claim that Herzberg's
"recall" method of data collection is subject to bias while Friedlander (1965) criticized
the "self report" technique because, as reported by Bockman (1971), "self perception
may be quite different from objective perception of what occurred" (p. 184). French,
Metersky, Thaler & Trexler (1973) commented that others who have used data
collection methodologies different from Herzberg's have obtained results not supportive
of the theory. However, in employee retention Herzberg contributes a valuable idea in
that the nature of the work environment- pay, challenge, flexible hours- is important in
maintaining high job satisfaction and preventing employees from leaving.

Castillo (2003) studies recruitment and management in maquiladoras, which are
export factories in Mexico near the US border. According to her Human Resources (HR)
is a vital function of an organization. Identifying needs is central to HR Management
(HRM). Castillo notes that needs may vary from one culture to another, and that the
majority of theories have been based upon studies of the needs of workers in the US.
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In her study the recruitment process is broken down into stages. The first stage is to
identify potential applicants; second is to narrow the pool of applicants down using
various recruitment and selection tools; third is to make an offer to the desired
applicant. Part of this is identifying "inducements", a general term loosely defined by
Rynes and Barber (1990) as "deliberate modification of job and organizational attributes
for the explicit purpose of enhancing the attractiveness of a job to potential applicants"
(p. 294).
The problem of employee retention is also addressed. Turnover is problematic in
that it requires additional recruitment and training of new employees, both of which
require expenditure of resources. To avoid turnover, management must identify the
needs of employees and ensure that they are met (Castillo, 2003).
She based her study on Maslow's and Herzberg's theories after outlining and
discussing them in detail. She found that the needs identified in one culture as
important may be of lesser importance elsewhere- for example, American workers
identified social needs as the third most important while Mexican workers considered
this to be least important (Castillo, 2003).
Other empirical studies are noted. Reitz (1975) found that among blue-collar
workers in twenty six industrial plants across eight countries, self-actualization was
ranked as the most important, while among more educated workers security was held
as of lesser importance than among less educated workers.
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Overall the studies indicate that Maslow's hierarchy and Herzberg's theory do not
necessarily translate universally to other cultures, and must be considered to be
approximate guidelines only.

Select Studies About Informants and Their Needs

Miller (1996) defines confidential informants (CI) as people who, rather than
simply pass along information to law enforcement, actively seek out information to
bring forth. They are typically criminals themselves who operate within a criminal
environment. According to DeGarmo (1972), large metropolitan police forces keep files
on their informants containing signed forms that 1) waive legal liability on the part of
law enforcement for their personal safety, 2) state any agreements between the CI and
law enforcement, and 3) specify violations while in the role of informant that may cause
dismissal or prosecution of the CI.
According to Miller (1996) the motivations of informants are generally:
•

The "hammered" informant- one who is informing due to having been caught
and pressured by law enforcement.

•

The mercenary informant- one whose motivation is financial.

•

The vengeful informant- one who wants to see someone else brought down in
retaliation for some past conflict.
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•

The "police buff"- one who wants to be a cop and have excitement (Miller,
1996).

The focus of Skolnick (1994)'s work is on the narcotics force of a police precinct.
There are some parallels between this and terrorism networks, in that the low-ranking
members of the organization are the most visible and take the greatest risks while the
highest-ranking individuals who are responsible for the overall actions of the group are
well hidden.
Skolnick references Harney and Cross (1968) in describing the motivations of
informants in general, but goes into detail regarding narcotics informers. The primary
types of informers tend to be either addicts or people who work in places frequented by
them. The motivation for the addicts is typically either to avoid incarceration or to
reduce the severity of the punishments for their crimes. The second group, those who
have casual contact with the addicts, may be motivated by a desire to avoid legal
trouble that comes with having illegal activities occurring in their place of business or a
simple desire to have the addicts removed from their place of business as they tend to
be less than desirable clientele (Skolnick, 1994).
Cultivating informants is often more than simply offering money or incarceration.
Skolnick uses as an example a sergeant whose techniques for cultivating informants
included using egalitarian symbols, such as asking to be addressed by his first name
rather than as "sir"; using a non-judgmental affect in his interactions with them, in the
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manner of a therapist addressing an illness rather than a crime; expressing interest in
the informant's well being and showing concern. This builds trust with the informant
and helps create a rapport. Of equal importance is to protect the identity of the
informant, as his safety would be at risk if it were generally known that he was assisting
law enforcement. Betraying the confidence of one informant can damage the trust of
the others as well (Skolnick, 1994).
Lee (2004) mentions four main purposes of DEA to use confidential informants:
•

“To gather information from sources not readily available to law
enforcement officers.

•

To make observations in places where strangers would immediately be
suspect.

•

To conduct undercover negotiations.

•

To gain firsthand, timely intelligence” (Lee, 2004, p. 64).

Lee then identifies following motivational factors for drug informants:

Fear: The threat of incarceration is a strong motivator. Combined with the offer
of reduced sentence or even dropped charges, this can be a powerful incentive to give
information. The threat of danger from his associates may also lead the informant to
seek protection from law enforcement. One consideration in this case is that if the
informant’s associates know of his arrest, they may cut off all contact with him to avoid
being set up. Action must be taken quickly before knowledge of the arrest spreads (Lee,
2004).
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Revenge/Jealousy: Revenge or jealousy may prompt a criminal to inform on a
competitor in hopes of getting them eliminated. Once the arrest has been made, the
officer may use the situation to gain information on his former informant as well (Lee,
2004).

Repentance: An individual may express repentance for his crimes, but this is
rarely genuine. Typically they are attempting to impress upon law enforcement how
good of a person they are now and a desire to make amends for past crimes, but their
true motivations may be devious (Lee, 2004).

Altruism: People may pass along information out of a desire to do good- for
example, airline employees or package delivery workers who have noted something
odd. As their access is limited, their information may not be very useful (Lee, 2004).

Mercenaries: A person may pass on information in exchange for money.
Mercenaries often have a criminal past of their own, and their familiarity with crime and
criminals enables them to gain valuable information. They may also introduce
undercover agents who can then infiltrate and ultimately arrest the criminals.
Mercenaries may be involved more closely and for longer than would be practical for an
undercover agent. While valuable, they may have other motivations which should be
explored (Lee, 2004).

Egotism: Commonly encountered informants are those who act out of a need to
bolster self-esteem. They may ostensibly be seeking monetary reward, but in reality
they need attention and praise. They may be difficult to control, wanting to take a more
84

active part in the investigation or drawing it out to obtain more money and praise. If
they feel they are not receiving adequate praise they may go to a different official or
agency. The ego of the handling agent should never be in conflict with the ego of the
informant (Lee, 2004).

James Bond Syndrome: Some informants will be motivated out of a desire to act
out fantasies of fast cars and amazing weapons. They may attempt to take control of
the investigation themselves. Their information may be exaggerated in an attempt to
get them into the act, to play their fantasy role (Lee, 2004).

The Wannabe: Wannabees are typically people who have desired a career in law
enforcement from a young age, but for various reasons fail to qualify. They may try to
emulate their handling officers, and often reveal themselves to unconcerned third
parties, implying that they have authority and prestige that they don’t. Their
information is usually limited at best as they lack criminal associations themselves (Lee,
2004).

Perversely Motivated Informants: An informant with ulterior motives may be able
to give valuable information, but they may be dangerous. Some will cooperate to learn
the identities of undercover agents, to gain information on the progress of an operation,
or about the weapons and capabilities of law enforcement. They may glean more
information than they give (Lee, 2004).
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Harney and Cross (1968) defined an informant as “a person who gives
information to an investigator because of a definite personal motive.” They then
categorize the motives as: Fear, Revenge, Perverse, Egotistical, Mercenary, Detective
Complex, Selective Law Enforcement, Appreciation or Gratitude Toward Police, and
Repentance or desire to reform.
Fitzgerald (2008) mentions 13 different motivation factors in getting a person to
cooperate as an informant in criminal investigations: money, fear of punishment, fear of
criminal associates and revenge, becoming citizen informants, walk-in informants,
jailhouse informants or furloughed informants, repentance, excitement, being police
enthusiasts, acting as double agents, being unwitting informants, and becoming
brokered informants.
Generally informants have to be motivated to act, and their motivations usually
fall into more than one category. Their handlers should do their best to identify as many
of these motivations as possible and keep them in mind.

Money: The most common motivator. The mercenary motive has a long history,
from the biblical accounts of Judas Iscariot to the Wanted posters of the American West
in the 1800s. The amount of money paid to an informer varies, but is the most easily
understood motivator (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Fear of punishment: As the majority of informants are criminals who have been
recently caught, this too is a common motivator. The person will trade information for a
reduced sentence or other advantages (Fitzgerald, 2008).
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Fear of criminal associates and revenge: Many informers will provide information
in hopes that someone who has threatened them will be incarcerated, or as a form of
revenge against someone who has wronged them. The informants may also seek future
protection by law enforcement from other former associates (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Citizen informants: Non-criminal sources of information, acting as a concerned
citizen. They may be hotel workers, neighbors, airline workers, delivery people, or have
some other casual contact with persons of interest. Generally they are not able to
supply a continual stream of information as they are not closely involved with the
criminals, but may have information about individual events (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Walk-in informants: These are somewhat rare, and often will not have useful
information. They may be motivated by any number of things- hoping for money, being
a dutiful citizen, wanting to be rid of criminals from their neighborhood, etc. Like citizen
informants, their knowledge is often very limited (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Jailhouse informants: Inmates may provide information in hopes of getting their
sentences reduced, gaining privileges, being transferred to a better environment or
other advantages while incarcerated (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Furloughed prisoners: A convicted criminal may be brought out of prison
temporarily to assist in an investigation by interfacing with persons of interest in order
to gather evidence (Fitzgerald, 2008).
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Repentance: The informant may wish to make up for past crimes to clear their
conscience. This may be in conjunction with other motivations, such as fear of
imprisonment or fear of their former associates (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Excitement: Also known as James Bond complex, these informants are difficult to
control as they are eager to act out fantasies based on action movies and crime
dramas. They see investigations as glamorous adventures, and may be dangerous to
themselves and to the investigation (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Police buffs: Similar to the James Bond wannabees, these informers are people
who wish to be police officers themselves but are unable to qualify due to physical
reasons or being unable to pass a background check. They may be members of a
neighborhood watch or other organization. However, as they are not closely involved
their information is likely to be limited (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Double agents: Also known as perversely motivated, this informant has ulterior
motives which may be disadvantageous to law enforcement. They may provide valid
information, but are also looking for information themselves about the law
enforcement- information about investigations, identities of undercover officers,
weaponry and resources available to law enforcement, etc. (Fitzgerald, 2008).

Unwitting informant: The informant may be unaware that the person they are
talking to is with law enforcement. They may be an associate of a criminal informant
who will then claim the information as his own, without law enforcement knowing the
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true source. The information gathered this way is generally very reliable (Fitzgerald,
2008).

Brokered informants: If a criminal has nothing to offer law enforcement, they
may call upon resources such as friends or family to help obtain information. While the
information may be good, the danger to the civilians is high (Fitzgerald, 2008).
With the help of previous studies and 25 years of personal law enforcement
experience Madinger (2000) identifies 10 common informant motives. These
motivations are: Fear (both threat of incarceration, and threat of harm by associates),
Revenge, Perverse, Egoistical, Mercenary, Repentance or desire to reform, Jealousy,
Cop wannabe/James Bond, Good citizen (Patriotic motive), and Mentally disturbed
individuals. All of these motivations are considered important and included in the
present study except for the mentally disturbed individuals. According to Madinger
(2000) some informants will come forward with bizarre or incomprehensible information
that stems from some form of delusion. Their information tends to be unreliable at best.
While generally harmless, they can consume time better spent on other efforts. Since
none of the subjects of the present study were mentally disturbed, this variable is not
tested in the present study.
Madinger (2000) uses Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory to explain these
motives, and utilizes 12 case studies to exemplify and confirm the validity of these
categories. Among the findings of Madinger regarding the informant motivation the
following are considered important for the purposes of my study:
89

•

Informants will often have multiple motivations

•

The motivations are flexible, of varying strength or even in competition
with each other depending on time and circumstances in the informant’s
career

•

Knowing the status of the informant’s motivations and what are the
strongest influences at a given time is the best means of exercising the
control needed to ensure his success as well as our own (Madinger,
2000).

The most obvious motivators are not necessarily the ones that the informant
needs to have immediately addressed. Threatening an informant with additional
punishments that may be avoided by cooperation may be the most direct, but
addressing his need to be valued and respected by treating him with dignity and
expressing appreciation for his help can be far more effective. Positive reinforcement
should never be overlooked as a motivator (Madinger, 2000).
In summary, Madinger concludes following in his study:
•

Motivations are the most critical element in informants- people who have access to
information are many.

•

The reasons against becoming an informant are many and powerful. The
motivations to provide information must be strong enough to overcome the very
strong prejudices against betrayal.
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•

There are several common reasons for people to cooperate with law enforcement,
all related to the potential informant’s perceived needs.

•

Most informants have multiple reasons for cooperating, and those motivations may
change over time, as their perceived needs shift.

•

It is critical that the officer working with the informant be aware at all times of the
informant’s motivations (Madinger, 2000).
Blum (1972)’s study is one of the most cited books in the literature regarding to

informants. In his study Blum interviewed 35 police informants in an attempt to put
together a profile of a typical informant. He found that the majority were males
between 25 and 45 years old and had not completed high school. They had various
occupations, the most common being prostitutes. Twenty percent were career
criminals.
According to Blum (1972) becoming an informant most often starts with an
arrest in which the suspect is offered a deal in exchange for information. Fear of
punishment is the most common motivation, followed by money, friendship with a
particular officer, and vengeance. Some seek safety with law enforcement, some are
trying to build up good will with law enforcement against a future time when they may
be arrested, while a few get a thrill from the secrecy and double identity involved.
Over time the relationship between law enforcement and the informant tends to
change. As fear or desire for revenge fade, the desire for money may grow, along with
friendship with the handler. The informer may also come to enjoy the feeling of playing
91

cop. The former associates of the informer may come to be perceived as undesirable,
as the informer tries to justify betraying their trust (Blum 1972).
Law enforcement reports their most common problems with informants are
finding them, being limited to secure channels to communicate with them, increasing
greed over time, reliability of information over time, providing adequate safety for the
informant, and being drawn into the informant's personal life (Blum 1972).
For the informants the biggest problems are the risks of being found out by his
associates, which will incur their vengeance, and the possibility of losing their job if they
are informing against an employer (Blum 1972).
Some common themes emerged in Blum (1972)’s study in regards to the
informer relative to his associates:
•

Most inform on persons engaged in the same type of crime as the informant.

•

The majority inform on people of their own ethnicity.

•

About half inform on people of their own gender.

•

About half inform on people in their own age group.

•

About a third inform on people who work with or near them.

•

About a third inform on their clients or customers.

•

Over a third inform on their competitors.

•

Over a third inform on their neighbors.

•

Some inform on former lovers.

•

Some inform on co-workers at legitimate jobs.
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•

A few inform on spouses and relatives.

•

A few inform on their employees.

•

A few inform on close friends (Blum 1972).
Officers, when asked to describe the differences between the informers and

those they inform upon, mostly describe the informers as acknowledging that the crime
is wrong and that they consider themselves to be acting in a more proper and moral
way than their associates. Some are characterized as being merely more clever or more
greedy than the others, and a few are described as being no different (Blum 1972).
When officers have been asked to describe their informants the picture they give
is of a person of average or above intelligence, much in need of praise, needing to feel
important, seeking appreciation, and not tolerant of boredom. They tend to seek
excitement, and get depressed when times are dull. About half are reasonably welladjusted normal people, with drive and ambitions, loyal to at least one person in their
group, eager to please, rather insecure, perhaps a bit vain and conceited, ambivalent
toward authority, idealistic and unrealistic, impulsive with poor judgment, having poor
self-control, often vengeful and harboring grudges, unreliable, cunning, and without
direction or meaning in life. They are often called losers, drifters, and other pejoratives.
A very few may be fanatical, dogmatic, angry, bitter zealots. They are often slippery,
devious

people.

These

characteristics

may

be

consistent

with

psychopathic

personalities, which may be what drew them into crime originally (Blum 1972).
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Natapoff (2009) in her extensive study discusses problematic issues about the
use of informants. According to Natapoff (2009) passing information to law
enforcement is generally held in contempt by the public, often with good reason as an
informant may implicate an innocent to gain advantages for himself. There are
documented cases where informants have given false information resulting in false
arrests or even accidental shootings of innocents. The term "snitch" has strong negative
connotations for this reason.
Informing is not always straightforward. There is the problem of verifying the
information, and even if the information was valid and helpful the deals struck with the
informants often result in criminals being released or even able to commit crimes with
impunity as the police may turn a blind eye to their activities. This has resulted in an
anti-snitch bias in crime-ridden communities as the community sees very little reward
for passing information while taking great risks of reprisal (Natapoff, 2009).
Additionally the informants themselves may be vulnerable. The informant may be
placed in danger while trying to cooperate in a police sting operation, or may run the
risk of their identity becoming known. Witness intimidation is common under these
circumstances. Information may even be obtained online from such websites as Who's
A Rat (http://www.whosarat.com/).
Backlash against informants in the United States reached the point of a Stop
Snitching campaign being mounted in Baltimore MD. This became nationally known
when a DVD was produced. When a witness wore a Stop Snitching shirt to court he
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explained, "Guys doin' all this crime and not doin' no time because they're telling on the
next man " (Natapoff, 2009, p. 121).
On a larger scale, Natapoff (2009) also references high-profile Mafia cases, such
as Sammy "The Bull" Gravano's testimony against John Gotti which resulted in Gravano
entering Witness Protection, only to commit new crimes under his new identity.
Political informants tend to fall into one of two categories: infiltrators and agent
provocateurs, and those who expose corrupt politicians. Examples given for the first
type were those who infiltrated the Black Panther movement resulting in the police raid
of 1969 and infiltration of the Communist Party. The second type is exemplified by the
Abscam sting operation in the 1970s in which twenty five politicians were indicted for
taking bribes (Natapoff, 2009).
Financial, or white-collar crimes are also known for informants receiving light
sentences. Examples include Michael Milken in 1986, who only served two years of a
ten year sentence for insider trading because he agreed to testify against his former
colleagues (Natapoff, 2009).
Since 11 September 2001, greater attention has been paid to obtaining
information on terrorists. The federal government of the United States actively courts
informants and rewards them with money, visas and protection. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and PATRIOT Act were passed, and FISA created
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a secret court used to obtain wiretaps and
other covert surveillance. Unfortunately since much of this is classified, it is difficult to
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know the exact extent of the use of informants. This enhanced secrecy also lends itself
unfortunately to abuses similar to those noted with more conventional criminals
(Natapoff, 2009).
Natapoff (2009) has recommendations for reforming the current informant
system. She proposes the following goals:
•

Increasing legislative and public knowledge about criminal informant practices.

•

Strengthening police and prosecutorial accountability, both internal and external,
for informant practices.

•

Improving the accuracy of information obtained from informants and fairness to
defendants against whom informants are used.

•

Calibrating informant practices more closely to the goals of crime prevention,
violence reduction, social and racial equality, and personal and community
security (Natapoff, 2009).
One of the rare empirical studies about motivational factors of informers is

Billingsley (2000)’s research. He surveyed 120 police informers in 12 police forces and
other law enforcement agencies throughout England. He sought to identify initial
motivational factors (reasons) for informing and how these motives may change over
time. In terms of methodology he utilized semi-structured questions with an openended format (Billingsley, 2000).
Billingsley lists motivations for informants that he has identified:
•

Financial: the mercenary motivation.
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•

Dislike the crime: the informant may feel that a particular crime has "crossed the
line" and is intolerable, and will turn evidence out of a sense of morality.

•

Reduced sentence: giving information in return for leniency.

•

Revenge: striking down someone who has wronged them.

•

Right side of the law: the desire to leave crime behind and become a good
citizen.

•

Looking for a favor: the informant may be hoping to curry favor with law
enforcement so they will look the other way regarding his own activities.

•

Friendly with officer: the informant may know an officer on a personal level and
have a friendship with him, and wish to help that individual officer.

•

Police pressure: reaction to threat of arrest and incarceration.

•

Take out competition: if the criminal has an adversary, he may inform on them in
hopes that the competitor will be arrested and therefore eliminated as a threat.

•

Part of a deal: if the informant has already been arrested they may give
information in exchange for some favor- transfer to a better prison, leniency in
sentencing, etc.

•

The challenge: the informant may feel a sense of pride and excitement in
assisting with law enforcement, and want to excel in their opinion.

•

Gratitude: the informant may feel that they were treated fairly by law
enforcement and prosecution, and feel grateful toward them for helping him out
of a difficult situation.
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Enjoyment: for some, the thrill of taking the risks of being an informant is
rewarding in itself (Billingsley, 2000).
The frequency distribution table of reasons for starting as informers is as follows:
Table 2: Motivations Found Effective in Billingsley’s Study

Initial reason
Financial
Dislike the crime
Reduced sentence
Revenge
Right side of the law
Looking for a favor
Friendly with officer
Police pressure
Take out competition
Part of a deal
The challenge
Gratitude
Enjoyment
Total

Frequency
32
17
16
15
9
9
8
4
3
2
2
2
1
120

(Billingsley, et al., 2001)
According to Billingsley (2001)’s findings the motivations of an informant may
change over time. Informants motivated by revenge or by a situational fear (threats of
incarceration, for example) will not be motivated by the same stimulus once their
situation has been changed. If they continue to supply information, it will be for
different reasons than those they started with. However, those initially motivated by
self-interest (money, taking out competition) will likely maintain those motivations.
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Billingsley’s findings are considered important and will be included in my study to
test to what degree these motives of informants in criminal cases are effective on
confidential informants in religion abusing terrorist networks.

Developing an Informant

So far we have reviewed theories focused on human motivations behind
individual behavior. We also have reviewed the studies that focus on informants in
different fields, however it is important to note how the recruitment process of
informants is conducted.
When a potential informant has been identified, great care must be taken to
build a relationship with him. Mishandling the informant will make him uncooperative.
As with any relationship, it must be taken in steps (Madinger, 2000).
The agent should begin by finding out as much information as possible about the
informant and his background. Finding things in common with the informant before
meeting him will help to make the informant more comfortable.
The first meeting should be held in a quiet and private place, and should be held
with as few people present as possible. The relationship with the informant is a
personal one between two individuals, not between one person and a group. Having
privacy and individual communication is far less intimidating for the informant.
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The agent must have a clear understanding of the informant’s needs. If the
informant is in need of protection, for instance, the agent must be aware of this and
offer to help to protect the informant and his family. However, it is important to
remember that the most obvious needs are not necessarily the most important ones.
The agent must let the informant determine what his needs are and communicate
them. After all, the informant is not working for the agent, but for his own benefit
(Madinger, 2000).
Once the needs have been identified and agreed upon, there must be a
negotiation in which the terms are made clear on both sides what the benefits and
responsibilities of the arrangement will be. The agent should be clear as to what he will
provide for the informant, and show the informant the benefits of the arrangement for
the informant. The agent should never promise more than he can deliver- the
agreement must bind the agent as well as the informant. The terms of the agreement
should be laid out in a very precise and logical manner (Madinger, 2000).
After the terms have been laid out, the agent should use persuasion to sell the
agreement to the informant. Appeals to the informant’s emotions are needed at this
point. Convincing the informant that the arrangement is in his best interests and
making him feel comfortable with it will influence his decision to accept it and cooperate
(Madinger, 2000).
The agent must develop a rapport with the informant. He must be sympathetic
and empathetic to the informant’s emotional state and develop a friendship based on
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trust and mutual respect. This will enable the informant and the agent to understand
and agree with each other and develop more open communications. Care should be
taken to not get too emotionally involved with the informant, but the relationship
should be comfortable and open (Madinger, 2000).
Lyman (1987) outlines a general interviewing procedure for confidential
informants as follows: Interview the potential informant for general knowledge;
Determine the extent of their detailed knowledge; Take a separate statement about the
CI's knowledge about individual persons of interest or groups; Take down detailed
information about persons or groups of interest; Get description of vehicles, associates
and places frequented; Verify the information given by the CI; Check vehicle
registrations; Check the CI's criminal record (Lyman, 1987, pp. 108-110).
Lyman (1987) also recommends rules for engaging confidential informants: Be
fair; Be truthful and don't overpromise; Keep the informant in his place, but be tactful;
Guide the informant so he doesn't entrap the person of interest; Don't let the CI know
too much about his handler; Don't tolerate crimes committed by the CI; Be careful not
to let the handler's morals slip to the level of the criminals; Beware of informers of the
opposite sex, as sexual advances may compromise the handler (Lyman, 1987, pp. 108110).
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Frustration

One condition that can become extremely counterproductive is frustration. If an
individual is blocked from achieving a goal they will become frustrated, and will react
with aggression. If the source of the frustration cannot be attacked, the individual may
find scapegoats to attack instead.(Hersey, et al., 1996)

Aggression is only one of the ways in which frustration may be shown. If
frustration persists, the actions may take one or more of the following forms:(Maier,
1955)
•

Rationalization- creating excuses to justify the failure to achieve the goal.
(Blaming others is a common form of this.)

•

Regression- acting immaturely, often in a childish manner (Brown, 1986).

•

Fixation- making the same attempt repeatedly, despite lack of success, and not
taking alternatives. “Frustration can freeze old and habitual responses and
prevent the use of new and more effectual ones”(Brown, 1986).

•

Resignation- giving up on achieving the goal.

•

Apathy- not having any emotional investment in whether the goal is achieved or
not (Hersey, et al., 1996).
If an agent sees that his informant is becoming frustrated he should work to

alleviate the frustration and help the informant reach his goals. He should empathize
and try to help to resolve the blockage.
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In terrorists frustration is common, and may lead to becoming an informant.
Alderfer and Guzzo (1979) states that frustration stems from unsatisfied needs, and
that an unsatisfied higher need may result in more focus on lower needs. An example
might be that a person in the lower ranks of a terrorist organization may be frustrated
by being unable to rise into a leadership position (self-actualization and esteem needs)
and focus his frustration on lack of money, poor quality living environment, or being at
continual risk.
An agent may be able to resolve some of the individual’s frustrations by
rewarding him as an informant. He may offer financial help (physiological needs),
protection (security needs), and may use praise and recognition (esteem needs). In this
way he can turn the informant’s frustrations into motivators and develop a relationship
with him.

Conclusion

The literature review may be considered to be two parts: content theories of
motivations as researched primarily in the workplace, and more specific literature of the
motivations of confidential informants in law enforcement are reviewed.
In summary, Maslow's hierarchy is useful in explaining how specific needs may
motivate individuals in a given direction- for instance, how basic needs arising from
poverty, hunger and insecure living conditions may be very strong motivators for RATs
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to provide information to law enforcement in exchange for money, food and protection,
while their needs for esteem from peers may be of lesser importance to them at that
moment. Using Maslow's needs hierarchy to anticipate the needs of the recruits may
help law enforcement to motivate them to become active informants. Alderfer's theory
is similarly useful and helps to emphasize that multiple motivations may be at work at a
given time and highlights the importance of the role that frustration may play.
Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene theory is especially useful in understanding the
motivations of recruits. Hygiene factors are often lacking within RAT networks, resulting
in bored, frustrated people who may be very eager to leave the network. Law
enforcement can use this knowledge to advantage by accentuating these lacks to
recruits.
Knowledge of the more specific motivations common to confidential informants
in law enforcement is also invaluable as it underscores the strengths of some
motivations while giving cautions regarding others- for example, fear or revenge will
motivate recruits in a very straightforward manner, while claims of patriotism and
altruism may be viewed more skeptically. Being aware of ulterior (perverse) motivations
or thrill seekers is likewise important to prevent potential damage to investigations.
Reviewed Literature is summarized in Table 3 for the motivations attributed to
informants.
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Table 3. Summary of Literature: Motivations Attributed to Informants
Reviewed Literature
Motivation

Blum

Copeland Harney&Cross Jacobson

Lee

O'Hara

Skolnick

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Reduced Sentence

+

+

+

Mercenary

+

+

+

Fear from Criminals

+

+

Revenge

+
+

+

Wilson Fitzgerald Madinger Blinglsley Maslow Herzberg* Alderfer

+

Fear from Police

Egoistical

+

Perverse
Repentance or Desire to Reform

Relevant Theory

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+
+

Jealousy

+
+

+

+
+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Altruism

+

Self-Esteem

+

James Bond Syndrome

+

+

+

+

Police Wannabe

+

+

Detective Complex

+

Selective L.E.

+

Gratitude Toward Police

+

+
+

Excitement
Patriotic

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+
+

+

Dislike the crime

+

+

+

Right side of the law

+

+

+

+

Friendly with Officer

+

+

+

+

Looking for a Favor

+

+

+

+

Take out Competition

+

+

+

+

Mentally Disturbed

+

+

+

+

105

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion concerning the research design and analytical
methodologies used in the present study. This chapter includes following components:
Research questions, strategy of the research methodology, secondary data source and
analysis, research design, analytical techniques, validity & reliability Issues, and
limitations of the study.
The main hypothesis for the purpose of this study is “The individuals’ decisionmaking processes to cooperate with LEI as a confidential informant is affected by some
motivation factors during recruitment process.” The present study tests 27 hypotheses
in order to answer two main research questions. To meet its objectives the present
study uses quantitative research methodology, constructs a cross-sectional research
design, and employs secondary data analysis to test the hypotheses of the research
questions.
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Research Questions

1. What are the motivational factors that make some individuals (terrorists) in
RAT groups confidential informants? What motivating factors have an effect on the
individual’s decision to choose to be an informant within RAT networks? In other words,
what general motivating factors of recruiting informants in the literature are applicable
to confidential informants within RAT networks?
2. How do the content approaches of human motivation—Maslow’s need
hierarchy, and Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theories—affect the likelihood of
becoming of certain RAT group informant? This question will be answered by answering
the following two sub questions:
2-a. What is the effect of hygiene factors-dissatisfiers-on the individual’s
decision to leave terrorism in RAT networks? This is essentially a question related to
Herzberg’s theory.
Following sub questions are related to Maslow’s theory:
2-b. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of
becoming Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming other
RAT informants? This question is related to Maslow’s theory.
2-c. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of
becoming Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT
informants?
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Strategy of the research methodology

From the review of literature it has become clear that studies regarding the
informant motivations have been conducted in the areas of drug trafficking, corruption,
organized crime, homicide or other street level crimes. Moreover, most of these studies
are at descriptive level written by practitioners for tactical purposes such as handbooks,
service manuals, personal experiences or legal documents. Thus, these studies are not
immune to cultural bias, cognitive inflexibility, or attribution error until there is ample
empirical support. On the other hand, no study with a specific focus on confidential
informants acting in terrorism has been conducted yet. This is primarily a consequence
of the secret nature of the phenomena. Because of the legal barriers put to ensure
confidentiality, it has been almost impossible for researchers to obtain and analyze
confidential information about the issue.
Therefore, this study is exploratory at the first phase in terms of exploring the
motives that may have an effect on terrorists’ decision to cooperate as an informant. In
this phase, terrorist autobiographies are surveyed. Surveying autobiographies is a wellknown data collection technique in terrorism studies. In the first phase of the present
study, I conduct an exploratory design by including as many variables as possible,
which are collected from the subjects of the target population. In addition to descriptive
statistical analyses, bivariate and multivariate statistics such as crosstabs, Chi Square,
and logistic regression are used to test the effects of these variables.
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The second phase of this study has an explanatory nature. First, motivational
factors acquired in the first phase of the study are classified based on the main
assumptions of motivation theories. Then, variables in these classifications are analyzed
with appropriate statistical methods such as multivariate binomial logistic regression to
test whether they support the hypotheses derived from theories or not.

Secondary data source

The dataset of the present study was formed by conducting archival surveys on
the official records of Turkish National Police (TNP) for the secondary data analysis. The
TNP has been employing informants over a century for law enforcement purposes, and
keeps confidential records of them under different departments. These records include
very detailed information about informants ranging from demographic and social data
to their hobbies and needs. The intelligence department of TNP, the IDB, is responsible
for recruitment, development, management, and protection of all confidential
informants within terrorist networks. Therefore, after getting a top-secret clearance
from the TNP, handwritten autobiographies and F10 forms which contain detailed
information about the recruit that were filled out by every confidential informant during
the recruitment process and available at IDB archives were searched.

F10 questionnaire forms contain several structured questions in addition to some
open ended questions such as, “Why did they choose to become informants?” etc. for
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the recruits to fill out during the recruitment. They also contain “official use only”
sections for the recruiters to include their observations, comments and evaluations
about the subjects during the recruitment.

Handwritten autobiographies are attachments of F10 forms and are used in the
present study because they contain valuable background information about the recruit’s
family, socioeconomic status, demographics as well as the motivations that led him/her
to be an informant in his own words. The IDB asks the recruits to write their
autobiographies as part of the recruitment procedure. The reason for asking
autobiographies is two-fold: First, the IDB wants to know the motivation of the new
recruits in detail. Second, they ask new recruits to write about their backgrounds,
connections, motivations and other things that he/she wants to mention so that they
can crosscheck the information in F10 forms and know the applicant better. Recruits
usually write their autobiographies in essay format and they are free about what to
include.
Based on the limitations of the approval letter and top-secret clearance from the
TNP, special consideration was taken in keeping their IDs secret while forming the data
set about the confidential informants. While some variables such as motivation factors
were taken directly, some others such as name, occupation, birth place, number of
children, date of birth etc. were not directly included in this study in order to keep
confidentiality and not to reveal the identities of confidential informants. Some
demographic and socioeconomic variables are recoded and included as control
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variables. For instance, recruitment age was calculated by subtracting date of birth from
the recruitment date and included as a variable in our data set. Income was not used
directly; instead it was recalculated based on average cost of living in the city where he
was living at the time he was recruited. Similarly, job and occupation were collapsed
into a new dichotomous variable, employment status, meaning 1 for employed and 0
for unemployed.
Accordingly, my data set contains detailed information about all individuals that
served as confidential informants for more than a year within any of 8 different religion
abusing terrorist networks—Al-Qaeda, Turkish Hezbollah, Selam Tevhid, Hiz-but Tahrir,
HD ICCB (AFID), IBDA/C, Vasat, and IHO—in the last two decades (N= 138).

Research Design

Cross sectional research design is used in the present study. The cross sectional
design is the most common design in the social sciences particularly in terrorism related
studies. The cross sectional research design is suitable for studies that entail collected
data measured at a single point in time on all appropriate variables (Nachmias &
Nachmias, 2000; Olsen & St George, 2004).
Because of confidentiality and the secret nature of the phenomena it was not
possible for the researcher to employ experimental or quasi-experimental research
designs in the present study. The researcher had neither a way of accessing the
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informants systematically to form control and experiment groups, nor did he have
access to situations where he can methodically manipulate and control motivating
factors affecting the informant’s decision. Cross sectional research design helps to
ensure that the appropriate information was collected and that the data analysis was
correct. With the implementation of bivariate and multivariate analysis, it allows the
researcher to investigate relationships among numerous variables—motivation factors—
and their influences on the individual’s decision to choose to be a confidential informant
(O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003). Moreover, the cross sectional research design
offers an advantage to researchers with different interests and different models to work
with dataset derived from a single cross sectional study, and analyze the phenomena
from different points of views (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000; O'Sullivan, et al., 2003).
These issues made a cross sectional design suitable for the present study.

Population and Sampling

The unit of analysis in this study is individual, confidential informant within RAT
networks in Turkey.
In general there are two types of confidential informants used in criminal
settings. In the first type, the law enforcement agency recruits somebody who fits the
job, trains him and infiltrates him into the target group. The advantage of this type is
that it is easier to find the right individual and the recruitment phase is safe but it is
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very risky for the informant. It takes time for the informant to gain the trust of the
criminals and get access to the information needed. In the second type, the law
enforcement agency recruits somebody who is already in the target group. This type of
informant is hard to obtain and the risks are great at the beginning, especially at the
recruitment phase, but it pays off quickly and has a lot of advantages over the previous
type as they were already in the criminal setting. As a rule the IDB prefers to employ
the second type of informant to reduce risk to civilian lives, so the sources cited in this
study were within the terrorist network when recruited.
Another criterion of IDB about the recruit to be classified as a confidential
informant is the trial period, which is usually one year. After the initial recruitment, the
individuals are treated as informants and at the end of the trial period if they meet the
criteria of the IDB then they become confidential informants. Thus, all of the subjects of
this study have served a minimum of one year as confidential informants in RAT
networks.

The population of this study is all confidential informants within RAT networks in
Turkey in the past two decades (N=138).
By saying so, this study doesn’t utilize any sampling procedure; instead, it utilizes
the entire population of confidential informants within RAT networks in Turkey
(n=N=138). Working with the population also reduces threats to internal and external
validity of the study since the significance levels become irrelevant, and the results of
the study directly reflects the social reality of the phenomena.
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Analysis

According to the literature, inferential statistics are used to draw conclusions
about the population based on analysis of the sampling data. If the analysis is focusing
on population, then descriptive statistics are used. Similarly, most of the variables
included in this study are in fact population parameters (Demirci, 2008; Nardi, 2006;
Yang, 2010).
However, I did an exception to this general rule in this study. I applied inferential
statistics to some extent and illustrated group level models for Turkish-Hezbollah and
Al-Qaeda RAT networks in order to illustrate practical implications of the study for the
practitioners. It would be good to form individual models for each RAT network such as
Islamic Movement, Vasat, Selam-Tevhid etc. Nevertheless, sample sizes of other RAT
networks are insufficient, largest being n=16, which would not only result in loss of
power, but also end up with statistically insignificant results. The sample size for AlQaeda was also not large enough (n=22) but a multivariate model was tested for it in
order to make some predictions about them. The ratio of sample size to the number of
parameters is critically important in logistic regression since it uses maximum likelihood
estimation. It is strongly recommended in literature that the number of cases in the
smallest group should be at least ten times the number of predictors in logistic
regression models (Gray & Kinnear, 2012; Hosmer David & Stanley, 2000).
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Analytical techniques

Research questions and hypotheses of the present study will be analyzed in four
phases: First, data preparation and descriptive statistics will be performed before any
in-depth analyses. Second, hypotheses relating to research question one (hypotheses
one through nineteen) are analyzed through bivariate analysis techniques. Bivariate
analysis refers to the analysis of two variables at the same time. Since this study is an
exploratory research the relationship between the dependent variable and every
independent variable should be examined separately on a one-to-one bases.
Third, motivation factors—variables tested in hypotheses one through fifteen—
are collapsed into five new categorical variables (physiological needs, security needs,
social needs, esteem needs and self-actualization) based on Maslow’s need hierarchy
theory and a new categorical variable (hygiene) is formed by collapsing motivation
factors (variables tested in hypotheses one through fifteen) into a new variable based
on Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory. Hypotheses based on these new variables
relating to research question two (hypotheses twenty through twenty five) are analyzed
through bivariate analysis techniques.
Fourth, two new dependent variables (Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda) are formed for
multivariate analyses. Hypotheses relating to research question two (2b and 2c)
(hypotheses twenty five and twenty six) are analyzed through multivariate analysis
techniques. Multivariate analysis refers to examining more than two variables
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simultaneously. Multivariate analysis of combined effects of motivations based on
Maslow’s theory is considered essential. Multivariate analysis is also required in
establishing a final model for being an informant in a RAT group.

Bivariate Hypothesis Testing
Among several statistics available in the literature to measure the strength and
significance of bivariate association between dependent and independent variables in
the present study contingency tables using the crosstab function of the SPSS is
considered appropriate because the level of measurements of DV and IVs are nominal
and all are treated as dichotomous measures in hypotheses one through twenty-five.
Pearson’s chi-square

and

the

Mantel-Haenszel

chi-square

(or

linear-by-linear

association) are used in determining statistical significance. Results having a p-value
less than .05 are considered statistically significant at the .05 alpha level.

Multivariate Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis twenty-six and twenty-seven are tested using stepwise multivariate
binary logistic regression analysis. Binary logistic regression was appropriate
multivariate analysis technique to predict a dichotomous DV from a set of nominal,
ordinal, and interval IVs. However, control variables are also included in these
hypotheses; therefore, stepwise binomial logistic regression is used to calculate the
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effect size made by each IV and to determine the amount of variance in the DV that is
explained by the combined IVs.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The main question to be answered in this study is: What makes some individuals
(terrorists) in RAT groups choose to become confidential informants? From the review
of literature and relevant theories it has become clear that motives are the reason or
driving force underlying an individual behavior at a particular time. Therefore, in this
study, I am primarily focusing on the motivating factors during recruitment process. I
also included some demographic factors as control variables to see the extent of their
effect. Accordingly, my primary research question is:

Research Question One

R.Q.1: What are the motivational factors that make some individuals (terrorists)
in RAT groups confidential informants? What motivating factors have an effect on the
individual’s decision to choose to be an informant within RAT networks? In other words,
what general motivating factors of recruiting informants in the literature are applicable
to confidential informants within RAT networks?
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Dependent variable: A decision by a militant to become a confidential informant
(level of measurement: nominal)

Independent Variables: Motivating factors (level of measurement: Nominal)
Hypotheses for the Question One
What motivating factors have an effect on the individual’s decision to choose to
be an informant within RAT networks?
All motivations mentioned in the literature are included as hypotheses and tested
to see which ones are applicable to terrorism field. First the question is answered by
testing the following hypotheses derived from literature. Hypotheses from H1 through
H15 test the effect of motivation factors derived from literature and the researcher’s
own field experience. Hypotheses H16 through H19 test the effect of negative
motivations- barriers to cope with- that the informant might expresses during
recruitment. It is also important to mention here that all of these hypotheses are also
associated with Maslow’s and Herzberg’s motivation categories. In the first question
since I don’t have non-informants in our dataset I only made descriptive analysis within
informants. Contingency tables—crosstabs—with Pearson Chi Square are used to test
following hypotheses.

H1. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants with an
expectation of reduced sentence during the trial.
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H2. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
friendly relationship with LEI officer.
H3. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer.
H4. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
mercenary needs.
H5. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of fear of
incarceration.
H6. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of
revenge motivation.
H7. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
need for repentance or desire to reform their criminal life.
H8. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
patriotic motives.
H9. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of fear
from their terrorist associates.
H10. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
selective law enforcement or altruistic motivations.
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H11. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
jealousy within the RAT group.
H12. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
ideological conflict in morality with the RAT group.
H13. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
desire to be a spy. (James Bond syndrome, police wannabe).
H14. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to fulfill their
need for excitement and egoistical motives.
H15. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of a
hidden perverse motivation.
H16. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the state of frustration to some
extend during the recruitment.
H17. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being labeled as snitch as
a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
H18. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being discarded by police
as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
H19. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed an ideological opposition to the state
and system as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
120

Research Question Two

R.Q.2: How do the content approaches of human motivation (Maslow’s need
hierarchy, and Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theories) affect the likelihood of becoming
of a RAT group informant?
This question is answered by answering the following questions:

2-a. What is the effect of hygiene factors (dissatisfiers) on the individuals’
decision to leave terrorism in RAT networks? This is essentially a question related
to Herzberg’s theory.
Dependent variable: Rat Group membership (level of measurement: nominal)
Independent Variable: Hygiene factors (level of measurement: Nominal)

2-b. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of
becoming a Turkish-Hezbollah informant relative to the probability of becoming
other RAT informants?
Dependent variable: Binary Hezbollah (level of measurement: nominal)
Independent Variables: Maslow’s Motivation categories (level of measurement:
Nominal)

2-c. Are there significant motivational differences in the probability of
becoming an Al-Qaeda informant relative to the probability of becoming other
RAT informants?
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Dependent variable: Binary Al-Qaeda (level of measurement: nominal)
Independent Variables: Maslow’s Motivation categories (level of measurement:
Nominal)
The sub questions 2-b and 2-c are related to Maslow’s theory. I examine the
effect of all motivation factors together and then demographic variables are integrated
into the model as control variables to make statistical control.
In order to answer the second research question, need groups are formed based
on assumptions of Maslow’s need hierarchy, and Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theories
by including all motivation factors that are relevant to the theories. Some demographic
and socioeconomic variables that were available during the data collection are also
added to our model to test the extent of their effects.
Since I don’t have non-informants in the model I created two dichotomous
dependent variables for sub questions 2b and 2c of second research question as
follows:

Binary Hezbollah variable is computed by making Hezbollah as group 1 and all
the others as 0. For Binary Al-Qaeda I computed Al Qaeda informants as 1 and all the
others as 0. I used these both dichotomous variables as dependent variables in my
Logistic Regression analyses. By doing this I made a contribution to the literature by
examining the effect of motivational factors and demographics on becoming
Hezbollah/Al-Qaeda vs. other RAT informants.

122

The sub questions of the second research question are answered by testing
hypotheses derived from Maslow’s need hierarchy and Hertzberg’s motivation-hygiene
theories. Multivariate binary logistic regression models for Turkish-Hezbollah, and AlQaeda RAT groups are considered a good fit to answer questions 2b and 2c. For
hypothesis H20, H21, H22, H23, H24 and H25, contingency tables using the crosstab
function of the SPSS is considered appropriate to measure the strength and significance
of bivariate association and Pearson’s chi-square is used in determining statistical
significance.

Hypotheses for the question Two
There are motivational differences between becoming Turkish-Hezbollah/AlQaeda informant and becoming other RAT informant.
Hypotheses from H20 through H24 test the individual effect of categories based
on assumptions of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory.
H20. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant physiological needs.
H21. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant safety (security) needs.
H22. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant social (affiliation) needs.
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H23. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant self-esteem and esteem from others needs.
H24. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant Self-Actualization needs.

Hypothesis for the question 2-a
H25. Lack of Herzberg’s hygiene factors in terrorism settings leads most recruits
from RAT groups to make the decision to leave terrorism to satisfy their
predominant needs by becoming informants.
H25 is formed to answer this question. This question is answered by testing the
effect of Herzberg’s hygiene category on recruit’s decision to leave terrorism.
Contingency table with Pearson’s chi-square is considered a good fit to measure the
strength and significance of bivariate association.

Hypothesis for the question 2-b
H26. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow’s need categories) and
demographic differences in the probability of becoming a Turkish-Hezbollah
informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.
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Hypothesis H26 is formed to answer this question. Multivariate binary logistic
regression model for Turkish-Hezbollah, and other RAT groups is considered a good fit
to answer this question.

Hypothesis for the question 2-c
H27. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow’s need categories) and
demographic differences in the probability of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant
relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.
Hypothesis H27 is formed to answer this question. Multivariate binary logistic
regression model for Al-Qaeda, and other RAT groups is considered a good fit to
answer this question.

Variables and Level of Measurement

Dependent Variables
For Bivariate Analyses
RAT Network membership is used as a dependent variable: A decision by a
militant to become a confidential informant. (Level of measurement: nominal)
According to Maslow individuals constantly progress and make decisions to
satisfy their predominant needs at a given time. According to Herzberg when the
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hygiene factors are lacking in their environment, individuals tend to leave that
environment and look for other options where the hygiene factors are present.
Therefore, individuals in RAT networks who have needs—motivation factors—and
cannot satisfy them in a terrorist setting look for other means to fulfill their unmet
needs. Eventually when they have the opportunity offered by the LEI officer to satisfy
their predominant needs they decide to cooperate with the LEI. Accordingly this
decision is used in this study as a dependent variable.

For Multivariate Analyses
Binary Hezbollah: Becoming an informant in Hezbollah relative to other RAT
networks. It is used as a dependent variable for research question 2-b: This variable is
computed by collapsing the dependent variable in the bivariate analyses, RAT network
membership, by making Hezbollah as group 1 and all the others as 0. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).

Binary Al-Qaeda: Becoming an informant in Al-Qaeda relative to other RAT
networks. It is used as a dependent variable for research question 2-c. This variable is
computed by collapsing the dependent variable in the bivariate analyses, RAT network
membership, by making Al Qaeda informants as 1 and all the others as 0. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).
I used these both dichotomous variables as dependent variables in my Logistic
Regression analyses.
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Independent variables

For Bivariate Analyses
Following motivation factors derived from literature and researchers own field
experience are used as independent variables:

Mercenary
Source of this variable is literature. Informants in this category are motivated
primarily by financial gain. They may be in financial hardship and need the money or
other material rewards for relief, or (more rarely) see informing as a way of gaining
money for luxuries (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney &
Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick,
1994; Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who
mentioned any kind of mercenary needs are categorized in this variable. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).

Reduced Sentence
Source of this variable is literature. If a person has been sentenced and is
incarcerated, they may find that they have access to information on other crimes either
unrelated to their own offense or future crimes. They may volunteer information in
exchanged for reduced imprisonment time. For the purposes of the present study
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confidential informants who mentioned that they expect a reduced sentence by being
an informant are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal,
discrete).

Fear of Incarceration
Source of this variable is literature. The drive for self-preservation is one of the
strongest motivations there is. A person motivated by fear will continue to be motivated
as long as the threat is perceived. Law enforcement may have caught the person
committing a crime, and will offer a choice: a long sentence in prison, or a lesser
punishment in exchange for information (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972;
Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000;
O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study
confidential informants who mentioned a fear of incarceration during the recruitment
are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Fear of Terrorist Associates
Source of this variable is literature. A criminal may find himself being threatened
by his associates, or find that the activity they are involved in is too dangerous for him.
If he leaves the group, he may be in considerable danger. At this point he may turn to
law enforcement for protection in exchange for information (Billingsley, et al., 2001;
Blum, 1972; Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004;
Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994; Wilson, 1978). This variable is based on
review of F10 forms and autobiographies. The fear of associates may include threats of
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death, injury, blackmail, seizing of assets, and penalties of various types (including
monetary). An example would be if an individual or one of his relatives is suspected of
assisting the enemy (government), the RAT network will convene a court and hold a
trial, and may demand that the person pay a substantial sum of money or assassinate
the person suspected. If the respondent mentioned any form of fear of his terrorist
associates, either threatening the respondent or his family, the variable was assigned a
value of 1. If not, the value assigned is 0 (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Perverse/Hidden Motive (Double Agent)
Source of this variable is literature. A person may come forward ostensibly with
information regarding a crime, but may have ulterior motives. They may be seeking
information on the activities of rivals, or perhaps information on law enforcement- the
resources available, the weaponry, identities of undercover operatives, etc. Their
information may be of limited use, as their true motives are not to assist law
enforcement (Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000;
O'Hara, 1973; Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study confidential
informants who were identified as having a perverse/hidden motive during the
recruitment are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Egotistical, excitement
Source of this variable is literature. Informants of this category are motivated by
a need to bolster self-esteem. They may be low-ranking criminals who wish to appear
more powerful and influential than they really are, or in some cases may be seeking the
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thrill of outwitting others and acting as a double agent. As long as their ego is being
boosted they will be helpful, but once their needs are not met they may stop
cooperating (Copeland, 1974; Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973;
Skolnick, 1994). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who
mentioned excitement as a driving force for being an informant during recruitment are
categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Revenge
Source of this variable is literature. A person who has been injured or wronged
may provide information in retribution. The angry informant will likely have good
information and will be eager to share it while his grievance is fresh in his mind, but
may be more reluctant in time when he is calmer (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Blum, 1972;
Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973;
Wilson, 1978). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who were
seeking an opportunity to take revenge from somebody in terrorism during recruitment
are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Jealousy
Source of this variable is literature. Like revenge, the informant will be acting on
emotion, perhaps impulsively. They may be trying to eliminate someone who poses a
threat to someone dear to them, or possibly their own rival. Their information is often
exaggerated and should be considered suspect (Jacobson, 1981; Lee, 2004; Madinger,
2000; O'Hara, 1973). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who
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showed signs of jealousy as a motivation during recruitment are categorized in this
variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Ideological Conflict in Morality
Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. An individual may join
a group due to his ideology, and then over time find that the group’s ideology or
morality differs from his own on some crucial aspect. He may realize that they have
distorted religion in a way he cannot tolerate, or may perform or condone something
that he considers to be immoral. At that point he will wish to distance himself from the
group or even see them abolished, and may approach a trusted officer. For the
purposes of the present study confidential informants who were having an internal
ideological conflict with the RAT network in religious norms during recruitment are
categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Repentance or Desire To Reform
Source of this variable is literature. Some criminals may have a desire to leave
crime, due perhaps to some traumatic event that has caused them to re-evaluate or
due to increasing uneasiness with their activities and their associates. They may provide
information from a need for absolution (Blum, 1972; Harney & Cross, 1968; Lee, 2004;
Madinger, 2000). For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who
mentioned that they were seeking to reform their criminal life during recruitment are
categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).
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Selective Law Enforcement
Source of this variable is literature. A criminal may feel comfortable with some
levels of crime but feel outraged over some act they consider to be egregious and wish
to eliminate the persons responsible (Harney & Cross, 1968; Madinger, 2000). The ones
that dislike the crime can also be included in this group (Billingsley, et al., 2001). For
the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned some acts of
RAT group that they could not tolerate during recruitment are categorized in this
variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Patriotic/Altruistic Motives
Source of this variable is literature. A person may provide information out of a
sense of civic duty. Their motivation will likely be superficial, but should not be
disregarded as they may be really motivated by this motivation. With the support of
other motivations patriotic or altruistic motivations can provide valuable informants for
the law enforcement intelligence agency (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Copeland, 1974;
Harney & Cross, 1968; Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000; O'Hara, 1973; Skolnick, 1994).
For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned during
recruitment that they chose to become informants primarily for patriotism or altruism
are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Cop Wannabe/James Bond syndrome
Source of this variable is literature. Similar to the egotistical informant, this
category is motivated by a desire for the perceived excitement of being in law
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enforcement or espionage. They may mimic officers and wish to take an active role in
the investigation, and could endanger themselves and the investigation (Blum, 1972;
Jacobson, 1981; Madinger, 2000). For the purposes of the present study confidential
informants who mentioned during recruitment that they have a strong desire to be a
spy are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Indebtedness- Appreciation or Gratitude Toward Police
Source of this variable is literature. If a person has been in legal trouble
previously and feels that he was treated well and fairly, or if he has at some time been
aided by law enforcement, he may feel a sense of gratitude toward his benefactors and
volunteer information to help them (Billingsley, et al., 2001; Harney & Cross, 1968).
Similarly, if the informant has received good treatment from the authorities- for
example, humanitarian aid for his family despite being known to be part of a terrorist
cell- he may feel gratitude toward the government.
Terrorists, it must be remembered, are people with needs like any other. If the
authorities have aided them in a time of need- responding to a fire, or taking a child to
the hospital for treatment- the individual may feel a sense of indebtedness to the
authorities, or to a particular officer. They may choose to repay that debt by giving
information. For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who
mentioned that they chose to become informants primarily for the feeling of
indebtedness towards a particular officer are categorized in this variable. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).
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Friendly with officer
Source of this variable is literature. At times a person in a RAT group may form
an acquaintance with an individual in law enforcement and develop a casual
relationship. Over time the officer may gain the RAT’s trust and form a bond of
empathy. The RAT may feel a degree of friendship with the officer and desire to pass
information to someone he knows he can trust (Billingsley, et al., 2001). For the
purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that prior friendly
relationship with an officer had an effect on their decision during recruitment are
categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Fear of Being Labeled As a Snitch
Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. In any group
operating illegally there is great pressure to keep secrets. Informing on the
organization- or even one individual- is considered unforgivable, a violation of trust. If it
becomes known that an individual has given information he may be shunned by the
community, and his life may be endangered as well as the lives of his family and
friends. This is a powerful threat and is extremely effective in discouraging informants.
For the purposes of the present study confidential informants who mentioned that they
were afraid of being labeled as snitch during recruitment are categorized in this
variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).
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Fear of Being Discarded
Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. If an individual comes
forward with information, one of his fears may be being abandoned by the law
enforcement officers. He fears that his trust in them may be violated- that once they
have the information they want, they will discard him. Considering the risks involved in
being an informant, this is not an insignificant fear. For the purposes of the present
study confidential informants who mentioned that they fear of being discarded by law
enforcement after the operation are categorized in this variable. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).

Opposition to State System
Source of this variable is researchers own field experience. The potential
informant may be motivated to give information by a number of factors, but still be
reluctant to come forward because they are deeply opposed to the government system
or other authorities. They may feel that they have to make a difficult choice between
the lesser of two evils. For the purposes of the present study confidential informants
who mentioned that they don’t legitimize the state system or they don’t trust the
authorities are categorized in this variable. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).
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For Multivariate Analyses
Physiological motivations
Source of this variable is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory. The most basic
drives are those pertaining to physiological needs, i.e., food, shelter, clothing. If the
individual is lacking in any of these it becomes the predominant need. For the purposes
of the present study mercenary needs are recoded to form this variable. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).

Security motivations
Source of this variable is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory. All individuals
desire security- freedom from violence, sickness, poverty, war, famine. If these are
threatened the individual will be driven by that need.
For the purposes of the present study, I first created a total security variable by
summing reduced sentence, fear of incarceration, and fear from terrorists variables.
Then I recoded this total variable as a dummy variable by assigning “0” as “No” and all
the other values as “1”. Thus, a reference category for this variable represents for no
need for security and the other category represents the security needs factor as a
motivation that has an effect on the decision of individual during recruitment. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).
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Social Motivations
Source of this variable is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory. The need to
belong to a group is strong, both for security and for reassurance of their beliefs from
like-minded individuals.
For the purposes of the present study, I first created a total social variable by
summing repentance or desire to reform, indebtedness towards police officer, and
friendly with officer variables. Then I recoded this total variable as a dummy variable by
assigning “0” as “No” and all the other values as “1”. Thus, a reference category for this
variable represents for no social motivation and the other category represents the social
needs factor as a motivation that has an effect on the decision of individual during
recruitment. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Self-esteem and esteem from others
Source of this variable is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory. Self-esteem is the
need for one to feel important, to have made a difference in the world. This is derived
from one’s sense of accomplishments, and from the esteem and admiration from others
in the social group.
For the purposes of the present study, I first created a total esteem variable by
summing perverse hidden motive, egotistical/excitement, revenge, jealousy, selective
law enforcement, and cop wannabe/James Bond syndrome variables. Then I recoded
this total variable as a dummy variable by assigning “0” as “No” and all the other values
as “1”. Thus, a reference category for this variable represents for no esteem and the
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other category represents the esteem factor as a motivation that has an effect on the
decision of individual during recruitment. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Self-Actualization
Source of this variable is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory. If the individual
feels that their personal goals have not been met, they will feel a sense of frustration
and feel unfulfilled. This may be professionally or in some aspect of their personal life.
For the purposes of the present study, none of the motivation factors available
with were directly fitting in this category. Among them only ideological conflict in
morality and patriotic/altruistic motives were considered to be at this level. However, in
Maslow’s own words these motives were given as examples of exceptions to the theory.
Therefore these two variables are included in multivariate analyses as separate
variables rather than representing self-actualization. (Level of measurement: nominal,
discrete).

Hygiene factors
Source of this variable is Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory. Hygiene factors,
or dissatisfiers, were defined in Herzberg's Motivator-Hygiene theory. These are
extrinsic factors in one's environment which, if lacking, tend to cause dissatisfaction,
frustration and high turnover. For the purposes of this study, I first created a total

hygiene variable by summing mercenary, reduced sentence, fear of incarceration, fear
of terrorists, revenge, jealousy, ideological conflict and morality, repentance, selective
law enforcement, patriotic/altruistic motivation, indebtedness and friendly with officer
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variables. Then I recoded this total variable as a dummy variable by assigning “0” as
“No” and all the other values as “1”. The combined effect of these motivations was
used as hygiene factors. Thus, a reference category for this variable represents for
presence of hygiene factors in RAT setting and the other category represents the lack
of hygiene factors in RAT setting as a factor that has an effect on the individual’s
decision to leave terrorism by being a confidential informant. (Level of measurement:
nominal, discrete).

Control Variables
Age at Recruitment
In order to prevent confidentiality and not to reveal IDs of any confidential
informant, variables date of birth and recruitment date are not directly included in the
present study. Instead, For the purposes of the present study Recruitment age was
calculated by subtracting date of birth from the recruitment date and included as a
variable in our data set. (Level of measurement: interval).

Marital status
Married is defined as having a spouse. This may be according to government
records, but includes those who have been married in a private ceremony but have not
filed for a marriage license due to their anti-government ideology. This is done
intentionally to protect confidentiality. Divorced is defined as having been previously
married but are no longer married. Widowed is defined as having a deceased spouse.
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For the purposes of the present study, married individuals at the time of
recruitment are referred to as 1 and divorced, widowed, or single are referred to as 0.
(Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Home Ownership
Home ownership is formed based on F-10 forms, which contain detailed
information about the recruit. If the individual or family owns their house they are
referred to as 1, if they rent their home they are referred to as 0. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).

Military Experience
Military experience was formed based on the official records and his handwritten
autobiographies. If the recruit had received military training in a terrorism setting or he
had served his mandatory military service before the recruitment, then he was
categorized as 1. On the other hand, the ones that didn’t have military experience or
hadn’t received any sort of firearm training were categorized as 0. (Level of
measurement: nominal, discrete).

Employment Status
To provide confidentiality, occupations are not identified. Job and occupation
were collapsed into a new dichotomous variable, employment status. Those who are
employed or own a business or have another source of constant income (for example,
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retirement) are referred to as 1 and those who are unemployed are referred to as 0.
(Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

Income
In order to prevent confidentiality, real income numbers are intentionally not
included in this study. Individuals with steady income from conventional sources
(employment, collected rents, business income, retirement, etc.) were compared to the
average cost of living in the area of residence at the time he was recruited and were
recoded as a new variable income. If the income was around or above the average cost
of living based on the family size it was categorized as medium or high income. If it was
below the average cost of living it was categorized as low income. (Level of
measurement: ordinal).

Insurance
Health insurance may be provided by the government to its employees, but also
to poor individuals in a program similar to Medicaid the United States. Small business
owners and their employees are also provided health insurance from the government at
a reduced rate. There is also private health insurance available. Lack of health
insurance is rare in Turkey, as most people are eligible and the insurance covers the
entire family. Generally individuals who lack insurance are willingly uninsured. While
there are individuals who are not qualified for any insurance, these are rare. RATs,
being ideologically opposed to government in all its forms, will often refuse to accept
insurance. Exceptions to this may be small business owners who are part of a RAT
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network and their employees, or individuals who secretly accept insurance for the
benefit of their family. Recruits who have health insurance, whether government
provided or privately provided are referred to as 1. Recruits who are uninsured are
referred to as 0. (Level of measurement: nominal, discrete).

SES (Factor analysis)
Among the control variables homeownership, employment status, income and
having health insurance are all related to economic status. It is assumed that these
variables seem to measure similar construct. Therefore, they are considered to be
conceptually collinear. Factor analysis is commonly employed to reduce large number of
variables into a small number of factors. Even though factor analysis assumes that
variables included in the analysis are interval/ratio level, Kim and Mueller (1978)
consents the use of dichotomous variables when there is moderate correlation(≤.70)
between the variables. Therefore, I first checked bivariate correlation coefficients
between the variables (homeownership, employment status, income and health
insurance). Since all of the coefficients were below the .70 level there was not a
multicollinearity issue.
Then, I conducted a factor analysis (Appendix A) to have a factor that represents
these variables. Using common criteria of eigenvalue of 1 I created a factor, SES, with
1.945 Eigenvalue, which explains 48.6 percent of total variation that exist within these
four variables. This is an acceptable level of representation of these four variables.
Moreover, the component matrix shows that the smallest loading for these variables is
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.448. Having a factor analysis also removes the potential multicollinearity issue. (Level
of measurement: ratio).

Table 4: Variables in Dataset and Measurement Levels
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Validity and Reliability Issues

This section discusses the reliability and validity issues regarding the present
study. First, this study has content validity since it examined the literature and looked at
several dimensions of the study. Almost all of the variables that previous research used
are included as measurement instruments in addition to some new ones to cover and
measure attributes of the concept more effectively as the data was available (Nachmias
& Nachmias, 2000). Including a wide selection of relevant variables also ensures the
empirical validity by giving the researcher to test whether different variables yield the
same results or not. Using different theories to test and explain why an individual chose
to become a confidential informant ensures construct validity of the present study
(O'Sullivan, et al., 2003). The present study is a population study because it includes
every confidential informant in RAT networks in Turkey. Therefore, findings of it directly
reflect the reality about the population, which ensures the external validity.
Generally, reliability refers stability, equivalence, and internal consistency of the
study (O'Sullivan, et al., 2003). This study is the first in field of terrorism measuring the
effects of motivation factors on the individual’s decision to be a confidential informant.
Therefore, it is hard to say at this point that our measure has the ability to yield the
same results time after time—stability—, or consistent results over and over in different
studies—equivalence—done by other researchers. On the other hand, including several
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measures of motivation ensures the internal consistency of the present study
(O'Sullivan, et al., 2003).
For the source of data, the information used in the present study is derived from
official government records of the intelligence department of the TNP. The particular
dataset used in this study is coming from the classified records—F10 forms and
attached handwritten autobiographies—of an intelligence department, the IDB, which
verifies every piece of information before entering it into the official records. In terms of
data collection archival surveys on official records and the survey of autobiographies are
special types of secondary data analysis and are both considered valid and reliable
sources of data and methods of data inquiry (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Especially
for hidden populations where the researchers have no access to the original sources to
collect primary data and in the absence of other means of data sources they are
considered very valuable. Therefore it is very common in terrorism studies to use
official records and biographical information as a data source for secondary data
analysis because of the clandestine nature of the phenomena.
According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) records that are produced to
mislead or that are unconsciously misinterpreted are considered inauthentic.
Autobiographies always have the potential to have some bias and problems with
reliability and validity. Especially when a confidential informant is talking about his
feelings, intentions, or motivations it is always possible to deviate from the truth. For
instance, motivation factors at self-actualization level, patriotism and altruism, which
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are derived from the hand written autobiographies, are hard to crosscheck. These may
be overemphasized by the recruits to give a more honorable image of themselves to the
officers, rather than admitting to more selfish motivations which may be seen as craven
or cowardly. This may also possibly be an attempt to rationalize their actions to reduce
their sense of guilt over betraying their associates. Therefore, these two variables are
considered to be weak in terms of validity. To ensure authenticity, the motivation
factors mentioned in the autobiographies are critically examined and crosschecked with
the motivations recorded in F10 forms to ensure authenticity.

Limitations of the study

According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) using secondary data has some
limitations. Primary limitation of secondary data is that usually the aim of data collection
was different than the aim of desired study; therefore, the available information may
not cover all aspects of the desired study. Even if the information is available, some
parts of it may still not be allowed to use for research purposes because of restricted
access, which is the case in the present study (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).
Accordingly, this study has several limitations. Confidentiality is the main
limitation because of the secret nature of intelligence. First, this study is limited with the
boundaries of clearance level and approval letter given specifically for this study by the
TNP, which took more than two years to obtain.
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Second, some of the subjects of this study were still active in the field during the
study; therefore, any piece of information that might reveal their identity would have
risked their lives. Thus, special consideration is taken to keep their IDs secret which
caused the researcher to sacrifice some details and valuable pieces of information by
keeping them out of the scope of this study. For instance, doing group specific analysis
would not only reveal the similarities and differences between terrorist groups, but also
would help us to build specific models for each group (Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, IBDA-C,
Hezbut-Tahrir etc.). Establishing models for each group would be a very valuable
contribution to the literature. Nevertheless, this study will be openly available to general
public including the terrorists; therefore, demographic profiles or group specific models
might also help each terrorist group to take precautions or to narrow down their search
for the betrayed individual. Eventually, it might pose a significant risk by surfacing of
active informants, or by preventing recruitment of future informants. Therefore, this
study will illustrate sample models for only Turkish-Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda RAT
networks. On the other hand, the bulk of information left out of this study will also be
analyzed and discussed in details, but will be shared only with intelligence experts on a
need to know basis. These sensitive parts of the analysis and findings will not be shared
in public and will be kept out of the scope of this study in order to keep the
confidentiality and to not risk the life of any confidential informant.
Third, this study is limited with the information available in the archives of TNP,
which was archived for law enforcement intelligence purposes; therefore, findings of
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this study may not fully reflect the needs and potential findings of national security or
military intelligence fields and may partially be applicable to these fields especially at
the international arena.
This also poses another limitation to the data collection method and data
analysis. Since the target population, confidential informants, is a hidden population
and their identities are kept secret from the public, it is almost impossible to contact
them and collect primary data for research purposes. Thus this study is limited to the
archival survey and secondary data analysis.
Handling confidential informants is another aspect of the issue. The strength of
factors and motives used to recruit informants change gradually after the recruitment
(Billingsley, 2000). Some of them disappear, some become less effective, and some
new factors emerge and become more important. Therefore, right after recruitment the
motives that are important while handling confidential informants become critically
important. However, this issue will be out of the scope of this study. An extensive
research needs to be conducted on that aspect of the issue too.
To summarize, the aim of this study is to find common variables and patterns
among confidential informants that are applicable to all Religion Abusing Terrorist (RAT)
groups.
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Descriptive Statistics for Research Question One

Descriptive statistical analyses were performed on all cases in the dataset to
determine population characteristics (Table 5). In our dataset there were 138 subjects
and they were all male. The distribution of informants to RAT networks was as follows:
22 (15.9%) of them were in Al-Qaeda, 69 (50%) of them were in Turkish Hezbollah, 16
(11.6%) of them were in RAT Group 1, 12 (8.7%) of them were in RAT Group 2, 5
(3.6%) of them RAT Group 3, nine of them (6.5%) of them in RAT Group 4, four
(2.9%) of them RAT Group 5, and only one (0.7%) of them was in RAT Group 6 at the
time they were recruited.
Among 138 recruits 96 (69.6%) of them were married, whereas less than one
third of them, 42 people (30.4%) were single. Similarly, 96 (69.6%) of them were
employed, and 42 of them (30.4%) were unemployed. More than half of them, 77
(55.8%) didn’t have health insurance, and 61 (44.2%) of them had health insurance
before they were recruited. For the home ownership, almost half of them, 65 people
(47.1%) were living in their own houses, while 73 (52.9%) of them were living in
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apartments or rental houses and didn’t own any kind of re
residence anywhere in the
country. Most of the recruits, 110 peop
people
le (79.7%) had prior military experience either
during mandatory military service or in terrorist training camps. On the other hand only
28 (20.3%) of them didn’t receive any kind of firearms or military training. Age was a
metric variable ranging from 18 to 44 and average age was 30 among all confidential
informants during the recruitment.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Research Question One
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Bivariate Statistics for Research Question One

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 outlining the methodology, Hypotheses 1
through 19 are bivariate hypotheses. Therefore, they were tested by Chi-square. In
order to test them, Crosstab function of the SPSS is used and contingency tables are
formed for each hypothesis. Statistical significance of the associations for the nominal
variables are tested by Pearson’s Chi-square. For the ordinal variables the MantelHaenszel chi-square (or linear-by-linear association) is used in determining statistical
significance. Results having a p-value less than .05 are considered statistically
significant at the .05 alpha level.

Hypothesis 1

H1.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants with an expectation
of reduced sentence during the trial.
From the review of case processing summary there were no missing cases in this

variable. This hypothesis was rejected because 97.8% of respondents did not mention
any expectation of a reduced sentence for becoming an informant. As seen in table 6,
only 1 individual in Hezbollah (1.4%) and two individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%) reported
such an expectation as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, the
expectation of reduced sentence appeared to have no significant impact on being an
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informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn’t show significance
beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 6.614; p=0.521).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, looking for a reduced sentence, is
associated with Maslow's security needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors
category. As the individual is in a criminal environment and is in danger of
incarceration, according to Maslow the individual will make reduction of sentence his
highest priority. However, this turns out not to be the case for this particular motivation
according to the results of this binomial analysis.
This is generally an expected outcome for the recruits within RAT networks in
Turkey because reduced sentence is very rare in the Turkish criminal justice system
especially in terrorism related crimes. RAT networks active in Turkey are aware of that
and accordingly don’t expect a reduced sentence as a result of being an informant. The
relatively higher percentage in Al-Qaeda (9.1%) is construed that some members of AlQaeda are temporarily in Turkey and are not familiar with the Turkish criminal laws.
Thus they are expecting reduced sentences as they might expect in other countries.

152

Table 6: Statistics for Hypothesis One

Hypothesis 2

H2.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of a
friendly relationship with an LEI officer.
Case
se processing summary showed no missing cases in this variable. This

hypothesis was rejected be
because 88.4%
% of respondents did not have
h
a friendly
relationship with the LEI officer before the recruitment. In other words, only 16 people
153

(11.6%) mentioned that having a friendly relationship with the LEI officer had a positive
effect on their decision to become an informant. On the other hand, as seen in table 7,
at least one confidential informant in almost every RAT network mentioned this
motivation as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, having a prior
friendly relationship with the LEI officer appeared to have no statistically significant
impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn’t
show significance beyond .05 level: 2 (7)= 7.105; p=0.418).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, a friendly relationship with an LEI
officer, is associated with Maslow's social needs category and Herzberg's hygiene
factors category.
This is also an expected outcome for all individuals that are associated with
terrorist networks because in any terrorist network individuals having relationships with
law enforcement are under suspicion of snitching among their peers. They can easily be
labeled for betrayal. Moreover, most terrorists and their associates usually try to avoid
identification and stay away from law enforcement. Maslow's social affiliation and love
needs category is valid under ordinary circumstances, but appears not to apply in
terrorism because satisfying this need may threaten their security needs. Associating
with government officials will seriously endanger them within the RAT network.
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Table 7: Statistics for Hypothesis Two

Hypothesis 3

H3.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer.
There were no missing cases for this variable in case processing summary table.

This hypothesis was rejected be
because 89.9%
% of respondents did not mention any type
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of gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer who recruited them. As seen in table 8,
nine individuals in Hezbollah (13%), one individual in Al-Qaeda (4.5%), and four
individuals in other RAT groups reported that indebtedness towards LEI officer had an
effect on their decision to become a confidential informant. As a result, the motivation
of gratitude or indebtedness to the LEI officer had a slight impact on being an
informant during the recruitment but was not statistically significant (The Pearson chisquare test of the hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: 2 (7)= 4.881;
p=0.675.)
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, gratitude or indebtedness to LEI, is
associated with Maslow's social needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors
category.
This motivation is very rare in terrorism settings. As mentioned earlier individuals
who are associated with terrorism usually stay away from any type of contact with law
enforcement. However, in instances such as a terrorist whose daughter was in need of
a kidney transfer or another terrorist whose life was saved by a police officer who
donated blood to him after a traffic accident in a small town, these actions can produce
gratitude or indebtedness to the police officer. This is especially true in cases where the
terrorist is aware that the officer did it despite the officer knowing of the individual
being associated with a terrorist network.
As mentioned previously, Maslow's social affiliation and love needs appears not
to apply in terrorism (especially as associating with government officials is extremely
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rare, since the government is their declared enemy). Becoming indebted to a
government official often brings more problems than benefits for RAT network
members, which explains its rarity as evidenced by the findings, but the benefits to LEI
officers are great enough to make the effort of befriending potential recruits
worthwhile.
Table 8: Statistics for Hypothesis Three

157

Hypothesis 4

H4.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
mercenary needs.
This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05).

Of 138 respondents 73 (52.9%) expressed a mercenary motivation having an impact on
their decision to become informants. As seen in table 9, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda
(27.3%), 49 individuals in Hezbollah (71%), 10 individuals in RAT Group 1 (62.5%), 4
individuals in RAT Group 2 (33.3%) and 4 individuals in RAT Group 4 (44.4%) reported
becoming an informant to satisfy their physiological needs. As a result, Maslow's
physiological needs category appeared to have statistically significant impact on being
an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance
beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 28.811; p=0.000).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, mercenary needs, is associated with
Maslow's physiological needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.
The statistics show a dichotomy in the effectiveness of monetary gains in
recruiting informants. For most RAT networks, especially those active in rural areas,
such as Turkish Hezbollah (71%) this is a very effective motivation; however, this
motivation is less effective with Al-Qaeda members relative to other RAT networks. This
appears to be because networks active in rural areas are living in more primitive
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conditions and are in greater need of basic physiological considerations while those
active in urban areas may satisfy these basic needs more effectively due to their
proximity to stores and other amenities.
These findings support Maslow's theory in that physiological needs are a stronger
motivation among rural terrorists than among urban terrorists, so the physiological
motivations are more dominant than higher-level motivations. This also supports
Herzberg's theory in that lack of hygiene factors within the RAT network causes
sufficient dissatisfaction for the terrorists to fulfill their needs elsewhere.

159

Table 9: Statistics for Hypothesis Four

Hypothesis 5

H5.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of fear of
incarceration.
This hypothesis was rejected be
because only seven (5.1%)) of respondents

mentioned that fear of incarceration had an impact on their decision to become a
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confidential informant. Among these seven people three of them were recruits from AlQaeda (13.6%) as seen in table 10. Based on the findings the impact of fear of
incarceration was not statistically significant on being an informant (The Pearson chisquare test of the hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: 2 (7)= 8.210;
p=0.314).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, fear of incarceration, is associated with
Maslow's security needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.
Terrorists, especially the ones in RAT networks, think that their acts are for a
divine goal. Therefore, most of them don’t fear incarceration or even death as can be
seen in suicide attacks. Accordingly, individuals recruited from RAT networks have little
fear of incarceration.
The fear of incarceration is not eliminated, as shown by the 5.1% who
acknowledged this to be a factor, overall this illustrates Maslow's exception regarding
higher level motivations overruling lower level motivations, as illustrated by martyrs or
the case of Gandhi sacrificing his basic needs (fasting) for the sake of his cause.
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Table 10: Statistics for Hypothesis Five

Hypothesis 6

H6.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of revenge
motivation.
This hypothesis
thesis was rejected because only 4
4.3% of respondents mentioned that

they were seeking revenge from terrorists by becoming confidential informant. As seen
in table 11, other than five individual
individuals in Hezbollah (7.2%) and one individual in AlAl
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Qaeda (4.5%) none of the recruits reported revenge as an incentive for becoming an
informant. The majority of recruits (95.7%) didn’t seek any sort of revenge during the
recruitment. Therefore, the revenge motivation appeared to have little impact on being
an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn’t show significance
beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 3.532; p=0.832).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, seeking revenge, is associated with
Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.
As illustrated in Table 11, revenge is a rare motivation among RAT network
members to become an informant, but when present it is a strong factor in the
decision to inform. This is more common in other networks where females are being
sexually abused. Due to the lack of females in our sample, this was not seen in this
study. The revenge motivation may also be strong in cases where family members
are victims of terrorist acts.
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Table 11: Statistics for Hypothesis Six

Hypothesis 7

H7.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their need
for repentance or desire to reform their criminal life.
Among
g all confidential informants 132 (95.7%) of them did not mention any sort

of repentance from their life in terrorism as a motivation for being an informant. This
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hypothesis was accepted even though only 4.3% of respondents mentioned that they
have a desire to reform their criminal life by becoming confidential informant. As seen
in table 11, one individual in Hezbollah (1.4%), two individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%), two
individuals in RAT Group 4 (22.2%), and one individual in RAT Group 5 (25%)
mentioned repentance as a driving force for becoming an informant. Based on the chisquare results the repentance motivation appeared to have statistically significant
impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed
significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 15.146; p=0.034).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, need for repentance, is associated with
Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.
While this motivation may be present, it does not show up as a primary
motivation often. A guilty conscience may be hidden beneath other motivations listed,
such as patriotism or altruism being overemphasized out of feelings of shame.
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Table 12: Statistics for Hypothesis Seven

Hypothesis 8

H8.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
patriotic and altruistic motives.
This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=
p=0.401>0.05).

Among all confidential informants 47 people (34.1%) mentioned that they chose to
become informants because of patriotic or altruistic motivations. On the other hand 91
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of confidential informants (65.9%) did not mention anything about effect of patriotism
or altruism on their decision to become informants. As seen in table 13, altruistic or
patriotic motivations are common and mentioned by several respondents in almost
every group. Even though these motivations were heavily mentioned, they appeared to
have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square
test of the hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: 2 (7)= 7.271;
p=0.401).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, patriotism/altruism, is not associated
with any of Maslow's needs categories. Though it may seem to fit in as part of Maslow's
self-actualization need, Maslow himself as an exception specifically mentions this to his
needs hierarchy. It does, however, fit Herzberg's hygiene factors category.
It appears that the respondents overemphasized these motivations. It is thought
that this motivation is commonly listed because the informants feel shame for having
been motivated by more base needs, and wish to appear more noble and trustworthy in
the eyes of LEI and themselves. This appears to be rationalization on the part of the
recruits to ameliorate their betrayal of their associates.
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Table 13: Statistics for Hypothesis Eight

Hypothesis 9

H9.

Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become inf
informants
ormants as a result of fear
of their terrorist associates.
This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.00<0.05).

Among 138 confidential informants 40 of them (29
(29%) mentioned that they fear from
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terrorist associates. On the other hand, the effect of this motivation was very high for
Al-Qaeda relative to other RAT networks. More than two thirds (68.2%) of Al-Qaeda
informants mentioned that they fear of being executed by their terrorist associates. As
seen in table 14, twenty respondents in Hezbollah (29.%), four respondents in RAT
Group 2 (33.3%), and one respondent in RAT Group 1 (6.3%) reported fear of terrorist
associates during recruitment. As a result, the motivation, fear from terrorist associates,
appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson
chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 28.304;
p=0.00).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, fear of their terrorist associates, is
associated with Maslow's security needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors
category.
From the review of the findings, the fear of associates is seen to be common
only in RAT networks which apply brutal punishments to those who attempt to leave.
Those who leave the network are often accused of being infidels or spies and are
persecuted. This is especially true for Al-Qaeda and Turkish Hezbollah. The high
percentage for Al-Qaeda is considered to be a result of broadcasts of video recordings
of the brutal killings of individuals who were claimed to be spies. Broadcasting video
recordings showing Al-Qaeda slaughtering individuals and chopping their heads off has
severe psychological effects on both the public and their peers, traumatizing the
viewers and intimidating them. This puts a big barrier for the LEI officer who recruits
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informants in these RAT networks too.
Table 14: Statistics for Hypothesis Nine

Hypothesis 10

H10. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of their
selective law enforcement, dislike the crime or good citizen.
This hypothesis was rejected because 90.6% of respondents did not mention
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selective law enforcement (dislike the crime or good citizen) motivation for becoming an
informant. As seen in table 15, only 7 individuals in Hezbollah (10.1%) and two
individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%) reported such an motivation as an incentive for
becoming an informant. As a result, selective law enforcement (dislike the crime or
good citizen) motivation appeared to have no statistically significant impact on
becoming an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis didn’t show
significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 3.084; p=0.877).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, selective law enforcement, is associated
with Maslow's esteem needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.
Unlike other crimes mentioned in the literature, this motivation is not common
among terrorists. This motivation is generally cited by people who find some acts to be
intolerable, usually violent crimes. As this is part of the nature of terrorism, it is thought
that this motivation may be masked under the altruism motivation. This motivation may
be explained in part by Maslow's self-esteem need, as the individuals try to protect their
self-image.
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Table 15: Statistics for Hypothesis Ten

Hypothesis 11

H11. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
jealousy within the RAT group.
This hypothesis was rejected because only two individuals (1.4%) mentioned
jealousy between peers in the RAT network as a motivati
motivation for becoming an informant.
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As seen in table 16, only one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%) and one individual in
RAT Group 2 (8.3%) reported jealousy between peers in the RAT network as a
motivation for becoming an informant. As a result, jealousy appeared to have no
statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the
hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 11.585; p=0.115).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, jealousy, is associated with Maslow's esteem
needs category and Herzberg's hygiene factors category.
This motivation is very rare among RAT networks as a reason to become an
informant. None of the respondents admitted to jealousy in their autobiographies, but
LEI determined it to be a motivation in two of the informants as listed in the F10 forms.
As this is considered to be an unworthy reaction with strong negative associations
among most people, none of the recruits will admit to it, so it is seldom recorded.
Based on Maslow's theory, this motivation can be ascribed to self-esteem. For
example, if the individual feels professional jealousy toward someone who was
promoted over him, he may use this as an opportunity to remove his perceived
competition and promote himself. This is also an outcome of lack of Herzberg's hygiene
factors.
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Table 16: Statistics for Hypothesis Eleven

Hypothesis 12

H12. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants as a result of
ideological conflict
ct in morality with the RAT group.
This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05).
Of 138 respondents
spondents 27 (19.6%) mentioned that they were facing ideological conflict
with their moral/religious norms versus those of the RAT ne
network.
twork. As seen in table 17,
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18 individuals in Al-Qaeda (81.8%) and 6 individuals in Hezbollah (8.7%), 2 individuals
in RAT Group 1 (12.5%) and only one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%) reported such
a moral conflict as an incentive for becoming an informant. As a result, the moral
conflict appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The
Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)=
65.625; p=0.000).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, ideological and moral conflict, is
associated with Maslow's self-actualization needs category and Herzberg's hygiene
factors category. However, this is another instance of Maslow's exception for zealotry.
This shows that the majority of Al-Qaeda members develop ideological
differences over time with the ideology of Al-Qaeda itself, compared to lesser
percentages in other RAT networks. Often members joining will have limited religious
knowledge and have ideals based on false premises, but when exposed to mainstream
religious writings and the Koran become disillusioned with Al-Qaeda. Others may
already have religious knowledge, but upon becoming involved will discover that the
ideals of Al-Qaeda are in conflict with their own ideals. Additionally, as found in
Hypothesis 9, fear of their associates was cited by over two thirds (68.2%) of all AlQaeda informants. Therefore their ideological objections are kept secret to avoid
execution, but when given the opportunity to escape by informing on the group, AlQaeda members are strongly motivated to do so.
Per Herzberg's theory, social interactions with peers are hygiene factors. In this
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instance the individuals are not only unable to express their true opinions, but are
actively opposed to the ideals of the o
organization.
rganization. This is a strong dissatisfier and
influences the individual to leave.
Table 17: Statistics for Hypothesis Twelve
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Hypothesis 13

H13. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
desire to be a spy. (James Bond syndrome, police wannabe).
This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.478>0.05).
Of 138 respondents, 92% did not mention any desire to be a spy as motivation for
becoming an informant. As seen in table 18, only 5 individual in Hezbollah (7.2%), two
individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%), one individual in RAT Group 1 (6.3%) and three
individuals in RAT Group 2 (25%) reported such an desire as an incentive for becoming
an informant. As a result, the desire to be a spy appeared to have no statistically
significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis
didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 6.541; p=0.478).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, James Bond/police wannabe syndrome,
is associated with Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's motivation
factors category.
This motivation was not strongly represented as a motivation for becoming an
informant. However, as noted by Blum (1972), informants tend to be thrill seekers,
devious and slippery people who often enjoy the excitement of their work. This fits
Maslow's self-esteem need as well as Herzberg's feelings of achievement (motivation
factor). Therefore this motivation is included in Maslow's esteem motivation but not in
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Herzberg's hygiene factor in the multivariate analysis in Research Question 2.
Table 18: Statistics for Hypothesis Thirteen

Hypothesis 14

H14. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to fulfill their need
for excitement and egoistical motives.
This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.049<0.05).
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Of 138 respondents 12 (8.7%) mentioned that they were looking for excitement in
becoming informants. As seen in table 19, 3 individuals in Al-Qaeda (13.6%) and 5
individuals in Hezbollah (7.2%), 1 individual in RAT Group 1 (6.3%) and two individuals
in RAT Group 2 (16.7%) reported looking for excitement as an incentive for becoming
an informant. As a result, looking for excitement appeared to have statistically
significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis
showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 14.154; p=0.049).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, egotistical/excitement, is associated
with Maslow's self-esteem needs category and Herzberg's motivation factors category.
Like the James Bond syndrome, the informants are motivated by excitement and
enjoyment of the thrill of being a secret agent, but may not be willing to admit to it.
This was not mentioned in the autobiographies, but was noted by LEI in the F10 forms.
It has been observed that this motivation develops more over time as the nervousness
and frustrations of recruitment fade and they begin to enjoy the task.
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Table 19: Statistics for Hypothesis Fourteen

Hypothesis 15

H15. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants because of a hidden
perverse motivation.
This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.912>0.05).
Of 138 respondents, only three individuals (2.2%) did appear to have a hidden perverse
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motivation (double agent) for becoming an informant. As seen in table 20, only one
individual in Hezbollah (1.4%), one individual in Al-Qaeda (4.5%) and one individual in
RAT Group 1 (6.3%) approached LEI with an apparent hidden perverse motivation for
becoming an informant. As a result, the perverse motivation appeared to have no
statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the
hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 2.691; p=0.912).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, egotistical/excitement, is associated
with Maslow's esteem needs category and Herzberg's motivation factors category. This
motivation was not mentioned by any respondent in the autobiographies, as expected.
However, LEI officers identified this motivation in the F10 forms in three cases. This
was determined by crosschecking information sources such as other confidential
informants.
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Table 20: Statistics for Hypothesis Fifteen

Hypothesis 16

H16. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the sta
state
te of frustration to some extent
during the recruitment.
This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05).
Of 138 respondents 12 (8.7%) expressed the state of frustration during recruitment.
recruitme
As
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seen in table 21, 8 individuals in Al-Qaeda (36.4%), three individuals in Hezbollah
(4.3%) and one individual in RAT Group 2 (8.3%) expressed the state of frustration
during recruitment. As a result, the state of frustration appeared to have statistically
significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis
showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 26.190; p=0.000).
The motivation tested in this hypothesis, frustration, does not fit any of Maslow’s
needs categories, or Herzberg's categories, but is included in the multivariate analysis
as a separate variable.
The frustration is seldom mentioned by the respondents, but is observed by the
LEI officers during recruitment. When the data was reviewed it was noted that two
thirds of the frustrated individuals were members of Al-Qaeda. This is considered to be
due to the more brutal nature of Al-Qaeda compared to the other RAT networks as
detailed in Hypothesis 9.
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Table 21: Statistics for Hypothesis Sixteen

Hypothesis 17

H17. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being labeled as snitch as a
barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.845>0.05).
Of 138 respondents, 36 individuals
ndividuals (26.1%) feared being labeled as a snitch while
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becoming informants. As seen in table 22, 17 individuals in Hezbollah (24.6%), four
individuals in Al-Qaeda (18.2%), four individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%), four individuals
in RAT Group 2 (33.3%), two individuals in RAT Group 3 (40%), three individuals in
RAT Group 4 (33.3%) and two individuals in RAT Group 5 (50%) reported fearing being
labeled as a snitch. As a result, feared being labeled as a snitch appeared to have no
statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the
hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 3.411; p=0.845).
This variable comes from the researcher's own field experience. The variable
tested in this hypothesis, the fear of being labeled as a snitch, is not included as a
motivation factor; rather it is tested as a barrier for the recruit to overcome during the
decision to become an informant. Therefore it is not categorized in either Maslow's or
Herzberg's theories during the multivariate analysis of motivation categories.
Although it is statistically not significant, the fear of being labeled as a snitch is
mentioned by 36 recruits in their handwritten autobiographies. It is a not uncommon
fear among recruits, so LEI must be aware of this factor and accordingly be reassuring
to the recruit.
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Table 22: Statistics for Hypothesis Seventeen

Hypothesis 18

H18. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed the fear of being discarded by police as
a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.240>0.05).
Of 138 respondents, 21 individuals (15.2%) expressed the fear of being discarded by
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police at the beginning of recruitment. As seen in table 23, 11 individuals in Hezbollah
(15.9%), two individuals in Al-Qaeda (9.1%), four individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%),
two individuals in RAT Group 2 (16.7%), one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%), and
one individual in RAT Group 6 (100%) expressed the fear of being discarded by police
at the beginning of recruitment. As a result, the fear of being discarded by police
appeared to have no statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson
chi-square test of the hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)=
9.179; p=0.240).
This variable comes from the researcher's own field experience. The variable
tested in this hypothesis, the fear of being discarded by police, is not included as a
motivation factor; rather it is tested as a barrier for the recruit to overcome during the
decision to become an informant. Therefore it is not categorized in either Maslow's or
Herzberg's theories during the multivariate analysis of motivation categories.
Although it is statistically not significant, the fear of being discarded by the police
is mentioned by 21 recruits in their handwritten autobiographies. It is a not uncommon
fear among recruits due to depictions in the media, so LEI must be aware of this factor
and accordingly be reassuring to the recruit that, unlike a criminal informant, he is a
confidential informant and will not be called upon to testify or be revealed.
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Table 23: Statistics for Hypothesis Eighteen

Hypothesis 19

H19. Most recruits from RAT groups expressed an ideological opposition to the state
and system as a barrier to cope with while choosing to become informants.
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This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05).
Of 138 respondents 7 (5.1%) expressed an ideological opposition to the state and
system. As seen in table 24, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda (27.3%) and only one individual
in Hezbollah (1.4%) expressed an ideological opposition to the state and system. As a
result, the ideological opposition to the state and system as a barrier to trusting the
police during recruitment appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an
informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond
.05 level: χ2 (7)= 26.910; p=0.000).
This variable comes from the researcher's own field experience. The variable
tested in this hypothesis, opposition to the state system and lack of trust in the police,
is not included as a motivation factor; rather it is tested as a barrier for the recruit to
overcome during the decision to become an informant. Therefore it is not categorized in
either Maslow's or Herzberg's theories during the multivariate analysis of motivation
categories.
It is statistically significant that opposition to the state system and lack of trust in
the police is mentioned by seven recruits in their handwritten autobiographies, six of
whom were Al-Qaeda members. Al-Qaeda does not recognize the legitimacy of the
state and the six Al-Qaeda recruits are still actively opposed to it despite their
cooperation. That they mention it in their handwritten autobiographies should be
considered a warning that they are cooperating due to a greater opposition to Al-Qaeda
than to the state, yet other factors are sufficiently strong to motivate them to continue
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to cooperate, including trust of individual LE
LEI officers.

Table 24: Statistics for Hypothesis Nineteen
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Descriptive Statistics for Research Question Two

Descriptive statistical analyses were performed on all cases in the data set to
determine population characteristics for the multivariate analyses (Table 25). In our
data set there were 138 subjects.
For the dependent variable Binary Al-Qaeda, 22 were Al-Qaeda members and
116 of them were members of other RAT networks. For the dependent variable Binary
Hezbollah, 69 were Hezbollah members and 69 of them were members of other RAT
networks.
In terms of Maslow's needs, 73 (52.9%) mentioned the need for physiological;
43 (31.2%) mentioned the need for security; 33 (23.9%) mentioned the need for
social; 41 (29.7%) mentioned the need for esteem.
In terms of Herzberg's theory, 134 mentioned the lack of hygiene factors in RAT
networks.
For other motivations, 47 respondents (34.1%) reported becoming informants
due to patriotic/altruistic motivations; 27 (19.6%) mentioned having an ideological
conflict in morality within the RAT network; 12 (8.7%) were in a state of frustration
during recruitment; 42 (30.4%) were single, 96 (69.6%) were married; 88 (63.8%)
were from low-income backgrounds, 50 (36.2%) were from medium or high income
backgrounds. Of all respondents, 110 (79.7%) had prior military experience; the
minimum age was 18, the maximum age was 44, and the average was 30.
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Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for Research Question Two

192

Bivariate Statistics for Research Question Two

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 outlining the methodology, Hypotheses H20
through H24 are bivariate hypotheses that test the individual effect of categories based
on assumptions of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory. and Hypothesis H25 tests the
combined effect of Herzberg’s hygiene category needs.
Thus, they were tested by Chi-square. In order to test them, Crosstab function of
the SPSS is used and contingency tables are formed for each hypothesis. Statistical
significance of the associations for the nominal variables are tested by Pearson’s Chisquare. Results having a p-value less than .05 are considered statistically significant at
the .05 alpha level.

Hypothesis 20

H20. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant physiological needs.
This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05).
Of 138 respondents 73 (52.9%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's physiological
needs category. As seen in table 25, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda (27.3%), 49 individuals in
Hezbollah (71%), 10 individuals in RAT Group 1 (62.5%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 2
(33.3%) and 4 individuals in RAT Group 4 (44.4%) reported becoming an informant to
satisfy their physiological needs. As a result, Maslow's physiological needs category
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appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson
chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 28.811;
p=0.000).
The variable tested in this hypothesis, physiological needs, is Maslow's first
category in the hierarchy of needs theory.
The findings support the theory that Maslow's physiological needs category has a
statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant within
the RAT networks. This is particularly noted in rural RAT networks (Hezbollah) rather
than urban ones (Al-Qaeda).
The statistics show a dichotomy in the effectiveness of physiological needs in
recruiting informants. For most RAT networks in poorer areas, such as Turkish
Hezbollah (71%), this is a very effective motivation as mentioned by Maslow in his
discussion about childhood experiences influencing adult needs; i.e., people who have
spent most of their lives in poverty are more strongly motivated by lower level needs
than those raised in affluent surroundings. However, this motivation is less effective
with Al-Qaeda members relative to other RAT networks, as they are active more in
urban areas and may satisfy these basic needs more effectively due to their proximity
to stores and other amenities.
These findings support Maslow's theory in that physiological needs are a stronger
motivation among RAT networks, especially ones active in rural areas than among
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urban networks, so the physiological motivations are more dominant than higher-level
motivations.
Table 26:: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty

Hypothesis 21

H21. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant safety (security) needs.
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This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.001<0.05).
Of 138 respondents 43 (31.2%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's security
needs category. As seen in table 26, 15 individuals in Al-Qaeda (68.2%), 22 individuals
in Hezbollah (31.9%), one individual in RAT Group 1 (6.3%), 4 individuals in RAT Group
2 (33.3%) and one individual in RAT Group 3 (20%) reported becoming an informant to
satisfy their security needs. As a result, Maslow's security needs category appeared to
have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test
of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 25.356; p=0.001).
The variable tested in this hypothesis, safety (security) needs, is Maslow's
second category in the hierarchy of needs theory.
The findings support the theory that Maslow's security needs category has a
statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant within
the RAT networks.
According to Maslow, when security needs are threatened all other needs
become negligible. Fear of being killed in operations, fear of their associates, fear of
being caught and imprisoned- all of these threats and more are very real and imminent
dangers for RAT group members. Accordingly 43 of 138 respondents mentioned that
security needs were predominant in their decision to become informants. From the
review of the findings, the need for security is strongly mentioned by Al-Qaeda
members (68.2%) and Turkish Hezbollah (31.2%), who apply brutal punishments to
those who attempt to leave. Those who leave the network are often accused of being
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infidels or spies and are persecuted.
Table 27:: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty
Twenty-One

Hypothesis 22

H22. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant social (affiliation) needs.
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This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.793>0.05).
Of 138 respondents 33 (23.9%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's social needs
category. As seen in table 27, 4 individuals in Al-Qaeda (18.2%), 16 individuals in
Hezbollah (23.2%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%), 2 individuals in RAT Group 2
(16.7%), 2 individuals in RAT Group 3 (40%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 4 (44.4%)
and one individual in RAT Group 5 (25%) reported becoming an informant to satisfy
their social needs. As a result, Maslow's social needs category appeared to have
statistically no significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of
the hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 3.887; p=0.793).
The variable tested in this hypothesis, social (affiliation) needs, is Maslow's
second category in the hierarchy of needs theory.
The findings support the theory that Maslow's social needs category does not
have a statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant
within the RAT networks.
Because of the nature of terrorism, terrorists are always under the surveillance of
their peers and all of their contacts are monitored and reported to their superiors. Any
suspicious contacts or activities may bring threats to their security; therefore their social
needs take a lesser role relative to physiological and security needs within the RAT
network.
These needs also cannot be met outside of the network, as any potential
friendships with police or other government officials will bring immediate suspicion. The
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motivation factors collapsed to form the social needs variable were repentance,
indebtedness
ss or gratitude toward law enforcement and friendship with police officers.
These factors were the only ones available to form this variable; however in real life
there are other factors involved in social needs. Therefore other influences were not
taken into
nto account. The findings only represent the limited combined effect of the
aforementioned social needs.
Table 28:: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty
Twenty-Two
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Hypothesis 23

H23. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their selfesteem and esteem from others predominant needs.
This hypothesis was rejected because of its significance level (p=0.151>0.05).
Of 138 respondents 41 (29.7%) expressed a need that fits within Maslow's esteem
needs category. As seen in table 28, 6 individuals in Al-Qaeda (27.3%), 21 individuals in
Hezbollah (30.4%), 4 individuals in RAT Group 1 (25%), 7 individuals in RAT Group 2
(58.3%), one individual in RAT Group 3 (20%), one individual in RAT Group 4 (11.1%)
and one individual in RAT Group 6 (100%) reported becoming an informant to satisfy
their esteem needs. As a result, Maslow's esteem needs category appeared to have
statistically no significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of
the hypothesis didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 10.731; p=0.151).
The variable tested in this hypothesis, self-esteem (and esteem from others)
needs, is Maslow's fourth category in the hierarchy of needs theory.
The findings support the theory that Maslow's esteem needs category does not
have a statistically significant effect on the individual's decision to become an informant
within the RAT networks.
The factors collapsed to form this variable were perverse (hidden) motive,
excitement, revenge, jealousy, selective law enforcement, and James Bond/police
wannabe. Of 138 respondents, 41 mentioned a need for self esteem or esteem from
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others. Although it was statistically insignificant, almost one third of respondents
mentioned a need for esteem. Therefor
Therefore
e it is interpreted in the present study that
esteem factors also have some effect on the individual's decision to become an
informant.

Table 29:: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty
Twenty-Three
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Hypothesis 24

H24. Most recruits from RAT groups choose to become informants to satisfy their
predominant Self-Actualization needs.
This hypothesis was not tested directly because the motivation factors fitting this
category of Maslow's theory (patriotic/altruistic motivations and ideological conflict in
morality) are contradictory and considered exceptions in Maslow's own words.
Therefore they are not categorized together under self-actualization and are tested
separately under Hypotheses H8 and H12. Patriotic/altruistic motivations (H8) were
heavily mentioned by confidential informants, but appeared to have no statistically
significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis
H8 didn’t show significance beyond .05 level: 2 (7)= 7.271; p=0.401). On the other
hand, the ideological and moral conflict motivation (H12) appeared to have statistically
significant impact on being an informant (The Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis
H12 showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)= 65.625; p=0.000).
The variable tested in this hypothesis, self-actualization needs, is Maslow's fifth
category in the hierarchy of needs theory.

202

Hypothesis for Research Question 2a

H25. Lack of Herzberg’s hygiene factors in terrorism settings leads most recruits from
RAT groups to make the decision to leave terrorism to satisfy their predominant
needs by becoming informants.
In order to test Herzberg’s theory a new variable, hygiene, was formed by
collapsing all relevant variables within the present study.

Before conducting any

multivariate analysis when descriptive statistics were run, in crosstab tables it became
apparent that 134 (97.1%) of all 138 confidential informants were mentioning the lack
of hygiene factors within terrorism setting. 97 percent of respondents strongly agreed
with hygiene item. This lends support to the idea that there is broad consensus on the
absence of hygiene factors within terrorism settings.
This hypothesis was accepted because of its significance level (p=0.000<0.05).
Of 138 respondents 134 (97.1%) mentioned deficiencies in RAT networks which fit
Herzberg's hygiene category and that these deficiencies had a significant effect on their
decision to leave terrorism by becoming informants. As seen in table xx, only two
individuals in Hezbollah (2.9%), one individual in RAT Group 2 (8.3%) and one
individual in RAT Group 6 (100%) did not mention lack of hygiene factors in the RAT
networks as their reason for leaving terrorism. As a result, Herzberg's hygiene factors
category appeared to have statistically significant impact on being an informant (The
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Pearson chi-square test of the hypothesis showed significance beyond .05 level: χ2 (7)=
36.431; p=0.000).
Because Hygiene item has very limited variance it is excluded from further
analysis. It is very close to become a constant.
As noted in the previous hypotheses, most of the motivations listed fit Herzberg's
hygiene factor category. Out of 138 respondents, 134 mentioned a lack of at least one
hygiene factor in the RAT network setting, leading them to leave terrorism. As Herzberg
stated, a lack of hygiene factors will cause dissatisfaction within an organization,
leading to high amounts of turnover. Similarly, lacks of hygiene factors have an effect
on the recruit's decision to leave terrorism.
Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory states that factors not inherent to the work
itself, extrinsic factors such as pay, security and environment, need to be addressed
and satisfied to prevent turnover. If these factors are not satisfied, the effect will be
dissatisfaction and frustration, which essentially pushes the person out of that
environment. In our findings almost all of the respondents mentioned lack of hygiene
factors in the terrorism setting during the recruitment process. Therefore, we conclude
that lack of hygiene factors had a statistically significant effect on their decision to leave
terrorism.
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Table 30: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty
Twenty-Five

Multivariate Statistics for Research Question Two

I used multivariate binomial stepwise logistic regression model to determine the
effect of motivational and demographic factors on the likelihood of becoming Turkish
Hezbollah or Al-Qaeda
Qaeda informant relative to becoming other informants.
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Hypothesis for the Research Question 2-b

H26. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow’s need categories) and
demographic differences in the probability of becoming a Turkish-Hezbollah
informant relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.
Multivariate binomial stepwise logistic regression model is used to determine the
effect of motivational and demographic factors on the likelihood of becoming Turkish
Hezbollah informant relative to becoming other RAT informants.
In the first step I entered physiological, security, social and esteem variables
based on Maslow’s theory. Instead of Maslow's self-actualization category, I included
patriotic/altruistic motivation, and ideological conflict in morality motivation in the
analysis together as separate variables. In the next step I included demographic factors
in the same model. When I used becoming a Hezbollah informant as a DV the only
significant variables were physiological needs and ideological conflict in morality ones in
the first step controlling for the other motivational factors (Appendix B). Specifically
having physiological needs "yes" corresponded with more likelihood of becoming
Turkish Hezbollah informant. Ideological conflict in morality "yes" has a negative
relationship with the DV in that ideological conflict in morality "yes" corresponded with
less likelihood of becoming a Turkish Hezbollah informant.
In the next step, after adding demographic variables in the model, both
motivational variables remained significant and in the same directional relationship
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(Appendix B).. In other words
words, controlling for demographic
graphic variables these two
motivational factors remained significant. The model in the second step improved by
increasing explained variance approximately 8% (from 24 to 32).
Controlling for motivational factors marital status and age were significant
demographic
ographic factors in the model.
A unit increase in age corresponded w
with
ith less likelihood of becoming a Turkish
Hezbollah informant. Married people were more likely to become a Turkish Hezbollah
informant.
The model was significant at all steps (the signific
significance
ance of chi square is less than
.05).
Table 31:: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty
Twenty-Six

Based on the above-mentioned
mentioned findings of multivariate analysis, it became clear
that physiological motivation factors have a positive effect on the likelihood of becoming
becomin
a Hezbollah informant relative to the other RAT networks. In other words, offering
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physiological comforts to potential recruits within Turkish Hezbollah will increase the
probability of becoming an informant. On the other hand, mentioning ideological
conflicts in religious norms has a negative effect on the likelihood of becoming a Turkish
Hezbollah informant relative to the other RAT networks. In other words, mentioning
ideological conflicts in religious norms to potential recruits within Turkish Hezbollah will
decrease the probability of becoming an informant. Moreover, age has a negative effect
on the likelihood of becoming a Turkish Hezbollah informant- that is, older individuals
are less likely to become informants. On the other hand, marriage has a positive effect
on the likelihood becoming a Hezbollah informant- that is, married people are more
likely to become informants.
Though it is not statistically significant, offering security increases the likelihood
of the potential recruit becoming an informant in Hezbollah. On the other hand, offering
esteem, social interaction or mentioning patriotic or altruistic motivations or being in a
state of frustration will decrease the likelihood of the potential recruits becoming a
Hezbollah informant. While being in a better socioeconomic status increases the
probability of recruitment, having previous military experience decreases the likelihood.

Hypothesis for the Research Question 2-c

H27. There are significant motivational differences (Maslow’s need categories) and
demographic differences in the probability of becoming an Al-Qaeda informant
relative to the probability of becoming other RAT informants.
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I used multivariate binomial stepwise logistic regression model to determine the
effect of motivational and demographic factors on the likelihood of becoming Al-Qaeda
informant relative to becoming other informants.
In the first step I entered physiological, security, social and esteem variables
based on Maslow’s theory. In the next step I included demographic factors in the same
model. When I used becoming Al-Qaeda informant as a DV the only significant variables
were frustration and ideological conflict in morality ones in the first step controlling for
the other motivational factors (Appendix C). Specifically having ideological conflict in
morality “yes” corresponded with more likelihood of becoming Al-Qaeda informant.
Frustration “yes” has a positive relationship with the DV in that frustration “yes”
corresponded with more likelihood of becoming Al-Qaeda informant. In the next step,
after adding demographic variables in the model, both motivational variables remained
significant and in the same directional relationship (Appendix C). In other words
controlling for demographic variables these two motivational factors remained
significant. The model in the second step improved by increasing explained variance
approximately 8% (from 68 to 76).
Controlling for motivational factors age was a significant demographic factor in
the model. A unit increase in age corresponded with more likelihood of becoming an AlQaeda informant controlling for other motivational and demographic factors.
The model was significant at all steps (the significance of chi square is less than
.05). The model significantly developed at each step.
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Table 32: Statistics for Hypothesis Twenty
Twenty-Seven

Based on the above-mentioned
mentioned findings of multivariate analysis, it became clear
that ideological conflict in morality motivation and frustration factors have a positive
effect on the likelihood of becoming an Al
Al-Qaeda
Qaeda informant relative to the other RAT
networks. In other words, mentioning ideological conflicts in religious norms to potential
recruits within an Al-Qaeda
Qaeda will increase the probability of becoming an informant.
Similarly, being in a state of frustration for the potential recruit will increase the
probability of becoming an informant. Moreover, age has a positive effect on the
likelihood of becoming an Al-Qaeda
Qaeda informant
informant- that is, older individuals are more likely
to become informants.
Other factors didn't have a statistically significant effect on the decision to
become an Al-Qaeda
Qaeda informant relative to other RAT networks. Although they were not
statistically significant, offering physiological comforts, esteem and social needs or
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mentioning patriotic or altruistic factors decreased the likelihood of the recruit becoming
an Al-Qaeda informant. On the other hand, offering security increases the likelihood of
the potential recruit becoming an informant in Al-Qaeda. Moreover, having a better
socioeconomic status and having previous military experience increases the probability
of the potential recruit becoming an informant while being married decreases the
likelihood.
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSIONS

Introduction

This study had three purposes initially: to find which motivation factors were
effective for persuading potential informers to cooperate with LEI; to find a theoretical
explanation for the phenomenon of turning terrorists into informants; and to create
group level models to predict the probability of individuals becoming informants in
various RAT groups. These three goals have been accomplished.
In order to accomplish the first goal, this study began with a comprehensive
literature review of various studies regarding informants in various fields and the
identified motivational factors were noted and listed.
The first goal, finding motivational factors, was accomplished by testing
hypotheses derived from the literature and the researcher's own field experience. The
findings of these hypotheses showed that some motivation factors were more
significant than others as expected, and were applicable to the study of terrorism.
The second goal was accomplished by a comprehensive literature review of
theories that might have been applicable. No theories were found which had already
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been applied to informants in terrorism; that is why, two theories were selected which
seemed to best fit the study. Hypotheses derived from the main assumptions of
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theories were tested to
determine to what extent they explained the phenomena.
The third goal was accomplished by conducting multivariate analyses of the data
obtained on RAT networks and by testing the hypotheses derived from two previous
goals against the analyses to form group level models for Turkish Hezbollah and AlQaeda.

Overview of Findings

Motivational factors

From the bivariate test of motivational factors, following results were significant:
Mercenary needs (H4), repentance or desire to reform their criminal life (H7), fear of
their terrorist associates (H9), ideological conflict in morality with the RAT group (H12)
and excitement (H14). However, as mentioned earlier in chapter three, this study is a
population study. It does not utilize any sampling procedure; instead, it utilizes the
entire population of confidential informants within RAT networks in Turkey (n=N=138).
Therefore, the significance levels in statistical tests become irrelevant, and the results of
the present study directly reflect the social reality of the phenomena (Demirci, 2008;
Nardi, 2006; Yang, 2010).

Thus, following table showing the frequency of each
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motivation mentioned
ed by individuals as having an effect on their decision to become a
confidential informant during the recruitment is considered a good representation of
findings.
Table 33: Frequencies of Motivation Factors

In addition to motivation
motivational factors, confidential informants also mentioned some
negative factors that had an a
affect on their decision during the recruitment. These were
also tested in the present study and summarized in table 34. Among 138 recruits 12
were reported as being in a state of frustratio
frustration. 36 recruits (26.1%) feared
fear
of being
labeled as snitch, 21 (15.2%) feared of being discarded by police, and 7 (5.1%)
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mentioned their opposition to state or system as barriers that they had to cope with in
their decision to be an informant.
Table 34 Frequencies
cies of Negative Factors

Findings about theories

Hypotheses H20 through H23 tested need categories formed based on Maslow’s
main assumptions. As seen in Table 35, among all respondents 73 individuals (52.9%)
had physiological needs, 43 (31.2%) had safet
safety
y (security) needs, 33 (23.9%) had social
(affiliation) needs, 41 (29.7%
%) had self-esteem
esteem or esteem needs during the recruitment.
On the other hand, self-actualization
actualization needs could not be tested in the present study
since none of the motivations were directly fitting in this category of Maslow’s theory.
Hypothesis H25 tested the effect of Herzberg’s hygiene category. 134 (97.1%) of 138
recruits complained about lack of one or more of Herzberg’s hygiene factors in RAT
setting.
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Table 35 Frequencies of Motivati
Motivation Categories

Theoretical remarks

The present study has empirical support for Maslow’s theory that individuals
acting in one of the needs hierarchy categories were choosing to be informants to
satisfy their predominant needs
needs. It also has empirical support for Alderfer’s theory that
most of the individuals were choosing to become informants because of multiple needs
in different categories at a given time. Unlike Maslow, Alderfer assumes that individuals
make decisions to satisfy their needs in different categories simultaneously. We also
found empirical support for Herzberg’s the
theory
ory that most of the individuals report needs
that made them to choose to become informants in the hygiene category of Herzberg’s
theory. 97 percent of recruits complained about lack of Herzberg’s hygiene factors in
RAT setting. This means that some terror
terrorists leave the terrorism environment because
of lack of hygiene factors in the terrorism setting.
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There is no single theory at this point that truly explains the motivations for
terrorists to become informants. Prior to this study, no one has attempted to apply
motivational theories to informants within terrorist groups. That said, Herzberg's theory
fits surprisingly well when applied to terrorist networks. Or is it really a surprise? The
living conditions are harsh, the rewards are few and not large, the people involved are
under constant threat of exposure by law enforcement as terrorists or by their own
associates as being potential risks to the network, isolation is constant, boredom is
rampant, and often the only thing preventing them from deserting is the threat of
reprisals from their associates. In such a dire environment, the prospect of leaving the
network must be almost irresistible at times.
At the same time, Maslow's and Alderfer's theories are well represented in the
motivations of informants. When offered the things that they lack in RAT groups such
as security, good food, decent shelter, freedom from persecution and death threats, the
option of becoming an informant becomes a tempting one. The RAT network may be
dismantled and made powerless and the informant may go free or face minimal
punishment, simultaneously alleviating fears of associates and fears of incarceration
while providing monetary assistance and increasing their sense of security.
When viewed not as competing theories but in conjunction with each other, the
motivational theories help to explain the behaviors of confidential informants and give
insight into the people who should be approached.
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Al-Qaeda vs. Turkish Hezbollah

From the statistics some general trends are very suggestive. A rough picture
begins to emerge from the trends for informants in Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah in
particular, from which one can construct a very general profile of the sort of person
most likely to become an informant for each of these groups. Unfortunately there were
not enough data points to form similar profiles for other RAT groups, and the profiles
for Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah are contradictory.
For Al-Qaeda, the more likely candidates will be found in urban areas, older men
with a higher socioeconomic status than most, unmarried, and showing signs of
frustration. He will likely be proud and idealistic, so approaching him with offers of
material aid (money, food and the like) or security assistance will be rebuffed and will
offend him. He is also not seeking friendship or admiration, and will respond negatively
to attempts to stroke his esteem. What he will most likely respond positively to are
discussions of ideology. He will be troubled by the differences he sees between AlQaeda's ideology and mainstream Islam ideology and want to discuss it in detail.
Having a copy of mainstream interpretations of the Qur'an at hand to look up particular
verses to show the entire verse in context may be helpful in persuading him to help LEI.
Hezbollah, however, is almost a polar opposite. Younger males are better
candidates, especially ones who are married. If they come from a higher socioeconomic
childhood background, they may feel frustrated with living in poor conditions in rural
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areas and will respond positively to offers of material or financial aid. If they have
former military training, either provided by the government or by terrorist networks,
they are less likely to be persuaded. They are also not particularly motivated to debate
ideology and in fact may respond negatively to such discussions.

Policy implications

Educate the public. Much of the power that the terrorist leaders have comes
from quoting portions of the Qur'an out of context to put their own interpretations on it.
If the quotes are read in their original context, the meanings become clear and the
radical interpretations are shown to be distortions.
Therefore theological scholars should be recruited to write an informative booklet
on the true meanings of the portions of the Qur'an being quoted, and the booklets
distributed throughout areas known to be sympathetic to the RAT groups. This will
decrease the number of people willing to join the RATs and confuse the minds of RAT
militants.

Remove violent videos from RAT groups from the internet as soon as they are
discovered. Videos showing beheadings, mutilations and other atrocities committed on
people who have been condemned as infidels by RAT groups are traumatizing to watch.
The viewers are intimidated by the cruel brutality shown and develop a strong fear of
the RAT group responsible, which gives the RAT group that much more power over its
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members and the public, and spreads their fame. The fear of associates in Al-Qaeda
significantly dissuades repentant RAT members from leaving terrorism as seen in the
findings of hypothesis H27. Treating these videos in the same way that child
pornography is treated will reduce the influence of the RAT groups.

Offer reduction of sentence for providing useful information. At the present time,
the Turkish justice system makes no allowances for reduction of sentence. Plea
bargaining is not used, nor is reducing jail time for informants. Therefore, a useful
source of information is being neglected. Offering reductions in punishment to
informants as is done in other countries such as the United States may yield a valuable
new source of confidential informants.

Invest more on HUMINT. As mentioned earlier, human intelligence has been
increasingly replaced by technical intelligence (TECHINT). Since the demise of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, human intelligence (HUMINT) has been
increasingly replaced with other means of intelligence collection. As illustrated by the
capture of Osama bin Laden, the RAT groups have taken to using very low-tech
methods of communication involving scraps of paper and elaborate delivery systems
that cannot be tapped electronically. When the right person is recruited the outcome
becomes incomparable. There are times a good confidential informant can produce
more valuable intelligence than any other intelligence asset.

Increase HUMINT budgets. Budget constraints should be reconsidered about
human intelligence. Budget should be balanced between TECHINT and HUMINT.
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Considering annual costs of aircrafts or reconnaissance satellites, the amount spent for
confidential informants becomes negligible.

Allow more researchers to study and analyze the available information. Because
of the secret nature of the phenomenon and confidentiality the data to conduct such
analyses is highly classified, so very few people have access to the data. The result is
that there is very little information available to researchers on current human
intelligence, so empirical studies such as this study have not been done. This can be
accomplished by giving clearances to certain researchers for specific purposes and
allowing them to study the phenomena empirically, as was the case for the present
study. Otherwise it would be like separating engineers from the discoveries of
physicists.

Be aware of potential needs of informants. Understanding the enemy is crucial in
the global fight against terrorism. This can be done by analyzing the available data
about the target group and figuring out the patterns among the group members.

Train intelligence officers more about the target group. Knowing the enemy and
training the agents accordingly is crucial in fighting terrorism. Knowing strengths and
weaknesses, internal norms, their mindsets, contradictions among their ideals, norms or
goals, conflicts in their minds, factors that may make them leave terrorism can help the
LEI to be more successful in recruiting informants within terrorist networks. Based on
our findings we can conclude that new training programs should be established by LEI
agencies for the recruiters to train and learn about the needs and common factors that
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are effective on a given terrorist group. This will increase their success in recruiting new
informants.

Conduct more PSYOPS against RATS. Hunting the terrorists is one aspect of
fighting terrorism and should continue until they no longer become a threat. Making the
terrorists leave the terrorism by conducting Psychological operations (PSYOPS) is
another aspect. For example, based on findings of the present study, conflict in moral
and religious norms of the individual and the ones alleged, enforced or dictated in the
Al-Qaeda RAT network is extremely common among confidential informants who were
recruited within Al-Qaeda and has a significant effect on their decision to leave
terrorism. Knowing this and attacking them from this weakness would accelerate the
dissociation or dissolution of Al-Qaeda members and the network globally. Every four
out of five Al-Qaeda informant (81.8%) mentioned that conflict between the
mainstream religious and moral norms of Islam and the ones that they were exposed in
Al-Qaeda was the main factor in their decision to leave terrorism. Being a confidential
informant is just one of the options in leaving terrorism. If the real interpretation of
sacred texts or religious norms are promoted and spread more in public, it would not
only be harder for the RAT networks to convince people with their misinterpretations
but also would increase the questioning of these abused norms in the minds of militants
among all RAT networks. (Spread of Mainstream interpretations of sacred texts in any
religion which are intentionally misinterpreted and abused by RAT groups to meet their
perverse political goals can produce more benefits in the long run.) Informing the public
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of how they are abused and misinterpreted and what their real meanings are by
globally or nationally accepted and well-known mainstream scholars would be an
effective strategy in fighting RAT networks.

Recommendations for future studies

The limited scope of this study has resulted in data trends among the two largest
groups in the sample, but cannot make further predictions. A more extensive study of
existing records of confidential informants would yield more information on these and
other groups, enabling LEI to construct better profiles of people likely to cooperate and
become informants.
This study is limited to RAT networks active in Turkey. To generalize the findings
it should be replicated among different cultures that these RATs are active with the
available data of different intelligence departments.
The findings of the present study show the law enforcement perspective of the
phenomena. In order to see a broader picture of the phenomena more studies need to
be conducted in national security and military intelligence arenas respectively.
Moreover, the present study was limited with secondary data available at the
time it was collected. In order to understand underlying factors that had an effect on
the recruit’s decision to cooperate with law enforcement a more extensive qualitative
study needs to be conducted.
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Another aspect of recruitment is the LEI officer who recruits informants.
Recruitment usually occurs between two individuals: the recruit and the recruiter.
Understanding the needs, perspectives, and constraints of the recruiters in the field
would enrich and shed light on a different aspect of the issue. That aspect of the
phenomena needs to be studied intensively too.
Finally, handling confidential informants becomes crucially important right after
the recruitment. This phase of the phenomena needs to be studied extensively to
improve the success of HUMINT.

Conclusion

Terrorists are human beings with needs, goals and emotions that drive their
actions; therefore finding their needs can be used to direct their behaviors toward the
desired goals of LEI of recruiting informants to help dismantle RAT networks. A
comprehensive study of records collected about confidential informants may be used to
form group level models for the behaviors of various RAT networks to assist LEI in
recruiting informants by providing profiles of likely recruits. For example, as illustrated
for Al-Qaeda, a successful recruit will have the following characteristics: male, older,
unmarried, from a moderately wealthy background, with frustrations regarding
ideology. A successful approach to this person will involve the discussions of ideology
but will avoid offers of material assistance or additional protection or friendship and
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admiration. However, it must be noted that this profile does not fit recruits from Turkish
Hezbollah, as their perceived needs are different from those of Al-Qaeda.
This study demonstrates that such group level modeling and profiling are
possible and will be helpful in the future to law enforcement, and should be undertaken
immediately by all nations to dismantle RAT networks as they are found.
This study was a quantitative study and was limited to the available secondary
data that was not primarily collected for research purposes. Therefore, these findings
shed light only on a portion of the phenomena in Turkey. More detailed qualitative
researches are needed to understand and perform in-depth analyses of the
phenomena, guided by the findings of this present study. As these organizations are not
limited to individual nations, further studies in other nations need to be done.
The findings of this study only represent law enforcement intelligence
informants; it needs to be replicated in the national security and military intelligence
fields and in other countries and cultures to provide a more comprehensive view.
Furthermore, as this study has demonstrated that different RAT networks produce
potential recruits with vastly different needs, analyses should be performed on each
RAT network to determine the characteristics of each group.
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